Francesca Giovannini is executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom (MTA) at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs. Previously, she served as strategy and policy officer under the executive secretary of the UN’s Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in Vienna. She holds a doctorate in politics and international relations from Oxford University, and has served as consultant for various international organizations including the UN Mission in Lebanon and the UNDP Crisis Management and Recovery Network in the Middle East and the Pacific Region. She was invited to speak on a panel at the recent Xiangshan Forum in Beijing. She was interviewed by Huang Zhijin, a reporter for China-US Focus.
Huang Zhijin:
Thank you, Dr. Francesca Giovannini, for meeting with me. My first question is about the Russia-Ukraine war. How has it changed the dynamic of the nuclear posturing by the United States and Russia?
Francesca Giovannini:
This is a really important question, so I’m glad we start our discussion looking at relations between the United States and Russia.
For many years we have considered this relationship as the true cornerstone of the global nuclear order. Ultimately these countries hold the largest nuclear arsenals in the world, and most of the things we’ve learned about nuclear deterrence, and arms control came from the way in which the Soviet Union and the United States competed and deterred each other during the Cold War. There have been many ups and downs in that relationship. But I think the Ukraine war constitutes a breaking point and has frozen any possibility of strategic talks at least for the foreseeable future. Yes, it has hardened NATO alliances and transformed Europe into a militarized area, but above all it has eliminated, at least for now, the possibility of a real arms control dialogue between the Russians and the Americans. More important, it has also increased nuclear risks.
The Russians also have signaled that they have zero interest in talking to the Americans. There was an attempt last year when Jake Sullivan said that “we want to meet with China and Russia without preconditions, and will abide by the limitations of new START.” But in the same talk, he also said: that the United States will have to decide what to do in this specific environment and that it intends to retain U.S. superiority conventionally.
We are still witnessing an escalation in Ukraine. Nuclear weapons today are embedded into larger geopolitical, economic and social processes. It would be very difficult just to think about any nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Russia in the absence of any resolution of the Ukraine war. As a Cold War student, President Biden and his administration have done a great job in managing escalation, but what we are witnessing right now is an escalation point that might bring significant nuclear risks. We are seeing the Russians revising their nuclear policies in a way that might lower the nuclear threshold. The linkage between the U.S. and Russia might weaken dramatically and it will be years before we rebuild it.
Huang Zhijin:
Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened the use of nuclear weapons. What has prevented him from resorting to that option so far?
Francesca Giovannini:
I think the United States is very clear about what prevented President Putin from using nuclear weapons. You probably remember when Biden came on TV and said to Russians, “Don’t do it, don’t do it.” The Americans understood that the Russians were very close to considering it. But it was the signaling from China that prevented this. According to American intelligence agencies, in September 2022, the risk estimate of using nuclear weapons in the Ukraine conflict was 50:50, literally a flip of the coin away. What changed the dynamic was President Xi Jinping, who sent a very clear message to Putin and successfully contained the crisis. The United States doesn’t praise China for many things, but that is an episode where we clearly say China was indispensable, because China was the country that fundamentally made Russia reconsider the cost of the use of nuclear weapons. But China is also in a difficult position right now.
The issue with nuclear weapons and deterrence is that nuclear deterrence does not continue to hold when it’s completely stretched. This is not a political solution. It will come to a point where the Russians are going to be put in a situation where they have to make a decision. The Ukrainians will not give up unless we find a political solution in which China will play a fundamental role. The risks of nuclear use will go up exponentially.
Huang Zhijin:
Is nuclear deterrence still working or is it not so effective?
Francesca Giovannini:
This is a question for the 21st century. How much is nuclear deterrence continuing to be a framework for great powers? Nuclear deterrence has been an invaluable mechanism to maintain stability. But what nuclear deterrence doesn’t do is prevent conflicts at lower levels. Nuclear weapons have never been a political tool to resolve conflicts.
For example, what we are seeing now with nuclear threats coming from Russia is the attempt to leverage nuclear weapons as a political mechanism. But nuclear weapons were never meant in that sense. So we need to return to a simplified nuclear deterrence doctrine to make sure nuclear deterrence works the way it is supposed to work. But when we use nuclear weapons to blackmail, to leverage to impose certain types of foreign policy, there is no longer nuclear deterrence. That is where nuclear deterrents can fail.
