Interaction between leaders of CPC and KMT has already become a convention between the two parties. Public opinion has welcomed such communications and formed a basis for the two sides across the Taiwan Straits to promote peace and development and stabilize cross-Strait relations. This has become the brand of these two political parties, both of which uphold the 1992 Consensus. The high-level exchanges and the CPC-KMT forum have powered the development of cross-Strait relations. The meeting between KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu and CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping was the first meeting between leaders of the two parties since the DPP took power and the KMT became the opposition. Xi took the opportunity to elaborate the mainland’s policy towards Taiwan. He emphasized the bottom line of the mainland and attempted to explore new aspects of cross-Strait relations.
First, he clarified that the 1992 consensus is about the nature of cross-Strait relationship and serves as the touchstone of whether the two sides belong to one country. Tsai Ying-wen, the new Taiwan leader, refuses to recognize the 1992 Consensus and has unilaterally disrupted cross-Strait peace and development, a status quo that has developed in the past eight years, driving cross-Strait relations into an age of cold confrontation. Tsai wants to seize the time of relationship cooling down to achieve ‘state normalization within Taiwan’ and ‘jurisprudential independence’ by way of ‘constitutional interpretation’. At present, the mainland is not able to directly influence and thus change public opinion in Taiwan. However, it is an undeniable fact that Taiwan and the mainland belong, constitutionally and legally, to one China. It is therefore strongly symbolic to reiterate the unshakable determination of the mainland to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity, to contain ‘Taiwan independence’ and to prevent the historical tragedy of secession. To put it straight, although the mainland cannot directly influence Taiwan’s jurisprudential independence process, it vows to be resourceful in dealing with the result. The one-China principle constitutes the inviolate political and jurisprudential bottom line for the mainland.
Second, the Xi-Hung meeting was a touchstone for the struggle between two camps on cross-Strait relations within the KMT. The KMT used to be the largest political party in Taiwan, and its program and orientation have a direct bearing on the future of cross-Strait relations. A KMT that favors an ‘independent Taiwan’ and converges with ‘pro-independence forces in Taiwan’ will only further chill the cross-Strait relationship and steer it to a more unknowable future. On the other hand, a KMT that holds high the banner of the 1992 Consensus and the objective of national reunification will serve as a buffering agent and an important communication channel during a period of cold confrontation between the two sides of the Taiwan Straits. From the crushing defeat to being driven out of the ruling position, the KMT went through incessant infighting, with cross-Strait relations a point in dispute. Hung plowed her own furrow with forthright support for national reunification. During her meeting with Xi, Hung gave a complete elaboration of the KMT’s ‘peace platform’, clearly deepening the 1992 Consensus, actively exploring the possibility of a peace agreement between the two sides, and steering the KMT to contribute to institutionalizing peace across the Taiwan Straits. How will these statements brew within KMT? What will be the result of KMT infighting? What will be Hung’s political status within her party after going back to Taiwan? Answers to these questions will testify to the future orientation of KMT.
Third, the Xi-Hung meeting was an attempt to explore new prospects for cross-Strait relations. At present, Tsai Ing-wen relied on the US and Japan to counter the mainland. From staffing to agenda setting, the US is on intimate terms with the Tsai regime, even urging active moves to find new consensus for DPP and CPC. On the other hand, the KMT is for the first time completely out of power and trying to adapt to its lowest position in Taiwan’s political life since its founding. Although the party remains politically active as the largest opposition force and still has some voice in the three branches of government, it is no longer able to hold back the DPP. Furthermore, the Taiwan authorities have used ‘transitional justice’ and ‘improper party assets regulations’ to contain the KMT’s finances, which produced spillovers to questions about KMT legitimacy, resulting in unprecedentedly low political influence for the party. In this situation, the mainland must explore a new path to continue rejecting official contact with the Taiwan authorities that have refused to recognize the 1992 Consensus, avoiding inter-party exchanges with a DPP that has a Taiwan independence clause and showing some kindness to the political forces still insisting on the 1992 Consensus and people in Taiwan. The Xi-Hung meeting thus signaled that the mainland will continue using the 1992 Consensus and its core content, i.e., both sides of the Taiwan Straits belong to one China, as the bottom line of cross-Strait exchanges and interaction — while seeking new ways to develop cross-Strait relations.
The meeting is an important event at a time where the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations faces challenges and uncertainties. The role of this historical event in the special situation of cross-Strait cold confrontation must not be underestimated because historical events are not only instantaneous but also diachronic. Consolidation and development of KMT-CPC ties and stability of forces recognizing the 1992 Consensus within KMT are important factors for cross-Strait relations to enjoy peace and continuity.