With Donald Trump again in the White House, the next four years will present new challenges for China-U.S. relations. His first term had a profound impact on bilateral ties, as it not only established the overall strategy of competing against China but also intensified pressure in geopolitics, security, trade and technology, severely squeezing the space for cooperation between the two countries. Now, with Trump returning to office and facing an even more complex and dynamic domestic and international landscape, his decision-making style, team composition and policy direction will again significantly influence the trajectory of China-U.S. relations.
Compared with his first term, Trump 2.0 is expected to be more mature. He will likely place greater emphasis on demonstrating leadership and earning respect from other countries. In foreign policy, he may strengthen interactions with allies and showcase U.S. international leadership through more diplomatic engagement with other heads of state.
In terms of his team, Trump’s second-term foreign policy team will no longer be entirely composed of outsiders. More establishment figures are expected to join the cabinet, aiming for more efficient policy execution. Trump will continue to prioritize loyalty as the key criterion for selecting officials, meaning that his appointees are more likely to play functional roles and will likely align closely with his views on foreign affairs.
Nevertheless, Trump’s foreign policy will continue to be constrained by domestic politics, particularly the power struggle between Congress and the White House and the differing proposals for U.S. competition policy towards China. This means that Trump will seek a balance between toughness and flexibility in foreign affairs but will still need to consider a variety of interests, especially those of the business community and allies.
Compared with his first term, Trump’s trust in China has diminished, and his policy toward China is expected to be more hard-line. This will be reflected not only in “decoupling” policies in the economic sector but also in further restrictions on China’s advancements in areas such as technology and military affairs. Another notable feature is that, under the broader framework of U.S.-China competition, federal government departments do not have a unified understanding of how to “manage” China-U.S. relations, as seen in the Biden administration. For example, members of Trump’s economic team may have differing views: Some may advocate for punishing China through trade wars and tariffs, while others may prefer negotiating and striking deals.
Considering the above context, the next phase of China-U.S. relations faces risks and challenges, as well as opportunities for easing tensions.
Trump to take actions that do not appear “weak,” in order to pressure China to make concessions in other areas. If the U.S. continues to maintain a tough stance on the Taiwan question, tensions in the Taiwan Strait will intensify, potentially leading to a risk of military friction.
Third, the global technology competition initiated by the United States, particularly in key areas like artificial intelligence and semiconductors, will become another major risk in China-U.S. relations. The Trump administration’s policy of technology containment against China is unlikely to change. In his second term, Trump may intensify sanctions and export controls on Chinese tech companies, which could affect the global innovation ecosystem. U.S.-China tech competition will no longer be confined to so-called national security or military technology sectors; the boundaries of the “small yard, high fence” will no longer exist.
Despite the many challenges facing China-U.S. relations, there are also opportunities for cooperation. First, dialogues and cooperation in law enforcement areas, such as fentanyl, are worthy of attention. Trump placed significant emphasis on the issue during his first term and repeatedly urged China to intensify efforts against fentanyl. Given the severity of the ongoing global drug trafficking situation, especially the rampant spread of lethal drugs like fentanyl, there is enormous potential for China and the U.S. to strengthen law enforcement cooperation to combat transnational drug crimes.
Yet cooperation cannot be one-sided. China has made notable progress in strengthening the control of fentanyl and its precursors, but the U.S. also needs to enhance its domestic governance capacity and level of management on this issue.
Second, an early end to the Russia-Ukraine conflict aligns with the interests of China, the U.S. and other countries around the world. Trump has expressed a desire to engage both Russia and Ukraine and push for a resolution to the conflict, while China has also played an important constructive role in promoting global peace and maintaining regional stability. If China and the U.S. can engage in candid exchanges on this issue and work together to promote a peaceful resolution, it will have a far-reaching positive impact on global stability. In particular, by coordinating support and assistance for the reconstruction of Ukraine, this would not only align with the interests of all parties but also help shape a more positive international image.
Moreover, even in the field of technology — and particularly in artificial intelligence and cybersecurity — there remains space for dialogue and cooperation between the two sides. Despite the intense competition between China and U.S. in this arena, the two countries can still explore engagement and dialogue on issues such as technical standards, cybersecurity protocols and AI governance.
This would not only help reduce the adversarial posture of the two countries in these fields but also lay a foundation for the healthy development of a global technological ecosystem and for addressing transnational challenges. Both sides should consider establishing specialized dialogue mechanisms to promote cooperation and consensus in the technology sector, particularly in cybersecurity, artificial intelligence and other cutting-edge fields, with the aim of creating effective risk management frameworks and platforms for technological dialogue.
Trump’s return presents new challenges for China-U.S. relations but also offers new ideas and opportunities for a fresh round of engagement between the two countries. The key lies in how both sides manage the potential changes and risks over the next four years. As long as both sides commit to enhancing communication, managing differences and deepening cooperation — while striving to reduce misjudgments and misunderstandings — China-U.S. relations can find a new balance in a complex international environment and work together to ensure a more stable future.
