Taiwan is the most important, most sensitive topic in relations between China and the United States. America’s China policy, characterized by major-power competition, has had a subtle yet significant influence on the Taiwan question. No matter who wins the coming presidential election, the next U.S. administration is likely to continue along these general lines. But changes can be expected.
Major features of U.S. strategy for competition with China
The U.S. strategy for major-power competition with China mainly encompasses the following three aspects:
First, it wants to make sure its geopolitical and military influence will not be surpassed, especially in the western Pacific. Although the general decline of overall U.S. national strength has been an obvious trend, and the mismatch between its available resources and policy goals has become increasingly conspicuous, the U.S. government still takes maintaining U.S. primacy in the Asia-Pacific as a strategic imperative.
Second, it seeks to guarantee absolute U.S. superiority in critical areas of science and technology. Because such technologies as AI, biotech, quantum computing and new-energy technologies have dual military and civilian potential, the U.S. government has been promoting a “small yard, high fence” policy, pressuring allies and partners to make sure it will not be surpassed by China in those areas. It wants to ensure that U.S. military hegemony will not be challenged by China by cutting off technology, capital or personnel flows between the U.S. (and its allies and partners) and China.
Third, the international order and model of governance must be “liberal,” rather than “authoritarian” or “autocratic.” Although the Chinese government does not export its ideology on its own initiative, the U.S. government thinks China’s Belt and Road Initiative — as well as its proposed Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative — are enormous challenges to the “liberal international order” and global governance regime. The U.S. cannot allow a heterogeneous major power to challenge the existing order from within or to build another order outside of it.
Characteristics of U.S. strategic competition with China
First, the idea that China is America’s main rival in strategic competition is a consensus of Democrats and Republican, both in the administration and in Congress. Although the Democratic and Republican parties don’t agree entirely on such subjects as the purpose, means, cost and benefits of the country’s China strategy, they all take China as America’s foremost strategic competitor. Even when a very small number of people in U.S. strategic and academic circles do criticize the government for failing to properly and thoroughly understand China, they don’t challenge the idea of China being America’s main rival in strategic competition.
Second, Cold War-style policies in a time of globalization are being used. Although ranking officials in the U.S. government keep saying that its China strategy is not a “new cold war” — because the time and conditions have all changed — one can judge from their actual practice that their strategy’s essence looks a lot like the Cold War. This is mainly reflected in A) promoting geopolitical, military zero-sum games; B) promoting the policies of de-risking and decoupling, which drive globalization toward regionalization, fragmentization and even faction; and C) promoting policies of ideological confrontation, blindly promoting confrontation by means of stigmatization, disregarding the actual performance of different systems and undermining the existing framework of effective global governance.
Third, it says it wants to avoid direct conflict or war with China. The essence of U.S. strategy for major-power competition is to contain China and prevent it from challenging America’s global hegemony by promoting Cold War-style policies. Hence, one feature of the strategy is striving to avoid a military collision. This is the most important reason that the Biden administration has repeatedly underscored the significance of “guardrails,” as well as mechanisms for preventing misjudgments — such as communication between various levels of the two governments.
Influence of U.S. strategy on its Taiwan policy
America’s China strategy has had a subtle yet important influence on Taiwan policy, visible mainly in the following aspects:
First, the goal of U.S. Taiwan policy has begun to imply preventing the Chinese side from accomplishing reunification by any means. Since the central focus is making sure that U.S. geopolitical and military influence is not surpassed, Assistant Defense Secretary Ely Ratner said during a congressional hearing soon after the Biden team assumed office that Taiwan’s status was a critical link on the “first island chain,” and its importance for preserving U.S. military hegemony in the region. American scholars have already pointed out that Ratner’s remarks were very dangerous, since they imply that the U.S. would attempt to prevent reunification. The Biden administration has since been cautious on the topic, yet judging from the orientation of its actual policies, doing everything possible to prevent reunification has already become the unspoken goal.
