For China-EU relations to develop into a stable, mutually beneficial partnership, the EU must undertake a more profound reassessment of its perception of China’s rise and the evolving dynamics of economic competition.
To strengthen its strategic engagement with Asia and the Global South, the European Union should prioritize collaborative approaches to counterbalance the retreat of the United States from multilateralism and global leadership. At the same time, Europe should focus on shaping a post-American model of globalization — one rooted in openness, inclusivity and mutual benefit.
Ever since European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen introduced the concept of “de-risking” at the 2023 World Economic Forum, the term has become central to the EU’s policy discourse on economic security, supply chains and industrial competitiveness. Initially developed in response to rising concerns over economic exposure to China — especially in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war — de-risking now informs the EU’s broader approach to trade and diplomacy with Beijing. Germany’s three-party coalition government institutionalized this policy shift in its July 2023 China Strategy, marking the first comprehensive adoption of de-risking by a major European power. The strategy has shown up in high-profile trade disputes, including European investigations into Chinese electric vehicles and other competitive sectors.
Donald Trump’s re-election has reignited transatlantic instability and shaken the foundation of the international order. The new volatility was exemplified by his April 2 global tariff escalation — a stark reminder of how the “America first” doctrine continues to pose material risks to Europe’s economic and strategic interests. The tariffs prompted European leaders to confront the vulnerability of the transatlantic alliance — a geopolitical foundation that has underpinned European stability for 80 years.
Subsequent discussions of de-risking by the United States have surfaced. A notable example is the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung’s editorial suggesting that de-risking strategies might be more appropriately aimed at protection from the wild acts of the United States. Leading figures such as European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde and the chair of the German Council of Economic Experts, Monika Schnitzer, have advocated reducing Europe’s “excessive dependence” on the United States.
The EU’s de-risking strategy consists of four core pillars:
• Identifying sources of external vulnerability;
• Reducing economic dependence through diversification of partnerships and selective repatriation of production;
• Enhancing technological sovereignty and security;
• Deploying diplomatic instruments to mitigate worst-case scenario risks.
Although EU leaders have avoided explicitly linking this framework to concerns about the United States, the underlying strategic logic increasingly reflects a broader recalibration of global alignments. Von der Leyen’s recent call to “accelerate the EU’s turn toward Asia” — including consideration of accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) — signals a deliberate effort to diversify trade relations.
In addition, recent diplomatic initiatives highlight Europe’s ongoing economic realignment. The first EU–Central Asia summit, accelerated negotiations on the EU-Mercosur trade agreement and high-level visits to China by Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez, French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna and EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic collectively signal a deliberate strategic shift. In the realm of economic defense, the European Union has retained its 21-billion-euro retaliatory tariff package, despite a 90-day exemption period, and is actively considering activation of the Anti-Coercion Instrument, or ACI — its most robust trade countermeasure — against U.S. reciprocal tariffs.
At the same time, Brussels continues to advance digital taxation initiatives targeting major American technology corporations such as Google, Amazon and Meta (formerly Facebook). Notably, the de-risking framework originally developed to manage economic relations with China is increasingly being extended to the United States.
The ongoing discussion and implementation of de-risking from the United States in Europe reflect a growing shift in mindset. The assumption that the U.S. can indefinitely serve as a reliable external economic pillar is no longer taken for granted. Instead, Europe is reevaluating its external economic priorities through the broader lens of shifting transatlantic relations and an increasingly complex global economic landscape.
While the United States remains the European Union’s largest trading and investment partner, as well as a key collaborator in supply chains, the EU’s dependency deepened in sectors such as energy and defense following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war. Nevertheless, Europe must now grapple with an inescapable truth: U.S. foreign economic policy is increasingly driven by economic nationalism and a strong emphasis on reshoring manufacturing. Protecting and revitalizing domestic industries has become a bipartisan rallying cry in Washington. Even if the world moves beyond the second Trump presidency, other nations may still face the unpredictability of a Democratic administration or the continuity of Trump-era economic doctrines.
Thus, a return to America’s previous levels of economic openness — whether toward allies or rivals — appears unlikely. On the contrary, Washington is poised to continue drawing industries back from abroad and reinforcing protectionist policies. In shaping the future of globalization and trade, the U.S. seems intent on constructing a system that maximizes advantages to itself — achieving trade surpluses, securing critical resources and energy and dominating supply chains — while offering little room for negotiation or reciprocity from others.
In this context, the EU’s prospective pivot to Asia and its engagement with the Global South must move beyond the objectives of the 1994 Asia Strategy or the 2018 EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy. These earlier efforts focused primarily on accessing emerging markets and reaping economic dividends. Today, the EU must prioritize building partnerships that collectively address the fallout from the U.S. retreat from international norms and responsibilities. The goal should be to foster a new era of globalization, one that remains open, inclusive and mutually beneficial in what could be a “post-America age.”
A central challenge in this pivot is how the EU engages with China. Given China’s economic scale and its centrality in the Asia-Pacific region, excluding it from any serious Asia strategy is simply not viable. In response to the disruptions stemming from Trump’s policies, the EU has shown signs of recalibrating its approach — for instance, by opening negotiations with China on resolving the electric vehicle dispute through a price undertaking mechanism, and following European Commission President Von der Leyen’s call with Premier Li Qiang in which concerns were raised about U.S. reciprocal tariffs. Support was expressed in the call for China-EU cooperation in defending multilateral trade norms.
However, for China-EU relations to progress beyond short-term tactical cooperation and develop into a stable, mutually beneficial partnership, the EU must undertake a more profound reassessment of its perception of China’s rise and the evolving dynamics of economic competition. Von der Leyen has conveyed to the Chinese side her concerns that U.S. tariffs could result in a diversion of dumped goods toward the European Union. At the same time, Germany’s incoming grand coalition government continues to emphasize the notion of de-risking from China. These trends suggest that Europe’s perception and strategic approach toward China require further adjustment toward greater pragmatism and objectivity.
