In recent years, Sino-Russian relations have become a model of great power relations with high degree of mutual trust, high level of collaboration and high strategic value. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the assessment of the challenges for China-Russia relations in the external environment, the understanding of the conflict’s role in reshaping China-Russia relations, and the examination of the prospects of China-Russia relations have been critical in the analysis of how the Russia-Ukraine conflict will impact the game of great powers.

As a geopolitical confrontation with global implications in the European region, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has an important and complex impact on China-EU relations.

The dominant narrative on the Chinese side is that this strategic competition between the two countries reflects the struggles for power, institutions, and perceptions, which will last throughout the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In general, it is thus believed that competition and struggle have been adopted as key words for both Washington and Beijing in managing their relations.

Up till now, the fighting has been going on for over 100 days, with the two warring sides still in an offensive and defensive stalemate. Questions about this ongoing crisis can be listed in a long line, most of which no one can answer at this time. Yet among all the uncertainties, one thing is certain: what the Russian troops crossed on February 24 was not simply the land border between Russia and Ukraine, but rather more symbolically, the River Rubicon of the post-cold war international order.

The Chinese foreign minister’s 10-day trip brought concrete answers that addressed the real needs of Pacific Island countries. But voices in the West continue to emphasize a negative view of China’s intentions — even trying to lock China and the United States into a cold war framework.

The Biden administration is prioritizing its foreign policy strategy in Asia by extensive outreach and alliances in the region. Strategic partnerships with other countries, particularly in the Indo-Pacific , are crucial for the U.S. to keep up with China’s growth in the region.

The IPEF attempts to placate those who oppose free trade in the Indo-Pacific region while also constraining China. But China is the biggest trading partner for most IPEF countries, so the attempt to encircle China on trade is tantamount to encircling its own members.

At first glance, the Ukraine conflict has some loose parallels to 1958, when the People’s Liberation Army shelled Kinmen without notifying Russia in advance. But while rumors of intrigue may raise eyebrows, the comparison falls apart quickly.

Alienating Russia will not increase stability for Europe, nor will Russia disappear as a result of the Ukraine war. But Russia’s old power model — needlessly using force to punish countries for switching sides — needs to change.

Whether or not bilateral relations will enter a new era depends, in particular, on what the U.S. can offer. Peace and development is ASEAN’s main concern. A strategy designed to force members to side with the U.S. or China will not be welcomed.