If the past is any predictor of the future, then whatever capabilities the U.S. develops, other countries will as well. This has reinvigorated the current security dilemma that has long plagued space strategy based on technology defending technology, particularly in the case of the U.S. and China. It is in every country’s interest to pursue ways to enhance communication and clarify expectations of responsible actors in space with as much vigor as they do contingency warfighting plans and the development of new warfighting technologies. That, unfortunately, has not been the case, even though the last two years have seen more progress in diplomatic space efforts through the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space than any other time prior.

In his first 100 days in office, Trump created more problems than achievements. The challenges and stakes ahead are abundant: Trump needs a breakthrough on his major reforms as soon as possible to gain some traction and rekindle confidence in his supporters and his party.

As the supposed engine of regional integration, and bedrock of East Asian security architecture, the ASEAN has sought, with limited success, to mediate maritime disputes and avoid conflict in the region. But beyond concerns over the gradual loss of so-called ‘ASEAN centrality,’ Southeast Asian countries are also worried about sudden and destructive escalation in Sino-American tensions in the area, especially if the Trump administration makes a step too far in order to project toughness.

"I didn’t want this job. I didn’t seek this job. My wife told me I’m supposed to do this.” These are the words of Rex Tillerson, the U.S. Secretary of State, the nation’s highest ranking diplomat. Tillerson’s candid comments come in light of his first trip to Asia where he met with leaders in Japan, South Korea and China.

Trump’s election campaign promises and and the executive orders the new president signed after he came into the White House reveal a narrow-minded, conservative and selfish United States. It’s a startling reversal of the country’s outlook for six decades, and completely outdated.

The US policy of “maximum pressure” without seeking regime change gives both sides more room to negotiate, but China’s “dual-track approach” still offers more hope for a win-win resolution.

The tendency to retreat into the comfort that the past provides will only be reinforced when the President and the Prime Minister meet on May 4 aboard a U.S. warship docked in New York Harbour to commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Coral Sea. On the one hand, the symbolism is powerful: two close, longstanding allies marking a pivotal moment in which the threat of Japanese imperialism was turned back. On the other, it projects a view of the relationship that is literally moored to memory, failing to engage in the more difficult conversations about what the American posture in Asia will look like in the years ahead, and what that means for Australia.

Contrary to some commentary, the American political system has not been swept away by a wave of populism, and no one should underestimate US institutions.

Observing the changing dynamics in the United States and elsewhere in the world, the unsettling question is: Will the United States follow the experience of centralized Confucian power—and by default the Communist Party of China (CPC)—to create a Hamiltonian world for Hamiltonians?

When Donald Trump became the 45th President of the United States on January 20, many in the U.S. and other parts of the world tended to believe that the U.S. would experience dramatic changes in the first two years of his presidency, creating a world full of uncertainties.