Recently, a U.S.-Japan-India-Australia quadrilateral security dialogue summit was held at U.S. President Joe Biden’s private home in Delaware. It was the fourth Quad summit and the last one for the Biden administration. One of the recent U.S. attempts to contain China by developing new alliances, the Quad has made some progress. But it also faces many fundamentally inevitable constraints.
The Quad became institutional as an important part of the U.S. alliance system in the Asia Pacific and the world during Biden’s term. Its prototype was first proposed in 2007 by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The idea was given more attention and taken up by the Trump administration to support its Indo-Pacific strategy amid so-called strategic competition with China. The Biden administration relies more on alliances to contain China and elevated the grouping to the leader level in 2021.
Meanwhile, the diplomatic and military interactions of the four countries were also institutionalized. At the recent fourth summit, Biden replied to a reporter’s question about the Quad’s survival beyond U.S. elections this way: “Way beyond November.” India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi confirmed that India will host the summit next year.
The institutionalized quadrilateral dialogue is now a leading alliance network of the U.S., alongside its bilateral alliances in the Asia Pacific. The Quad, the AUKUS grouping and the emerging “Squad” bloc linking Australia, Japan, the Philippines and the U.S. now underpin America’s Asia-Pacific strategy. The institutionalization of the Quad — the only multilateral structure spanning the Pacific and Indian oceans of all U.S. moves to build coalitions around the world — offers systemic protection for the usual American offshore balancing strategy against an opponent. With bipartisan approval from both Republican and Democratic administrations, the Quad will probably be further strengthened in the future.
The Quad grouping has also made progress in using multiple new security topics to advance the national interests of the four countries. The Quad has left a strong security imprint since its inception as an exclusive group. Against the backdrop of China-U.S. strategic gaming, which comprehensively affects the regional situation, the four countries have significantly increased their attention on emerging security issues — on top of continued interest in traditional military security collaboration.
The first summit in 2021 set its sights on the climate crisis, emerging technologies and cyberspace and created a working group on critical and emerging technologies to pursue cooperation in artificial intelligence and next-generation communications technologies.
The 2022 summit focused on Indo-Pacific infrastructure construction and illegal fishing. In 2023, discussion centered on digital public infrastructure and proposed cooperation for undersea cable connectivity and resilience.
From the U.S. perspective, these new security topics help highlight the cooperative nature of the Quad and overshadow its role as a confrontational coterie against China. For the four, cooperation on the above-mentioned new topics will facilitate integration and strategic alignment in many fields.
There are also deep-rooted natural limits for the Quad. As the four countries’ interests and positions are not fully aligned, the lengthy joint statement produced in Delaware only includes moderate language that repeats their positions on their respective core strategic issues. Their differences are larger with regard to global hot spots such as the Ukraine crisis and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The fact that various political forces in the U.S. strongly oppose Japanese steelmaker Nippon Steel’s attempt to buy U.S. Steel and that the U.S. and India see emerging strategic differences in the Ukrainian crisis also cast a shadow over the summit and the Quad’s future.
On the more crucial issue of China, while the Quad has been trying its best to align positions within the group, it is obviously difficult for the four countries to synchronize their China policy priorities and needs. All of them are adjusting their China relations to varying degrees. Biden’s widely reported hot-mic moment also reflected the two-sidedness of America’s China policy, which has attracted much attention.
Moreover, all four countries are in a new domestic political cycle, and the outcome of the upcoming U.S. election remains unpredictable. Therefore, all of them are planning ahead for potential uncertainties, possibly including whether or not they will continue supporting the U.S. position in its strategic competition with China. Shared strategic concerns drive the Quad coterie as it offers the benefits of an alliance. They also challenge the complex interactions within the group as the four countries continue to differ in their national interests and positions, which will affect alliance management.
