In a historic first, Manila hosted the latest iteration of the "two-plus-two" talks between Filipino and American defense and diplomatic chiefs. Philippine defense chief Gilberto Teodoro and Foreign Affairs Secretary Enrique Manalo hosted their American counterparts, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken, for arguably the most consequential meeting of its kind.
To boost the alliance, the guests announced the approval of a $500 million Foreign Military Financing (FMF) package to the Philippines, parts of which would be invested in the jointly-operated military facilities under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). TO enhance intelligence-sharing, both sides also finalized a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) similar to that between South Korea and Japan -- the two other major U.S. allies in Asia. The latest Philippine-U.S. talks came on the heels of a major defense pact between Japan and the Philippines.
Under the newly-signed Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA), the two sides agreed to establish the legal regimes and logistical procedures, which would regulate “the force of one country…visiting the other country.”. The RAA, which is expected to be approved by legislatures in both nations in coming months, will pave the way for expanded joint exercise and drills between the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Japanese Self Defence Forces (JSDF). Down the road, the new Philippine-Japan defense pact may also facilitate the transfer as well as joint development of weapons systems between the two U.S. allies.
The Philippines is also exploring similar pacts with New Zealand, Canada, and France, while South Korea and India have emerged as major suppliers of modern weapons systems for the Southeast Asian nation. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. described his country’s strategy as akin to building something “close to the apex of a defensive alliance." Upon closer examination, however, it’s clear that the Southeast Asian nation is more interested in enhancing its own heavily-underdeveloped defensive capabilities rather than joining an anti-China alliance in Asia.
By all indications, the new U.S. defense package is too minimal to reset the balance of power in the region. Given China’s preponderance of military strength, the Philippines is simply seeking a diverse network of partners and allies in order to enhance its minimal leverage amid the intensifying maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Unwilling to be dragged into any U.S.-led ‘proxy war’ against China, the Philippines has doubled down on its diplomacy with the Asian superpower by recently negotiating an interim agreement over the hotly-contested Second Thomas Shoal. If anything, the Southeast Asian nation recalibrated its ‘transparency initiative’ in order to avoid provoking China and give diplomacy a chance.
Doubling Down on Alliances
In fairness, the Philippine-U.S. alliance has been moving into a ‘hyperdrive’ mode in the past year. The two allies have been conducting their biggest and most sophisticated wargames yet, while undertaking joint patrols with likeminded powers in the South China Sea. Unlike former President Rodrigo Duterte, who refused to visit any Western capital throughout his six-year term in office, Marcos Jr. has visited the U.S. on four different occasions over the past two years alone (most recently for the inaugural trilateral Japan-Philippine-U.S. (JAPHU.S.) trilateral summit) in addition to high-profile trips to Canberra, London, Brussels, and Davos.
Crucially, the Philippines has also granted the Pentagon four additional new military sites under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), while finalizing a number military hardware transfers after Manila decided to scrap earlier deals with Russia in compliance with new Western sanctions. Top U.S. officials, including Vice-President Kamala Harris, have regularly visited the Philippines. Blinken was on his third visit to Manila yet since Marcos Jr.’s ascension to office.
On his part, Blinken, carrying warm greetings from the White House, praised the latest high-level meeting as “genuinely historic” and described the new defense aid package to the Philippines as “once-in-a-generation investment” to boost the Southeast Asian nation’s maritime security modernization. However, it’s clear that U.S. assistance to the Philippines is substantial enough to alter the regional balance of power, nor is the Southeast Asian nation interested in aligning with the West against China.
Quest for Strategic Autonomy
“I am a bit surprised considering how interesting your political situation has become back in the States, but I’m glad that you’ve found the time to come and visit with us,” Marcos Jr. told his American guests, referring to growing polarization and political instability in America ahead of November elections.
Though his remarks were taken lightheartedly by Blinken and Austin, it was clear that the Philippines -- similar to other Asian allies -- is carefully following domestic political upheavals in America with a tinge of worry. If anything, even Manila is quietly worried about the prospect of a second Trump presidency, which could mean greater American unilateralism, destructive protectionism, and brazen transactionalism.
More fundamentally, however, Marcos Jr. is intent on strengthening ties with the U.S. if it enhances the Philippines’ strategic autonomy. This explains why, from the very beginning, the Filipino president also sought a “new golden era” of bilateral relations with China and chose Beijing, ahead of either Washington or Tokyo, as his first major state visit destination. Only when he felt that China was not offering sufficient incentives on the economic front and any meaningful compromise on areas of divergence that Marcos Jr decided to double down on traditional alliances.
Festering disputes in the South China Sea only reinforced his determination to expand and leverage the Philippines’ network of security partnerships. Signing RAAs with Japan and new strategic partners help enhance interoperability with likeminded nations as well as accelerate the Philippines’ military modernization. If anything, the Southeast Asian nation is allocating $35 billion to develop its naval and aerial capabilities over the next decade.
Nevertheless, the Filipino president has rejected alignment with the West or entry into any New Cold War. “[T]here is a narrative out there that is going around that we are at the beck and call, practically, of the United States when it comes to these foreign policy decisions, especially surrounding the South China Sea,” Marcos said during a high-profile speech on the sidelines of his state visit to Australia earlier this year. “But let me make it very, very clear. The Philippines acts for its own interest, and the decisions that we make when it comes to foreign policy are decisions that we make because we believe, and are convinced, and know that it is in the national interest,” he added.
Few months later, the Filipino president reiterated that position during his keynote speech at Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where he emphasized the Philippines’ strategic agency and quest for a ‘middle power’ status. Accordingly, Marcos Jr. has turned down offer of military assistance from Pentagon even at the height of recent tensions in the South China Sea, while also remaining mum on how far he is willing to give Americans military access to Philippine northern bases near Taiwan’s shores.
Marcos Jr. is keenly aware that the U.S.’ military assistance to the Philippines is dwarfed by multi-billion aid packages to the likes of Ukraine or Israel. Not to mention, China is a superpower with growing strategic footprint across adjacent waters. Accordingly, the Philippines is still pursuing diplomacy, albeit from an enhanced strategic position. The upshot is the recently-finalized interim agreement between the Philippines and China over the Second Thomas Shoal, under which both sides exchange information over any Filipino resupply mission to the contested feature. Crucially, the Philippines is also drawing down its ‘transparency initiative’, namely publicizing encounters with and aggressive actions by Chinese forces, in order to avoid diplomatic provocation. By all indications, both sides are giving diplomacy a second chance, underscoring Marcos Jr.’s strategic pragmatism.
