As the presidential election draws near in the United States, major political changes may occur that will add further uncertainties to China-U.S. collaboration in science and technology. In March, the two countries negotiated and extension of their Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement for half a year. In three months, the agreement will once again arrive at a crossroads. In the medium and long term, its protection of bilateral scientific and technological cooperation will decrease. The two countries need to find new ways to continue their collaborative ties in this field, or at least protect them from total decoupling.
Since the beginning of 2024, the China-U.S. relationship in science and technology has approached a critical point. On one hand, contacts and exchanges have continued, with a series of new collaborative mechanisms launched. Since the San Francisco summit, people-to-people exchanges in this field have picked up. In May, the first intergovernmental dialogue on artificial intelligence was launched, marking the start of formal bilateral consultations on this topic.
On the other hand, the U.S. government has redoubled its efforts to contain China with more stringent export controls and investment restrictions targeting tech industrial chains and cutting-edge technologies. Those conflicting moves have made it difficult to restore mutual trust, leaving the remaining ties of collaboration more fragile. Many people worry that if and when the political atmosphere in the U.S. changes significantly after the election, cooperation and communication between the two countries will take a hit.
From a longer historical perspective, changes in sci-tech ties may be attributed to three factors. First, the American strategic perception of China has changed, with the fields of science and technology having become the most serious source of concern for the United States. In recent years, the U.S. increasingly describes China as its main competitor, especially with regard to frontier technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and 5G communication. Both countries are leading players in global competition, and the catch-up and breakthrough of one side will have a huge impact on the other.
Second, the ecosystems of science and technology cooperation are changing. In the past 20 years, China and the U.S. have developed a mutually complementary and win-win ecology in science and technology, with their talent, capital, technologies and industrial chains deeply tied to each other. However, the ecology is changing. The American government places increasing emphasis on controlling science and technology industrial chains and has made various moves to increase the content of American technology in global industrial chains. This has changed the interactions between tech industries with increased competitive elements.
Third, the positions of China and the United States. in the global science and technology ecosystem are evolving. China has significantly improved its position and begun to seek tech development goals similar to those of the U.S. The increase of homogeneous competition has to some extent intensified antagonism.
American politics has also affected how the above three factors influence China-U.S. sci-tech ties. Competition tends to maximize and become overwhelming with a Republican administration, leading to more acute frictions with China. A Democratic administration, on the other hand, puts more emphasis on American competitiveness and its position in the tech ecology. For example, the Trump administration saw the advantages of Chinese enterprises in 5G as a direct threat and took extremely tough measures to suppress them. The Biden administration has made a greater effort to build industrial chains and ecosystems against China through alliances and multilateral mechanisms.
In this situation, no matter which party comes to power in the U.S., the two countries will face an increasingly inhospitable environment for tech cooperation. At the same time, however, they also need to keep their ties and connections and avoid a complete decoupling, which would have serious consequences for global sci-tech development. They must be creative and find new ways out.
First of all, both countries should put more emphasis on mutual trust and assurances in such underlying areas as talent development, academic exchanges and basic research, which have played a long-standing critical role in the sci-tech ecosystem and are no less important than capital or industry. Very strong mutually beneficial ties still exist in these areas and must be protected. In particular, students from both countries should not be subjected to political discrimination or groundless judicial harassment. In recent years, with tightening U.S. policies, many Chinese students in the U.S. face more visa restrictions and security clearances, which not only disrupts academic exchanges but also undermines the very foundation of sci-tech cooperation.
Second, the two countries should explore ways of cooperation to use the results of scientific and technological advancement to benefit all mankind. In international airspace management, poverty reduction and common development, China and the U.S. may join hands to narrow the tech divide and manage tech risks. The purpose is not to hedge their competition in other fields but to deepen and broaden cooperation to shape a long-term framework for future sci-tech ties.
For example, with regard to climate change, China and the United States may jointly develop and roll out clean energy technologies to reduce global carbon emissions. In public health, they may collaborate in vaccine R&D and disease prevention and control, with a potential future global health crisis in mind.
Finally, the two countries should try to better define national security boundaries in science and technology. Admittedly, the ongoing tech revolution has woven technology and national security tightly together, and it is difficult to measure the national security impact of emerging technologies. However, China and the U.S. need to continue exploring the boundaries — in particular by drawing upon lessons learned in mature technologies.
That boundary won’t be based on the protection of absolute security but rather on recognition of the security dilemma and reduction of miscalculation through increased transparency. For example, the two countries may increase information sharing and risk assessment in sensitive technologies via a regular tech dialogue mechanism to reduce potential conflicts caused by misjudgment.
Challenges come not only from the strategic competition between the two countries but also from the profound changes in the global science and technology ecosystem. In this context, the two sides need to actively explore new modes of cooperation with an open attitude and seek mutual benefits and win-win outcomes to realize development together. How they manage to find a balance between competition and cooperation will determine the future of science and technology in both countries and even the whole world.
