"Albert Speer's Grandson Addresses Joint Session Of Congress." Can you imagine that headline? I can't either, particularly if Speer's grandson had devoted much of his life to rehabilitating his grandfather's image, was on record as being sympathetic to Holocaust deniers and had used his political base among Germany's neo-Nazis as the springboard to secure the prime ministership.

Abe’s expansion of Japan’s military capabilities—even within the new “guidelines”—could allow later American administrations, realizing that U.S. strategic interest demand non-confrontational relations with China, to conclude that Japan does need or warrant defense by the United States.

Japan’s PM Abe’s amnesia toward past military crimes and general xenophobia calls into question whether a U.S. alliance with Japan is in the U.S.’s best interest – especially in dealing with the challenges on the Korean peninsula.

Despite a recent Pew Research survey indicated that two-thirds of Japanese do not want a more active military, Prime Minister Abe’s visit to the U.S. saw the release of new “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation,” which risks U.S. involvement in Japan’s territorial claims.

Japan’s leader made a good show out of his US visit, but the struggle to nail down a TTP deal actually highlighted deep differences between the two countries. Meanwhile, Japan’s stance on revising history continues to irritate many in Washington as it does across Asia.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States is an important opportunity to carry forward his grandfather's legacy in seeking equal status with the U.S. in the area of security. “Abenomics,” which gives top priority to the "price of capital," features bold financial policy and flexible fiscal policy will not be compromised for the U.S.-backed TPP, though.

The U.S. state visit by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will be remembered not only because few foreign leaders have been privileged to address a joint session of Congress, but for the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Neither Washington nor Tokyo should explicitly link a more robust U.S.-Japan relationship with deterrence against China’s rise.

A key component of Washington’s military rebalancing strategy is improving its relationship with Japan. However, actions by Abe and some close associates reinforce suspicions of the attempt to legitimize imperialism through revised textbooks, visits by the PM to the Yasukuni Shrine, and reluctance to accept the history of “comfort women.”

Previous U.S.-China issues of friction are becoming magnified again: Taiwai-Strait militarization, tension on the Korean Peninsula, maritime tension in the East and South China Seas, and security issues in cyberspace. Zhang Tuosheng calls on both nations to improve their desire to not seek conflict as a solution, strengthen and improve their liaison mechanism, enhance the role of research, and hold joint meetings.

Abe must understand – and the U.S. should exert pressure on him – that the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II is prime time for him to profoundly reflect on Japan’s wartime crimes. If Abe goes too far in the wrong direction, there will be no peace in the Asia-Pacific and the hard-won beginning of a Sino-Japanese détente may vanish.