Some people in both the United States and China have suggested that the bilateral relationship has entered “garbage time” recently, implying that neither side is able to take effective measures to improve relations. However, this characterization is inaccurate. “Garbage time” is a term often used in sports to refer to the period near the end of a game when one side has achieved an insurmountable lead, thus rendering the remaining time inconsequential to the final outcome.
Using such terminology to describe China-U.S. relations can create misunderstandings. The bilateral relationship is extremely complex and not akin to a sports contest. Neither side has entered meaningless garbage time yet. Applying this term could mistakenly imply that the power disparity between China and the United States is too big to eliminate. While it is understandable that people may adopt a pessimistic view, stakeholders from both China and the U.S. are in a wait-and-see mode, mainly because the U.S. elections have yet to play out. This adds an element of subtlety: China-U.S. relations are actually relatively stable as the two confront multiple challenges as they seek meaningful improvement in the short term.
As for the long term, some people believe that despite signs of stabilization the trend of strategic competition by the U.S. suggests a prolonged period of difficulties, leaving few viable options.
Recently, I visited Washington to conduct research at several think tanks and engaged in discussions with American scholars. This made me realize that within the context of the U.S. strategic competition against China there is still room for maneuver under this overarching framework. Neither side should regard this period or the foreseeable future as garbage time. Although facing challenges, both should take action to expand the positive aspects of the relationship, striving to limit negative interactions and avoiding the onset of self-fulfilling prophecies.
It seems that a new debate on China is currently emerging within Washington’s academic and strategic circles. However, this debate lacks the depth and breadth of the major strategic discussions on China in 2014 and 2015, for example. Instead of debating fundamental policies, the current debate indicates a situation wherein various stakeholders hope to influence the next administration’s policy, attempting to further calibrate U.S.-China policy within the framework of strategic competition.
The debate centers on the perceived end-game of U.S.-China strategic competition — essentially what the United States really wants. Some people support the idea of managing competition, as advocated by certain Biden administration officials, such as Jake Sullivan and Kurt Campbell. Others criticize this approach as merely a means, not a desirable outcome. They argue that “winning” should be the ultimate goal in alignment with U.S. interests.
However, there’s no consensus about the details of what winning looks like. Some believe it means preventing China from imposing its will on the U.S. and its allies. Others suggest that it requires China to accept the U.S.-led international order. And several argue that it means changes within China.
This ongoing debate reflects that U.S. strategic competition against China is likely to enter a new phase after the November election. While the 2014-15 discussions focused on what strategy to adopt after the failure of engagement, current debates are more about the goals of competition and the price the U.S. is willing to pay.
But there’s still no consensus within the U.S. strategic community regarding China. Differing views are competing under the broad framework of “strategic competition”. This suggests that China-U.S. interactions may yet be able to shape the direction of future policy.
During the election runup and transition period, numerous matters will emerge where both sides can advance to maintain stability. These include high-level meetings, working-level communications and pragmatic progress in problem areas like narcotics, artificial intelligence and climate change.
However, it’s important to note that domestic discourse in the U.S. might still fuel narratives about Chinese “interference” in elections or conflate normal people-to-people exchanges with so-called influence operations. These could distort public perceptions in America about China and weaken the civil foundation of bilateral relations.
As the new U.S. president will be inaugurated in January 2025, the coming year will be a critical for China-U.S. relations. While the new administration will initially focus on team-building and domestic affairs, rapid engagement and communication between the two countries can still be crucial. If Kamala Harris wins, her foreign policy will likely be shaped by her experience as vice president, possibly continuing President Joe Biden’s policy direction but also being influenced by the Democratic left towards a somewhat isolationist stance.
On China issues, Harris may lean more toward “managing competition” as part of the ongoing strategic debate. Her administration would likely continue to collaborate with allies to compete with China and maintain pressure in technology fields, while human rights could become a new focal point. In any case, she will likely articulate a vision for orderly competition and peaceful coexistence with China. In this context, the focus of China-U.S. relations will be on how to manage bilateral ties in a way that aligns with both countries’ interests.
If Donald Trump were to win, he could implement personnel decisions more freely, given a likely Republican-controlled Senate. The current requirement for “winning” the China-U.S. strategic competition might become the mainstream view in U.S. policy.
Interestingly, much like the Democratic left’s isolationism, Trump may also pursue a form of strategic retrenchment. But this doesn’t mean that Trump will give up on America’s overseas impact. On the contrary, his administration’s approach would likely be characterized by a seemingly tougher “peace through strength” stance and aiming to refocus resources on the Indo-Pacific region to counterbalance China — particularly by rapidly concluding the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
In China’s view, Trump would likely resemble the Trump of 2020 rather than the Trump of 2017. And this will lead to significant strain in China-U.S. relations, especially in trade. Even if Trump's proposed 60 percent tariffs would be difficult to implement, he would nevertheless seek to pressure China through trade wars and push for reduced reliance on China in key technologies and supply chains. Worse still, Trump’s lack of interest in governmental dialogue may halt some of the existing communication mechanisms, pushing the relationship closer to a zero-sum game, with cooperation nearly stifled.
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the current debate in the United States over China policy extends beyond bilateral relations. For instance, many people are reflecting on whether the U.S. should focus more on domestic governance as China’s influence grows.
Meanwhile, the question whether U.S. foreign policy should lean more toward interventionism or appropriate retrenchment has been rethought, too. Ultimately, these discussions will impact U.S. policy adjustments with respect to China. If both sides maintain a rational and pragmatic understanding of each other and continue on a path of patient, stable communication as they look for opportunities to close seemingly impossible gaps, then a negative final outcome is not a foregone conclusion.
