Much like NATO’s Vilnius summit last year, this year’s gathering in Washington concentrated on the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, with the upcoming U.S. presidential election casting a long shadow, NATO did not make significant advancements on these fronts but has instead opted for a measured and circumspect approach.
Ukraine’s accession to NATO was not the focal point. More than 20 countries have already signed security assurance agreements with Ukraine, essentially establishing an alternative arrangement to NATO membership. The summit’s primary concern seemed to be stabilizing aid to Ukraine to shield it from the uncertainties of domestic politics in the U.S. and Europe.
In addition to agreeing to provide F-16 fighter jets and committing to 40 billion euros in aid next year, NATO undertook the following measures:
1. Missile deployment against Russia’s nuclear deterrence:
• On the defensive front, the U.S., Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Ukraine issued a joint statement on enhancing Ukraine’s air defense.
• On the offensive front, the U.S. and Germany announced plans to deploy long-range missiles in Germany starting in 2026. France, Germany, Italy, and Poland signed a letter of intent to develop long-range missiles. Attendees also discussed whether Ukraine could use the provided missiles to strike targets within Russian territory.
2. Institutionalizing aid to Ukraine:
• NATO aims to shift the decision-making focus slightly from the U.S. to Europe. The summit statement emphasized “strengthening our NATO command and control and assigning key leadership roles to nationally provided headquarters.”
• Countries agreed to establish NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (based in Germany) and the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Center (based in Poland). Additionally, the secretary-general would appoint a senior NATO representative in Ukraine.
3. Encouraging Europe to take on greater defense responsibilities:
• The summit statement underscored the need to ensure that increased national defense expenditures are “commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order.”
• Countries agreed on the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge to strengthen U.S.-European defense industrial cooperation.
In the intricate tapestry of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, another thread of concern wove its way into the global consciousness: the prospect of peace talks. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, stepping into the role of the EU’s rotating presidency earlier this month, embarked on a whirlwind diplomatic tour, visiting Ukraine, Russia, China and the United States. Each stop seemed a deliberate step in his ambitious “Peace Mission 3.0,” with the NATO summit as a pivotal waypoint. Furthermore, should Donald Trump emerge victorious in the U.S. presidential election, the prospect of championing negotiations with Russia looms significantly large.
Yet, the NATO summit’s communique was unambiguous in its stance: “We fully support Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements and decide its own future, free from outside interference.” NATO’s position on Russia has hardened, and the statement resolutely declared, “We will never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea.” In a rare and pointed demand, it further called on Russia to “withdraw all of its forces from the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, stationed there without their consent.”
Turning our gaze to the Indo-Pacific, we see Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand — the so-called IP4 — marking their third consecutive year of participation in the summit. They committed to launching tailored projects in the areas of “supporting Ukraine, cyberdefense, countering disinformation and technology.” However, the ambitious plan discussed at last year’s summit to establish a NATO office in the Indo-Pacific has been set aside.
In the grand scheme of NATO’s expansion into the Indo-Pacific region, the leaders of the United States and NATO emerged as the most fervent advocates, trailed by the EU and the IP4 nations. This dynamic resulted in a summit that was more circumspect on Indo-Pacific issues than anticipated. The summit’s declaration conspicuously omitted NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s frequent references to “the growing alignment of Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.” Neither the South China Sea nor the Taiwan Strait were mentioned. Only North Korea found a place in the narrative. Similarly, the joint statement from the IP4 was singularly focused on North Korea, leaving other pressing matters unspoken.
Moreover, the United States has recalibrated its approach to rallying Europe against China. Once, it underscored the perils in the Taiwan Strait to pivot European focus toward the Indo-Pacific. Now, it accentuates China’s “support for Russia,” aiming to sever the burgeoning bonds between China and Europe.
While last year’s summit statement gently stated, “We particularly call on the PRC to act responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia,” this year’s declaration strikes a decidedly sterner note. It brands China as a “decisive enabler” of the conflict, asserting unequivocally, “The PRC cannot enable the largest war in Europe in recent history without this negatively impacting its interests and reputation.”
U.S. President Joe Biden, addressing the press, warned that “European allies are prepared to cut investment to China if it keeps up its support for Russia.” Media outlets have further disclosed that NATO deliberated on measures to recapture certain Chinese-owned infrastructure projects in Europe should tensions with Russia escalate.
Throughout the summit, European leaders echoed Biden’s stance while also seizing moments to engage with Trump’s inner circle, reflecting a multifaceted approach to their relations with both the U.S. and China.
French President Emmanuel Macron advocated shifting the infrastructure conversation from NATO to the European Union. Germany, on the other hand, significantly bolstered its cooperation with NATO. The Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, aimed to keep the U.S. engaged in Europe by presenting a united front against China. Meanwhile, Italy deftly leveraged the narrative of China as a threat to NATO’s southern flank, aligning NATO’s strategic actions with its own developmental agenda.
