Russian Defense Minister Andrei Belousov’s surprise visit to China and the Oct. 22-24 BRICS Summit in Kazan, Russia, once again made the Ukrainian war a hot topic globally. Belousov described Russia-China military cooperation as a critical global and regional stabilizer. Aligned with its rhythm of military diplomacy, the BRICS Summit is the largest intergovernmental multilateral conference organized by Russia since February 2022. The summit has deepened Western concerns that the international divide will continue and BRICS countries may become a tool to counterbalance the G7 club. War efforts by Russia to resolve the crisis, as well as internal problems in the United States and other Western countries and Ukraine’s limited military strength may prompt major changes in the war.
Shifting war goals
Ukraine’s desire to join NATO and territorial issues are the two major obstacles to achieving peace. Circumstances are changing for both. The direct cause is Finland’s nascent NATO membership. The distance from Finland to Moscow is roughly the same as that from Ukraine to Moscow, and it is only 150 kilometers from the Finnish border to St. Petersburg, Russia’s second-largest city.
Even though there has been no substantive change in Russia’s position on Ukraine’s accession to NATO, a different voice has emerged on whether NATO enlargement is a problem. It is argued that if NATO enlargement were a problem for Russia, Finland and Sweden would pose no less threat than Ukraine. This new thinking may have prompted a Russian “land for peace” proposal through its agent in the West, with Russia agreeing to Ukraine’s NATO membership in exchange for the latter’s acceptance of territory losses. However, Ukraine rejected the tentative discussion and insisted on restoring its 1991 post-Soviet borders. Michal Smetana, director of the Peace Research Center in Prague, believes that increasing numbers of Ukrainians support territorial concessions in exchange for NATO membership. NATO has always stressed the timing factor for Ukraine, so that could be negotiable with Russia.
War-weariness in the West
Peter the Great took Russia into the European world, so Russia has been dealing with European countries for more than 340 years. Thus it has far more knowledge of the Western world than most other countries and very rich diplomatic experience in fighting Europeans. In the ongoing hybrid warfare against the West, Russia has achieved remarkable results. First, it has successfully launched an anti-Western movement on the periphery of the West — such as in New Caledonia, Zimbabwe, Georgia and Iran.
Russia is also presenting itself as the new global anti-colonial pioneer among countries in the South, especially Africa. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairman Dmitry Medvedev wrote an article last June about the Western obsession with political control over other parts of the world and dominance of the international stage. He called for a global anti-colonial movement for the freedom of nations.
Second, Russia has exploited internal frictions within the West and funded far-right European parties to undermine support for Ukraine, with Russia-friendly or anti-Ukraine-aid parties given special attention. The Alternative for Germany party and the Bundnis Sahra Wagenknecht boycotted Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s speech in the Bundestag. The European Conservatives and Reformists Party and the Identity and Democracy Party, which control 18 percent of the seats in the European Parliament, oppose European support for Ukraine. In addition, far-right parties in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, France and other countries oppose sanctions against Russia. In response to the war-weariness of Western allies, Zelenskyy made frequent visits and speeches to counter the Russian public opinion offensive and replaced nine senior government officials, including the foreign minister, to consolidate Western support and boost morale at home.
Year 2025 probably key
Ending the war in 2025 is a goal of Zelenskyy’s “Victory Plan.” Russia finds no role for Zelenskyy in the future course of the war. Undeniably, the longer the war drags on, the more variables there will be. Bearing this in mind, Zelenskyy may modify his tough stance and seek more pragmatic ways to end the war, such as a truce conditional on NATO or European Union membership. Russia’s Foreign Ministry has said it rejects such a plan, and Ukraine is well aware that, but for a massive and fruitful counterattack in 2025, its demand for a 1991 border will not be honored. For the United States, while Ukraine has repeatedly asked for a change in its cautious attitude, the risk of an expanded war is far greater than that posed in the Middle East. In this connection, the U.S. has not lifted restrictions on Ukraine’s use of Western weapons. By Oct.16, the U.S. had provided 67 tranches of military equipment without quantitatively or qualitatively satisfying what is needed for a massive counterattack.
Even if a cease-fire is achieved in 2025, the European security crisis may last for many years because Russia will not accept its position in the international system. It will certainly attempt a “new security cooperation framework” in Eurasia and lead the anti-colonialism movement in the South. Russia’s relations with the West will continue to be fragile and full of fights.