Second, the focus of America’s Taiwan policy has shifted from emphasizing preservation of the cross-strait status quo to enhancing military deterrence and suppressing Beijing’s impulse for resolving the Taiwan question by military means. Since the U.S. sees that China’s asymmetric military advantages in the western Pacific are steadily expanding — an acute concern based on its analysis that “ability determines intention” and the strategic need to guarantee its dominance in the Asia-Pacific — the focus of America’s Taiwan policy has changed from preserving the status quo to strengthening military deterrence against Beijing by enhancing military security cooperation. It does this through alliances, partnerships and direct military security cooperation with Taiwan. This means that no matter who might have become Taiwan’s new leader in the island’s Jan. 13 election, and no matter who wins the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5, the U.S. government will actively push military security cooperation with Taiwan. At the same time it will incorporate Taiwan into the military security apparatus of U.S. allies and partners in the region, so as to discourage Beijing from resolving the Taiwan question by force.
In April, the U.S. Congress passed the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2024, and President Biden signed it into law. The law provides a $2 billion package for Taiwan and others — on top of the $1.9 billion that had been earmarked for the military already — for education and training in Taiwan and defense materials and services for regional partners. The amount was a historical record.
Third, the U.S. is trying to reinterpret UN Resolution 2758 to prevent the “one China” principle from defeating the “one China” policy. The Biden administration began promoting reinterpretation when it entered the White House, claiming the document did not resolve Taiwan’s representation within the United Nations system. This sudden move was mainly driven by the fact that, during the Donald Trump presidency, a number of countries withdrew diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and expressed in their joint communiques with China upon establishment of diplomatic relations a commitment to adhere to the “one China” principle. This made the U.S. government very nervous, and it reacted by telling itself it had to prevent the “one China” principle from becoming dominant at the UN. Otherwise, it thought, the legitimacy of the “one China” policy it had committed to, along with some other countries, might be seriously weakened. This is consistent with the main goal of the U.S. strategy for major-power competition with China — i.e. making sure the “rules-based international order” remains under complete U.S. leadership and that the “rules” are dominated by the U.S. and its alliance and partnership regime.
Fourth, the U.S. is attempting to incorporate Taiwan into the U.S.-led regional alliance and partnership framework, dwarfing the Chinese mainland’s achievements by highlighting those of Taiwan on such matters as supply chain security and governance model competition. For its leading role in the R&D and manufacturing of high-tech chips, Taiwan has become an important chess piece in America’s competitive strategy in such fields as China-U.S. scientific and technological competition and U.S. supply chain security.
Moreover, affected by the “democracy vs. autocracy” ideological competition in its strategy, the U.S. government has employed Taiwan’s “system of freedom and democracy,” “democratic elections” and “pandemic response model” to create the image of a liberal democratic model that is supposed to outshine the “authoritarian,” “autocratic” mainland. Unlike the Obama administration’s neglect of Taiwan in its strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific, the Biden administration has an explicit definition of Taiwan’s position in the region and in the U.S. strategy for competition with China. It wants to make Taiwan “visible.”
Factors that will impact the next U.S. administration’s Taiwan policy
The next U.S. administration will continue implementing the strategy of major-power competition with China, but the scope and extent of it will definitely be different. Factors that will affect the next round include the following:
First, the new administration will assess the negative influence of enhanced military deterrence. The strategy for competition features a focus on avoiding direct military conflict with China, but the negative impacts of a steady stream of U.S. moves to consolidate military deterrence in the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasingly prominent as time goes by. For the U.S., the biggest danger will be that the two big powers’ military deterrence could go overboard, with both sides sinking deeply into a security dilemma. The U.S. could be duped by the authorities in Taiwan into making misjudgments in the case of some accident, resulting in a possible conflict. The next U.S. administration will have several months to assess the current Taiwan policy, and the outcome will be worthy of close attention.
Second, a dilemma similar to that in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis will come to characterize the Ukraine situation and the broader East-Asian security framework. At present, neither Russia nor Ukraine is capable of decisive victory on the battlefield. Both sides have sent signals of willingness to engage in dialogue, and even negotiation. Yet, because Russia and Ukraine — as well as (behind-the-scenes) the U.S. and Europe — differ greatly over how to end the war, there will be serious disagreement on the future of European security. The Ukraine crisis likely morph gradually into a dilemma similar to the one in Gaza. This will have a significant influence on relations between the U.S. and Russia, as well as between the U.S. and Europe. It will also have collateral impacts on the Asia-Pacific, particularly the East-Asia security framework.
