The U.S. government recently imposed sanctions on Chinese companies allegedly aiding Pakistan’s ballistic missile program, a move that could potentially jeopardize the country’s defense initiatives.
In September, the U.S. State Department sanctioned four Chinese firms, one Pakistani firm, and one Chinese citizen for transferring equipment to Pakistan, which is controlled under missile technology control regimes. This was a major blow to Pakistan’s missile program, which has relied on China for its development and maintenance over the years.
U.S. sanctions have specifically targeted the procurement of equipment for testing rocket motors for Pakistan's Shaheen-3 and Ababeel missile systems. The Shaheen-3 is a land-based medium-range missile with a range of 2,750 kilometers specifically developed to target every corner of India, Pakistan’s arch-rival. The Ababeel is a land-based tactical ballistic missile with a normal range of 1,800 kilometers. With these sanctions, Pakistan will now struggle to get equipment for testing rocket motors, especially if Chinese firms comply.
Pakistan is China’s largest purchaser of major arms. Between 2018 and 2023, Pakistan received 58% of all major arms exports from China, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Moreover, Pakistan and China are collaborating on the production of the JF-17 Thunder aircraft and the Al-Khalid main battle tank. Pakistan has also purchased 25 J-10C aircraft and Wing Loong II armed drones from China, ordered eight Hangor-class attack submarines, among other equipment, and its Haider battle tank is a variant of the Chinese VT-4.
Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs termed the U.S. sanctions as biased and politically motivated. “Similar listings of commercial entities in the past were based on mere suspicion; they involved items not listed under any export control regime and yet were considered sensitive under broad, catch-all provisions,” said a statement from the ministry’s spokesperson.
The timing of these sanctions raises questions about why the U.S. has imposed them at this particular juncture in time. The first and foremost reason is that they are an extension of the existing U.S.-China geopolitical rivalry. Washington seemingly viewed the targeting of firms allegedly supplying equipment to Pakistan’s missile program as a crucial opportunity, representing a strategic maneuver in its ongoing geopolitical competition with China. And as the U.S. considers China a major threat to its influence in the Asia Pacific region, it’s likely policymakers will continue taking actions that undermine Chinese defense firms.
Another driving factor for the sanctions is the U.S.’ desire to secure its allies in the Indo-Pacific region from threats of ballistic missile programs. As previously noted, Pakistan's ballistic missile system is designed to target various regions within India. Furthermore, Pakistan aims to enhance its capabilities to reach distant areas, including strategic locations such as the Nicobar Islands in the Indian Ocean, should conflict arise. India, however, is a leading ally of the U.S. in the region. Consequently, Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. largely revolves around India, so it’s only natural for the U.S. to seek to protect the country from potential threats. Undermining Pakistan’s ballistic missile program by sanctioning Chinese firms is a way to achieve that target.
It’s also essential to analyze the impact of the U.S. sanctions. First, these sanctions will undoubtedly slow down the development of Pakistan’s missile program. Effective missiles require spare parts for regular maintenance, and the sanctions may complicate Pakistan's ability to get such components from China. Given the deep integration of Chinese firms into the global financial system, the prospect of exclusion from this system as a result of U.S. sanctions could dissuade these firms from providing the necessary spare parts to Pakistan.
Second, grant India a sense of security. Any efforts to slow down the development and upkeep of Pakistan’s India-centric missile program will be a sigh of relief for India. As a result, Pakistan may find it hard to maintain a huge stockpile of ballistic missiles due to spare parts shortages, which will undermine Pakistan’s defense needs while India can maintain a larger stockpile of similar missiles without any problems. Ultimately, this will protect the security interests of India vis-a-vis Pakistan. Once India feels protected from Pakistan, it can focus more on its defense preparations against China, which was part of Washington’s intent when applying the sanctions.
Third, Pakistan is collaborating with Beijing to build fighter aircraft jets, and has ordered eight submarines from China. Sanctions on missile programs have also raised fears that Chinese companies involved in aircraft and submarine sales to Pakistan may be sanctioned by the U.S. as well, which could potentially cripple Pakistan's defense production. So, these sanctions also have an indirect negative impact on wider Pak-China defense cooperation.
Last, the sanctions could indirectly push Pakistan closer towards China, which may be an unintended negative impact from Washington’s perspective. The U.S. is now targeting the means through which Pakistan gets defense supplies from China, which will compel Pakistan to further align with the Chinese to protect its interests, as the U.S. is firmly standing with India.
Overall, the recent U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms linked to Pakistan's missile program have far-reaching implications for the geopolitical landscape of South Asia. Given these circumstances, Pakistan is actually likely to deepen its defense collaboration with China and may be inclined to offer additional geopolitical concessions, which would be a win for Beijing. This shift highlights an opportunity cost for Washington in imposing sanctions on Pakistan's ballistic missile program, as it may inadvertently strengthen the Sino-Pakistani partnership.
