To counterbalance threat will remain the constant in China-U.S.-Russia strategic rivalry as long as anarchy remains the norm in international political architecture.
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Sixty-nine years ago, the U.S. intervened in Vietnam to secure a strategic edge over the Soviet Union. However, the move backfired: It failed to achieve dominance and instead sparked widespread anti-war protests domestically. Amid mounting pressures and the shifting dynamics of China-U.S.-Russia relations, President Richard Nixon introduced the “Nixon Doctrine” and managed to leverage the “great triangle” to rectify his strategic missteps, thereby laying the groundwork for America’s victory in the Cold War.
Fast forward to 2025. President Donald Trump faces challenges akin to the Nixon era. To gain a strategic advantage, he has a pressing need to end the Russia-Ukraine conflict, while carrying forward with the Biden administration’s policy of containing Russia and China. As the international system has inherent constraints, and isolationism has its limitations, the U.S., China and Russia each respond to strategic competition with varied approaches, all rooted in the logic of counterbalancing threats.
International system constraints
The interplay between the international system and its constituent units will shape the dynamics of strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War era, the post-Cold War international system is characterized by disequilibrium and anarchy, which no single superpower can alter on its own. Consequently, throughout his four-year tenure, despite leaving his mark in other ways, Trump was unable to alter the constraints inherent in the existing international architecture. In the aftermath of the Nixon Doctrine, entities such as ASEAN, OPEC and the European Economic Community have grown rapidly, alongside ascendant regional powers, which served to offset the destructive power of the U.S.-Soviet rivalry.
In tandem, while military power is not the only defining factor in international conflicts, nuclear arsenals remain a pivotal strategic deterrent. As of March 2024, Russia possessed 5,580 nuclear warheads, compared with the 5,044 for the United States, according to the Federation of American Scientists. In November, Putin’s approval of a revised nuclear deterrence policy presented a big challenge. It will test Trump’s tolerance for altering the status quo in Ukrainian conflicts.
Flexible isolationism
Alexander Hamilton, an early American political philosopher, recognized the merits of isolationism. He said that national interests should guide international actions within the limits of justice and integrity. Despite its centurylong influence on U.S. policy, isolationism for American elites has been tempered with moral realism. This flexibility explains Franklin D. Roosevelt’s involvement in European and Asian affairs, Nixon’s approach to China and his strong support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War.
In essence, Trump’s isolationism did not deviate from traditional U.S. diplomacy. Rather, perceptions of Trump’s foreign policy may be tilted because people are more accustomed to the internationalist face of America, which leads to a cognitive bias against Trump’s diplomatic actions.
Isolationism has clearly shaped Trump’s foreign policy, leading to a more cautious and protracted approach. For example, he is less likely to intervene in international affairs if a war of tariffs can effectively protect U.S. national security. Trump uses national security as a lever to sway public opinion, which means he exaggerates minor risks or downplays major ones that might raise his administration’s costs. In December, during his Paris visit, Trump said he would not support Ukraine’s NATO membership but would not object to European forces monitoring cease-fires there, without U.S. troop involvement. He recognized that a refusal to back Ukraine today could exact a higher price for U.S. national security in the future.
Responding to historic rivalry
A historical review shows that U.S. leaders, from Nixon to Biden to Trump, share the same goal of preserving America’s strategic preeminence. The ongoing anarchy in the international system means that counterbalancing threats remains the U.S. objective in the strategic competition with China and Russia, while the tactics employed may vary.
For Trump to achieve competitive advantage, resolving the Ukraine conflict is the key, which is central to U.S.-Europe, U.S.-Russia and China-Russia dynamics. Addressing this issue and ensuring NATO solidarity could potentially weaken Sino-Russian relations, disrupt China’s Asia supply chains, amplify the effects of a tariff war and secure a U.S. advantage in strategic competition.
But Russia’s decision-makers, mindful of the Soviet Union’s historical lessons, are unlikely to yield to Trump. Even if Trump were to abruptly achieve the end of the war in Ukraine, the underlying issue between Russia and the West would persist. Russia is expected to rely on nuclear deterrence and its traditional diplomacy of “divide and rule” to counter external threats. Since December, top Russian officials including Sergei Shoigu and Dmitry Medvedev have visited China to shore up a key pillar in their strategic rivalry with the West.
In response to growing external pressures, China will focus on strengthening its economic and technological prowess internally while broadening multilateral cooperation externally. This dual approach aims to counteract containment of China and set the stage for sustainable growth in China’s modernization.
