In the Chinese capital on July 23, high-level representatives of 14 Palestinian factions signed the Beijing Declaration on Ending Divisions and Strengthening Palestinian National Unity. If some Western media were skeptical or adopting a wait-and-see attitude about China’s success in brokering a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement last year, the Beijing Declaration provides yet another strong testament to the fact that China has become a player to be reckoned with on Middle East affairs.
In my view, the significance of the Beijing Declaration should not be underestimated, either from the perspective of the Gaza crisis, regional peace or China’s Middle East diplomacy.
First, the declaration may help to provide new ideas for the protracted Gaza crisis. Since the outbreak of the crisis in October, both the Palestinians and the Israelis have paid a huge price. According to Gaza’s Ministry of Health in July, Israeli military operations there have resulted in more than 39,000 deaths and nearly 90,000 injuries, including many innocent Palestinian women and children.
The immense humanitarian crisis has caused widespread international outrage. In addition to the campus protests that have been taking place, some Western countries and international organizations have criticized Israel and accused it of military adventurism. In the eyes of most members of the international community, the Benjamin Netanyahu government’s so-called self-defense moves have in fact turned into a sort of collective punishment of Gaza’s people.
As Carl von Clausewitz once observed, war is the continuation of politics. Yet the Netanyahu government’s military operations in Gaza have not been accompanied by any effective political solution. His three pre-conditions for a cease-fire in Gaza — the destruction of Hamas, the demilitarization of Gaza and the de-radicalization of Palestinian society — are not feasible.
As a result, while Israel has made a lot of military progress in Gaza since the beginning of the conflict, it has made no progress at all politically or strategically. On the battlefield, Israel has not only failed to bring back all the hostages taken by Hamas but also failed to liquidate the Hamas organization — not to mention the radical ideology and transnational network behind it.
At the international level, on one hand, Israel has lost the international image and moral foundation that it has painstakingly built up over the years. It will not be easy for it to re-establish its military prestige and strategic deterrence in the region in the short term. At the same time, the regional situation risks further escalation and deterioration because of the involvement of Hezbollah and the Houthis. Because Israel defined Hamas as a terrorist organization at the outset of the conflict, it is blocking any possibility of dialogue.
In the Beijing Declaration, all the Palestinian factions have agreed that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative, which will spare Israel the embarrassment of having to deal with a Hamas representative in the future. At the same time, a takeover of the Gaza Strip by the PLO, with appropriate participation by Hamas and the support of other countries, may become the greatest common denominator acceptable to all parties. This would provide a great deal of room for imagination in solving the Gaza crisis and preventing a continued escalation of the conflicts in the region.
Second, the Beijing Declaration has helped to rekindle hope in the Middle East peace process. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict was at the heart of the problem after World War II and closely linked to the question of statehood for Israel and Palestine. After the successful establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948, the question of Palestinian statehood has never been effectively addressed.
The two-state solution, as a political initiative to promote Palestinian statehood, had been supported by most countries in the world, but it was fraught with difficulties in practice. On one hand, domestic politics in Israel has taken an increasingly rightward turn over the past three decades, with ever fewer people and politicians supporting the peace process. On the other hand, after Yasser Arafat’s death, there was no authoritative Palestinian leader capable of continuing to lead the political dialogue. Particularly after the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Palestine was split in two, with Gaza and the West Bank governed respectively by Hamas and Fatah.
For Israel, the Palestine split may have provided a greater strategic advantage. But it has also made it difficult, if not impossible, for Israel to engage in any effective political dialogue with the Palestinians. After Arafat’s death, I discussed with some Israeli counterparts the question of whether they will miss Arafat. It turned out that the question was not unfounded, and that the continuing divisions and struggles within the Palestinian society are not a boon to Israel. In fact, the decline of Fatah after Arafat and the dominance of Hamas in Gaza is one of the major causes of the current crisis there.
During the signing of the Beijing Declaration, representatives of 14 Palestinian factions participated as a sign of “national unity.” If they can take this as an opportunity to truly achieve national unity, it will be possible in the future to form a relatively unified voice in any Palestinian-Israeli dialogue or peace talks, creating new opportunities for their own statehood and for enduring peace.
It must be pointed out that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has going on for nearly a century, and the hatred, contradictions and mistrust accumulated on both sides cannot be resolved overnight. Coupled with the dramatic changes in the domestic politics of the main parties, as well as external stakeholders such as the United States, Europe and the Arab world, there will be enormous new variables and uncertainties in the future, whether it be a cease-fire in Gaza, the relaunching of peace talks or the promotion of a new peace process. In this regard, the Beijing Declaration provides only a starting point and a possibility, not a final solution or concrete outcome.
Finally, the Beijing Declaration demonstrates China’s enormous influence in Middle East regional affairs and provides new opportunities for world powers to cooperate in the region. Over the past decades, China has become the most important trading partner of many regional countries through economic cooperation that includes America’s allies or partners.
As China has long insisted on a diplomatic posture of non-interference and has avoided getting too involved in the regional affairs, its influence is mainly focused on the economic sphere. However, Beijing’s successful mediation of the rapprochement of Iran and Saudi Arabia, including the reconciliation of Palestinian factions, is a good indication that its influence in the region is no longer limited to the economic field.
More important, compared with the West’s zero-sum diplomacy, which puts more emphasis on geopolitical competition and black-or-white, China has demonstrated the wisdom of an oriental global power with a deep cultural and historical heritage by building various win-win strategic partnerships. So far, China remains the only world power that maintains effective dialogue with all parties in the region. There is no substitute for this unique role.
In the eyes of some Western countries, especially the United States, many people still tend to view the expansion of China’s influence in the region through a lens of great power rivalry or competition. In fact, China not only rejects this concept but also has no intention of seeking such a standoff with the United States.
The Middle East should not be a battleground for great power competition as it has been throughout recent, nor is China the cause of the current failure of U.S. diplomacy in Gaza. On the contrary, China’s diplomatic efforts have helped to prevent the escalation of regional crises. For Washington, which has been heavily dragged down by the Gaza crisis, the time has come to look squarely at China’s role in the Middle East.
