As a mechanism for cooperation between emerging economies, the idea of “Greater BRICS” is attracting increasing international attention. The U.S.-led West is concerned not only about whether BRICS will expand further but also whether it might be upgraded into a formal organization and establish a secretariat and whether it would extend to military and defense cooperation. Meanwhile, political and academic circles in BRICS countries have engaged in discussions on ways to strengthen and consolidate the grouping.
Does BRICS need a secretariat?
Debates have been going on for some time on this question and have become a hot topic again following recent remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. During an interview, Lavrov said that no one is interested in turning BRICS into a formal organization with a secretariat, because it is not only unnecessary now but won’t be for a long period of time.
After the statement by Lavrov, the foreign minister of the host country of this year’s BRICS summit meeting, there have been extensive discussions on the matter among scholars in member countries. Those against the establishment of a secretariat believe it is premature — at least before BRICS upgrades from a forum-style mechanism into a cooperative organization. If a secretariat is set up, the BRICS mechanism would prematurely become an organization of a binding nature and thus lose flexibility.
Those for a secretariat contend that multilateral cooperative organizations need a secretariat and that there have been international examples of loose forums establishing secretariats. Also, they say, setting up a secretariat doesn’t necessarily make the forum mechanism rigid or ossified.
In fact, judging from the practices of global mechanisms and organizations of multilateral cooperation, there are more advantages than disadvantages in establishing a secretariat. Take ASEAN for example. The establishment of its secretariat in 1976 effectively addressed two key issues: countries holding a rotating presidency acting on their own, with bigger or smaller member countries’ having capacity gaps in coordinating intra-ASEAN affairs.
Another example is the China-Central Asia Summit’s secretariat, which came into operation less than a year after its first summit meeting. It has seen practical outcomes in implementing summit meeting achievements and coordinating work between member countries.
The secretariat also built platforms for China-Central Asia cooperation and investment promotion. While preserving the BRICS mechanism’s flexibility and member countries’ autonomy, coordinating day-to-day BRICS operations with a secretariat will not only avoid the trouble of member countries’ ability to contact the correct people in charge of specific matters but also provide rotating presidents with such intellectuel support as agenda setting — even offering monitoring and oversight services for implementing agreements reached at summit meetings.
Do BRICS nations need to cooperate in military and defense affairs?
After 18 years as an institution, BRICS has grown significantly in terms of political and economic cooperation as well as in people-to-people exchanges. But there has been little progress when it comes to overall military and defense cooperation because of the fear of leaving the impression that BRICS is a political-military group.
Some member countries think that once BRICS starts overall military cooperation, the U.S.-led West will come to the mistaken conclusion that it foresees military confrontation. India and Brazil are particularly worried about irritating the United States; therefore, BRICS has been prudent and sensitive in this aspect.
However, the second joint naval exercise by China, Russia and South Africa last year near South Africa attracted broad international attention. Brazil participated for the first time as an observer. Although the exercise was not carried out in the name of BRICS, the scale and duration of the drill was significant, as it occurred soon after South Africa assumed the BRICS rotating presidency. This sent a message that BRICS nations were heading toward overall military cooperation.
But conducting overall military and defense cooperation doesn’t mean BRICS will become a military alliance. In fact, BRICS has no intention of creating military rivalry. There is no need to over-read normal military and defense cooperation, especially against the backdrop of frequent outbreaks of global geopolitical conflict and the messy, volatile international order. It is of epoch-making significance that BRICS should expand its realm of cooperation to military and defense, which has realistic importance in preserving regional stability and world peace.
Should BRICS set up a monetary fund?
With the collective rise of emerging economies and the Global South, the disequilibrium and irrational nature of international power distribution has become more evident. Emerging economies and the Global South’s institutionalized international power does not match the size of their economies.
For instance, as the two major pillars of postwar global financial governance, both the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have been controlled by the U.S.-led West, with the former headed by an American and the latter led by a European, with both institutions having their headquarters in the United States. The U.S. holds the most voting power in both financial institutions, as well as veto power. It is worth mentioning that since its establishment of the IMF, the loans it has issued to African nations account for only a tiny fraction of those to Western nations.
In the face of unfair, irrational international financial governance, many ideas and proposals have been floated from the political and academic circles of BRICS member nations about setting up a BRICS monetary fund. The calls have grown louder after the emergence of the BRICS New Development Bank. People believe more financial entities should be formed, in addition to the NDB, to preserve BRICS nations’ financial stability and security and facilitate the process of pluralizing the international financial system. Therefore, many believe it is necessary to establish a BRICS fund as an IMF equivalent to supplement and enhance the existing international financial safety network.
It may be advisable to build such a fund based on the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement Fund. The $100 billion fund has never been used, but multiple exercises have been conducted and there have been positive developments in resolving outstanding technical issues. Once a BRICS fund is established, it will be conducive to global financial security and in turn press the IMF to make quota reforms, effectively increasing the financial say of BRICS nations and the Global South.
Does the the NDB need to resume Russia-related business, and how should an appropriate leader in Russia be selected?
The NDB is a golden billboard of the BRICS mechanism, whose investments in infrastructure and sustainable development have achieved impressive outcomes, including AA+ ratings from major international credit rating agencies. But it has yet to meet the operational criteria for a mature international financial institution. It needs to integrate with the international financial mainstream to benefit from advanced experience.
After the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, the NDB suspended Russia-related business to avoid sanctions imposed by the U.S.-led West. As Russia is the rotating host this year, it has asked the NDB to resume Russia-related business. Moreover, in accordance with the five-year rotation rule, a Russian is supposed to head the NDB from July 2025. According to convention, the head of the bank should be a ranking financial official or former national leader of a member country. But such Russian officials are mostly sanctioned by the U.S.-led West.
Whether to resume Russia-related business and how to find a proper leader for the NDB are questions that will test the wisdom of those in the political and academic circles of BRICS nations. If it’s not handled well, it will inevitably affect the bank’s credit ratings, as well as integration with the mainstream international financial system.
To sum up, these four hotly debated issues are not only structural, realistic conundrums that the expansion and deepening of the multilateral mechanism can’t get around, but they also reflect member countries’ concerns over the future prospects of BRICS. They reflect one indisputable fact: As the international order stands at a critical crossroads, the international community is closely watching how the “Greater BRICS” could become a new center of global governance, decision-making and discourse.
