In the Shangri-La Summit, the Trump administration introduced a new, muscular Indo-Pacific strategy, which is fueled by private interests and foreign governments - not the interests of the US, China or emerging Asia.

China is not seeking a sphere of influence in Pacific Ocean island states, President Xi Jinping told the visiting prime minister of Vanuatu amid fears in Western capitals of China’s growing role in the region.

The U.S. military has held talks with the Federated States of Micronesia about joint military exercises and new naval facilities.

Through the use of rhetorical narratives, the American “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” is intended to be an alternative to China’s Belt & Road Initiative, emboldening counterproductive geopolitical competition in the region.

Indonesia grows increasingly wary of an expansionist China.

The Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy faces significant obstacles.

The agreement for a single draft text as the basis for further negotiations for a Code of Conduct (COC) is a significant milestone in the long-running South China Sea saga, argues Lucio Blanco Pitlo III.

Along with military goals, the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative serves a variety of economic purposes with strategic undertones. Japan and, to a lesser extent, the United States, Australia, and India are seeking to increase their regional political leverage, favour their export industries, and shield regional countries from economic dependency on China.

America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are not necessarily competitors.

ASEAN nations are seeking clarity on who makes the best ally in the Indo-Pacific: China or the United States.