Donald Trump’s unabashed pandering to an aggrieved white voter base as well as the long-standing consistency of his (much less-noticed) anti-trade convictions bear implications for Washington’s China policy. As the disillusioned, blue-collar nativist element within slowly defects from a party that remains bound and determined to cater to the interests of its 1% backers, including under the incoming Trump Administration, U.S. politics will enter a period of flux.

The US has shown no desire to defend the arbitration award with force as hinted by the exercise in the Philippine Sea. Although the American strategic community now sees markedly greater risks of military conflict with China, US decision-makers also don’t believe that the US has the ability to change or stop China’s international conduct by force.

Trump is not ideologically driven and is less biased against China than Clinton, with business ties booming with Chinese partners. Without such ties, US domestic statistics suggest, the US economy would shrink by one-third and prices would go up by one-third — undermining US status as the heart of global financial system. This is a price that the US could ill-afford, and Trump is pretty strong on math.

A president-elect’s promises and actual policies are always two different things. “Putting America first”, Trump’s chief consideration, means that a quick expansion of the U.S. role in international affairs doesn’t look likely in the near future. But remarkable shrinkage in U.S. diplomatic and military activities in the world will not happen very soon either.

Donald Trump will be the next president of the United States, which could signal a new configuration for U.S.-China relations. Three options appear possible. First, Trump’s Administration could end up confusing China through a mixture of respect and intimidation. Second, Trump’s Administration could opt to preserve the status quo of economic engagement but American military superiority in East Asia. And Third, Trump’s Administration could seek to orient the bilateral relationship towards respect and mutual benefit, avoiding “self-damaging” competition. Which path will be taken will largely rest on the sort of people Trump appoints to his Administration.

Reacting to issues from Korea to the South China Sea, the next president of the United States should carefully build mutual confidence and reduce the possibility of risks. Holding the annual summit between the two leaders as early as possible in 2017 would be a great first step.

Based on conversations Kaiser Kuo and his wife Fanfan have had with Chinese and Chinese Americans since moving to North Carolina in person and on WeChat groups, the chief reasons behind the popularity of Trump with first-generation immigrants from the PRC are: affirmative action, sexual conservatism, racism, schadenfreude, and Clinton’s hawkishness, taxation, immigration, and personality.

The remainder of the U.S. election season could play out any number of ways, but it appears a safe bet that Beijing will be spared the vitriol it witnessed in recent American political contests, perhaps the result of a cooling Chinese economy or meaningful advances in the bilateral relationship under presidents Obama and Xi.

Every four years when the US has a presidential election, many people ask the same question: who is China's choice? This time is no exception. Given a choic