Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2024
During his first trip to Europe as U.S. Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth told the Ukraine Defense Contact Group they must understand that “stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe.” Besides homeland security threats such as illegal immigration, “We also face a peer competitor in the Communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific.” Given “the reality of scarcity,” Hegseth argued that NATO had to accept a “division of labor in which Europeans assume lead responsibility for their Continent’s security” while the United States concentrates on “deterring war with China in the Pacific.”
At the same time, President Donald Trump voiced to the Washington media on February 13 his desire to discuss with Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin how to halve their countries’ defense budgets: “We’re all spending a lot of money that we could be spending on other things that are actually, hopefully much more productive.”
In assessing which forces to cut and which to redeploy from Europe and elsewhere to the Asia-Pacific region, the Trump administration will draw heavily on the recently released Pentagon report on “Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2024.” This document, which the Defense Department has submitted annually since 2000 to meet a congressional requirement, is commonly referred to as the “China Military Power” report.
The version released in December underscores the challenges facing the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies. For example, the text validates earlier projections of an unrelenting increase in China’s nuclear forces while raising its estimate of China’s maximum possible defense spending to almost $450 billion, approximately twice the public People’s Liberation Army (PLA) budget.
For the first time since the Soviet Union’s demise in 1991, the U.S. Navy now confronts a potential peer adversary in China’s navy. The PLA Navy (PLAN) currently has more hulls than the United States—more than 370 battle force ships and submarines of which more than 140 are major surface combatants, including several aircraft carriers. The Pentagon anticipates that the PLAN will deploy 435 warships by 2030. China’s massive shipbuilding capacity means the PLAN will retain a numerical lead over the U.S. Navy for years.
China’s growing fleet is most evident in the PLAN’s constant presence around Taiwan and in the East and South China Seas. The head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Sam Paparo, just described the former as “rehearsals for the forced unification of Taiwan to the mainland.” In recent years, the Chinese armed forces have conducted frequent deployments inside Taiwan’s air defense identification zone and across the centerline between the Chinese and Taiwanese coasts.
But perhaps more impressive is how Beijing has been leveraging its paramilitary Coast Guard and Maritime Militia to act as quasi-navies in sensitive waterways. According to the Pentagon, almost two hundred Maritime Militia ships patrol the South China Sea every day. Together, the Coast Guard and Maritime Militia possess hundreds of vessels, many substantially larger than those serving in other Asian-Pacific coast guards, such as those of the Philippines. Indeed, some of these ships began service with the PLAN but transferred to China’s Coast Guard.
Thanks to its long-range ship-launched missiles, the PLAN is no longer hemmed in by the first island chain—which includes Taiwan and Japan (including the U.S. military bases in Okinawa and the other Ryukyu Islands). Not only can its ships launch increasingly precise cruise and ballistic missiles, but the Navy has also improved its capacity for executing long-range joint fires with the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). Together, the PLAN and PLAAF aircraft “constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 3,150 total aircraft.” These ships, planes, and missiles can attack more targets than ever before, with increased precision.
The PLAAF has become a substantially more powerful fighting force in recent years. The Pentagon observes that recent reforms have yielded more realistic combat training and exercises. Additionally, its bomber fleet can now provide “long-range standoff precision strike capability.” For example, the bombers can sortie from mainland China to engage U.S. forces and bases in the Second Island Chain, which encompasses large U.S. military bases in Guam and the Philippines. The Defense Department assesses that PLAAF drones are “rapidly approaching technology typical of U.S. standards,” including potential swarming and pilot-drone collaborative combat operations. Meanwhile, the Chinese defense industry can finally build high-precision fighter plane engines, ending PRC dependence on Russian imports.
The report observed how structural reforms are potentially enhancing Chinese military power. For example, the recent rearrangement of the PLA’s strategic cyber and information capabilities could strengthen its communications and network systems management in major wars. Similarly, the transfer of the Navy’s land-based fighter and bomber fleet, along with support capabilities such as ground-based radar and air defense units, to the PLAAF encourages the PLAN to focus on developing its novel carrier aviation capabilities while augmenting the Air Force’s integrated homeland air defense network. The Pentagon anticipates the PRC will seek to acquire additional foreign bases and access points to become a global expeditionary force, though the Trump administration is vigorously striving to prevent that development in Panama and other locations.
Future reports could better specify the characteristics and precision of China’s capabilities development milestones. The current text implies that the PRC leadership wants the PLA to be capable of launching an urgent invasion of Taiwan by 2027, to achieve comprehensive modernization by 2035, and to become a “world-class” military with global reach by 2049. But the operational implications of each date could be clearer. Similarly, while the report comprehensively discusses the Chinese military’s interest in leveraging scientific advances in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, biotechnology, and other fields, it leaves unclear when the PLA might plausibly realize its aspirations. Of course, U.S. reluctance to expose sources and methods and new PRC rules further restricting publication of military information online limit what the Pentagon can include in these reports.
The Pentagon does identify impediments to China’s military buildup, especially the sweeping anti-corruption campaign targeting many senior military and defense-industrial leaders. Whatever its short-term disruptive effects, if the campaign genuinely eliminates corrupt practices, it could enhance the PLA’s long-term military effectiveness. The Trump administration’s policy reviews must assess these and other complex issues as the Pentagon optimizes its plans and programs for the emerging international security environment.
