The 32nd ASEAN Summit, held in Singapore on April 27 and 28, saw the ASEAN adopting tough language against America’s trade protectionism, while pursuing further its blossoming relations with China.

For China the Arctic represents a largely blank geoeconomic canvas outside of the United States’ sphere of influence in which it can lay the foundation today for significant economic and geopolitical rewards in the future.

The release of China’s Arctic White Paper in late January brought broad attention to China’s somewhat nascent but rapidly expanding role and interests in the Arctic region. Even though most of the information in the White Paper is not new, initiatives such as the Polar Silk Road could indicate a coming surge in China’s political and economic endeavors in the Arctic.

Washington’s current Asia-Pacific strategy is financially unsustainable. Instead of trying to organize a containment system, Washington should focus on advancing its few serious interests, such as freedom of navigation. Otherwise the U.S. should step back and leave China’s neighbors free to respond to whatever they believe necessary.

Security and the economy are the two key areas of global governance. Zero-sum game thinking on these issues should be avoided at all costs.

The Philippines is often portrayed as an American ally on the verge of defecting to Eastern powers, with Duterte firmly overseeing this strategic shift. Yet, a closer look reveals that the tough-talking Filipino leader doesn’t have the requisite power to unilaterally reshape his country’s foreign policy, nor is he interested in fully severing ties with the Philippines’ century-old ally, America.

Could the arbitration award of 12 July 2016 have unexpectedly opened a cycle of appeasement between China and South-East Asian countries in the South China Sea? It is difficult to conclusively answer this question, since behind these changes are uncertainties and continuities likely to undermine at any moment the progress made.

China and ASEAN countries should focus on implementing a dual-track approach and formulating a code of conduct for the sea, as well as establish mechanisms for maritime situations and to build mutual trust. If the US and China are truly committed to a new type of big-country relationship, they will find facilitating this approach to be in their mutual interest.

However histrionic the demagogic oratory of President Trump has been, his strategy to revitalize American manufacturing will be better served by exporting more to China, not decreasing Chinese imports. China’s gigantic market has thus become the golden apple of discord in an accelerating geo-economic competition between the United States and Germany, which already enjoys significant production networks within the Middle Kingdom. Yet unlike the days of the Boxer Revolution and the alliance of eight Western nations, China can this time choose her major commercial partners.

Without a question, it is still too early to predict the exact trajectory of Trump’s actual policy in office, given his penchant for policy equivocation and tendency for self-contradiction. Deals like the TTP now hang up in the air. There are also opportunities for China in the new administration. Doubts over Trump’s temperament, judgment, experience, and commitment to the global order could encourage a growing number of Asian nations to reconsider their relations with Washington in favor of Beijing. The Trump administration faces an uphill battle to reassure allies in the region that America will continue to preserve and provide public international goods in the region, stand strong with its allies, and deepen its economic engagement with Asia.