At the 14th Western Pacific Naval Symposium held in Tsingtao on 22 April, 21 member states unanimously voted for a new edition of The Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
First proposed by New Zealand in 1994, CUES offers safety procedures, a basic communications plan and maneuvering instructions when naval ships or naval aircraft of one state meet casually or unexpectedly with a naval ship or naval aircraft of another state. It provides procedures to avoid collision, such as: not getting too close to any vessels in formation; maintain safe speed and distance; avoid simulation of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, and fire control radars in the direction of vessels or aircraft encountered; and refrain from aerobatics and simulated attacks in the vicinity of ships encountered.
In the Western Pacific, unplanned encounters between naval ships and naval aircraft of different states are not rare at all, especially between Chinese ships and naval aircraft with those from the US and Japan. The US ships, aircraft and UAVs come to China’s EEZ all the year round for close-in reconnaissance despite China’s security concerns. When the Chinese naval flotilla navigates through the high seas in the Japanese straits to the western Pacific Ocean, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force will almost certainly send ships to follow and will send aircraft to hover over the Chinese flotilla for surveillance and information gathering.
Such encounters without commonly accepted communications and procedures could be lethally dangerous. In March 2009, there was a standoff between Chinese ships and the USS Impeccable. In December 2013, a collision was narrowly-escaped between the USS Cowpens and a Chinese amphibious landing ship trying to stop the US ship from getting too close to the Chinese aircraft carrier Liaoning. Worst of all, a Chinese J-8 jet fighter collided with a US EP-3 reconnaissance plane off Hainan Island in April 2001. These incidents invariably triggered off immediate tit-for-tat accusations of the other side and in the last case, caused a free fall in bilateral relations.
In the Western Pacific, crisis management mechanisms as a whole are insufficient. The military hotline between China and the US is used only at top military levels. It is responsive rather than proactive. China and the US signed a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement as early as 1998, but the meetings are only held three times a year. In 2012, China and Japan failed to negotiate a maritime liaison mechanism as a result of Japanese government’s attempt to “nationalize” the disputed island. The ASEAN countries and China issued a joint declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002, but the principles are difficult to observe without a road map to follow through.
And this is why the CUES is so important. In the late 1960s, there were similar incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. Ships deliberately bumped one another, and both ships and aircraft made threatening movements against those of the other side. In March 1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. The US-Soviet Incidents at Sea Agreement, withmany of the articles similar to those of the CUES,was signed during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972. In 1985, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman observed that the frequency of incidents was “way down from what it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.”
The CUES is all the more significant in that it involves most of the Asian countries that have territorial disputes with one another at the sea. It is exaggerative to assert, as some people have argued, that currently there is a naval race in the western pacific, but it is true that the waters in the western pacific is getting more volatile with an increasing number of ships and aircraft from different nations. Unplanned encounters at sea could become more frequent.
The CUES is particularly important for China and the US. The two countries still have differences in interpreting the international maritime law, such as the definition of freedom of navigation and the legal status of military ships in the EEZ of another country, but the two militaries have agreed to work towards establishing a notification mechanism for major military activities and setting-up of rules of behavior on military, air, and maritime activities. Before such agreements can finally be reached, if possible at all, CUES will help reduce miscalculations and the chance of an incident at sea, and – in the event that one occurred – to prevent it from escalating.
The 2014 Tsingtao edition of the CUES is a win-win option for all, thanks to the joint efforts of 21 member states. This is a fine moment. Naval officers, mariners and airmen could relax and celebrate with a glass of Tsingtao beer.
Zhou Bo is an honorary fellow with Center of China-American Defense Relations, Academy of Military Science.
