The indefinite deployment of a powerful U.S. weapon system in the northern Philippines and Beijing’s strong reaction to it has the makings of a new missile crisis. Manila wants to acquire a Typhon mid-range capability (MRC), but Beijing warned this would trigger a dangerous arms race. Manila argues that its procurement decision is driven by its own security calculus. But the cost, sophistication, and nature of this capability and the timing fuel doubts, adding to the boiling cross-Strait flashpoint.
South China Sea or Taiwan Strait?
Typhon MRC was installed in Laoag in northern Luzon during a joint Philippines-United States exercise last April and has stayed since, much to China’s chagrin. Laoag City is the capital of Ilocos Norte province, the stronghold of the powerful Marcos family. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. served as vice governor, governor, and representative of the province’s second district. His late father, strongman Ferdinand Sr., also served as a representative before becoming a senator and, eventually, president. Hence, stationing Typhon in the city suggests it has the nod from the highest official in the land. Choosing Laoag may be both strategic and expedient, given its location and buy-in of national and local leadership. Other provinces, like neighboring Cagayan, have aired unease about increased U.S. military presence, worried this may affect Chinese investments and put them directly in harm’s way should hostilities break out.
The storm brought by the appearance of the Typhon was preceded by the expansion of U.S. military access in the northern theater closer to Taiwan. This fueled speculation that the move was more in line with a cross-Strait crisis rather than deterring China in the South China Sea. From where it is presently fixed, the MRC can fire missiles that can hit targets way beyond the South China Sea, including the Mainland, Taiwan, and parts of the Western Pacific. Beijing replied to this unprecedented prolonged arms deployment by staging its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test in 44 years.
The Typhon deployment infuriated China. Not even U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, have allowed installment of the platform on their territory, possibly anticipating China’s reaction. While Seoul’s THAAD bid may be understood in light of Pyongyang’s growing nuclear and ballistic arsenal, no other South China Sea claimant has seen China’s maritime grab in such stark view as to warrant hosting a foreign lethal missile system on their soil. Beijing claimed the move was destabilizing, a view Manila was quick to refute. Likely to assert agency, Manila said it is keen to induct a Typhon to strengthen its defense posture. Owning the capability may be a ploy to allay concerns that the country is simply granting the U.S. free reign to use its territory for its larger strategic goals. The logic is that Philippine-owned U.S. arms on Philippine soil mean the button will be pushed by someone from Manila, not Washington. This is akin to South Korea’s order for a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery, which also riled Seoul’s ties with Beijing.
No bystander? But at what cost and risk?
Due to its proximity and the presence of over 150,000 Filipino nationals in Taiwan, a cross-Strait emergency presents dilemmas for the Philippines. Manila already struggles to deal with Beijing in the South China Sea in the west and would not wish to have another front in the north. But the prospect of a forceful takeover of the self-ruled island worries the Southeast Asian country. While Manila abides by the “One China Policy,” it maintains unofficial ties with Taipei, which is also an important trade partner and investor.
Allied exercises in northern Luzon and Batanes, expanded American military footprint, and Typhon’s indeterminate placing in that space can be seen from the prism of the Taiwan crisis. Three of the four new agreed locations for US military presence are in northern Luzon. For the first time in the history of the Philippines-US Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), a naval base was opened for US access. Camilo Osias Base in Santa Ana, Cagayan stares at Taiwan across the Luzon Strait. Four of the five original EDCA locations are all air bases further south. The other one is an army base. Typhon was stationed at Laoag International Airport. Another new EDCA site was the Lal-lo airport in Cagayan. That both Laoag and Lal-lo are civilian airports suggests that even strategic non-military real estate can be tapped in a possible contingency operation.
All these developments give the impression that Manila is warming up to a possible Taiwan emergency, which some estimate may happen by 2027. Washington is reportedly keen on building a potential dual-use port in Batanes closer to Taiwan. Northern Luzon was a theater for joint Philippine-U.S. military exercises last year. Last October, Philippine and U.S. marines staged drills to evacuate displaced Filipino migrant workers, a scenario that may happen should armed conflict break out. Hence, Beijing’s intensified pressure on its smaller neighbor may be more in reply to Manila taking steps aligned with the U.S. broader deterrence initiative to prevent Beijing from using force against the island.
Marcos said that EDCA sites will not be used as staging grounds to target another country. EDCA facilities are also said to be useful for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. Northern Luzon and Batanes being at-risk for strong typhoons make it a palatable pretext. But China is not buying it and is vigilantly watching Philippine and U.S. actions in this space. Beijing discourages other countries from intervening in the Taiwan issue, saying it is a domestic matter. Even before its ICBM test, China had already warned the U.S. and its neighbors to stay clear of Taiwan. The southernmost of the six exclusion zones where China undertook drills in response to the 2022 visit of former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taipei included waters and airspace off northern Batanes. Five ballistic missiles fired by China during that exercise landed in Japan’s EEZ. These actions are messages to Manila and Tokyo, two US allies closest to Taiwan, and are counted upon by Washington as crucial in deterring forcible attempts to change the status quo across the Strait.
Philippine participation in a Taiwan emergency is a delicate issue. Repatriating its nationals in Taiwan is a top priority for Manila. It may also help evacuate other foreign nationals, including citizens of fellow ASEAN countries like Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand, which also have big communities on the democratic island. Manila may also permit medical evacuation to Batanes. Delivery of food, medicines, and other basic humanitarian supplies may be considered. Further steps may depend on the country’s comfort level, given the grave hazards involved. Pressure from the U.S. is expected, especially if the latter decides to play a big role in Taiwan’s defense, something to watch under the second Trump administration. However, an anxious domestic Filipino public may also dissuade the government from joining the fray, especially if the stakes are not sufficiently conveyed.
Due to its own turbulent ties with Beijing over the South China Sea and its traditionally strong alliance with the U.S., Manila may not be in a good position to broker a cross-Strait dialogue. But predisposing the country to bear U.S. arms as the only way to matter in a Taiwan Strait crisis shows a dearth in imagination. As a founding father of ASEAN, the Philippines, at the minimum, can support ASEAN or an ASEAN country like Singapore or Indonesia to play a more robust role in defusing tensions.
*This piece draws from the author’s prior work published in Italian text: Pitlo, Lucio III B. “Manila Morirebbe Per Gli Scogli Ma Non Per Taiwan.” Limes (Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica) No. 10 (November 2024). 223-231.