Huang Zhijin:
About the “no first use” policy: President Biden was a strong advocate for that policy since he was vice president during Obama’s tenure. Even before he was elected in 2020, he reinstated his support of the NFU doctrine. But he reversed that position during his presidency and revised the U.S. nuclear declaratory policy, which for the first time reoriented Washington’s deterrent strategy toward China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Why did Biden omit that NFU pledge in the U.S.’s nuclear review and what are the reasons behind that?
Francesca Giovannini:
You are right. The no first use policy has been advocated within the Obama administration. Vice President Biden was in favor of it. Even during his first year in office, he thought about NFU policy, but what we would call “sole purpose” — the idea of just using nuclear weapons as a deterrence mechanism, not as a war-fighting system.
However, there are many different interest groups in the United States. When it comes to China, most of the policymakers today see China as a real competitor, way more able to compete than the Soviet Union ever was. The idea of tying yourself to restraints on your power projection was politically impossible. There is also a consideration about U.S. allies that want a commitment for a very specific type of power projection. But the calculation in the U.S. is domestic, and we have lost the argument of pro-arms control. We lost it way before China was in the picture. It started, actually, with President George W. Bush who announced that the United States had withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. So saying arms control is no longer working because of China is just not accurate. Historically, the United States moved away from arms control way before China started to expand its nuclear arsenal.
Huang Zhijin:
Donald Trump, the former president, has until recently warned of the dangers of a nuclear war, citing the Russia-Ukraine conflict, even as the Biden-Harris administration is under pressure to expand the U.S. nuclear arsenal. What are the differences between the two U.S. presidential nominees on nuclear reduction? Do they care about nuclear arms control? Who do you think is more likely to take up this issue when dealing with China?
Francesca Giovannini:
Both candidates have strengths and weaknesses and might provide an important opportunity for China. What I think China needs right now from a U.S. administration is being pragmatic, not ideological — a president who looks at relations with China as the most important and consequential in the world and understands that we need to manage the risks and boost the benefits of cooperation.
A President Harris or a President Trump will affect China in very distinct ways. Many of the China experts that Trump might bring into a new administration — including Matt Pottinger, Elbridge Colby and Robert C. O’Brien —have cast themselves as hawks when it comes to China, calling for stronger deterrence and containment and, if needed, a direct confrontation with Beijing. But Trump, in my view, is extremely pragmatic and does not have very strong beliefs one way or another. For a start, he has a sense of admiration for what he considers to be a great nation and has great respect for President Xi. He would be far less ideological over Taiwan and the South China Sea. He has said that he does not want to get an adversarial relationship with China over Taiwan. I think in terms of security, the Chinese would be able to have frank talks with Trump.
On the economic side, however, Trump will be extraordinarily tough. He has promised during this political campaign 100 percent tariffs on many imported Chinese products and will seek to compete aggressively in many domains. Harris’s foreign policy remains a question mark. Most likely she will continue some of Biden’s policies, including strengthening alliances in Europe and the Asia Pacific, seeking to engage China where and when possible and competing in critical sectors.
But it seems to me that the key difference between Harris and Trump would be in the role that allies might play in the relationship of the U.S. and China. Trump does not seem to believe in alliances and he will certainly invest far less in the Indo Pacific strategy than his predecessor. On the other hand, I think she’s going to be way more moderate when it comes to economic sanctions. She understands that decoupling with China is not possible. Therefore, a Harris administration try to de-risk some sectors and make them less vulnerable. In the end, she would be far less radical.
Huang Zhijin:
Where are the possibilities for the U.S. to reach out to China if Trump is reelected?
Francesca Giovannini:
I do believe that Trump is determined to have successful agreements with China, a country that he admires. For example, you can think about a series of mechanisms that could de-escalate the crisis in the Asia Pacific. Donald Trump will not necessarily withdraw from the region, but he is not as committed to allies as his predecessors were in the Asia Pacific.
Trump said that he would negotiate an exit strategy for Ukraine and Russia. In no way would he be able to do this without China at the table. One of the first things that Trump would probably do is talk to China about a possible approach to a cease-fire in the Ukraine war. That would open up a lot of possibilities for joint peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations. So you might not necessarily have nuclear talks coming in immediately as the first point, but this would be part of a security engagement with China and open a lot of possibilities — for example, the relaunch of a series of strategic stability dialogues. Trump tends to be far more transactional than what you’ve seen. This will come as a good turn for China.
Huang Zhijin:
During Trump’s first term, he tried to bring China back to U.S.-Russia nuclear arms talks for a far-reaching trilateral accord limiting the nuclear warheads of the three powers. China rejected this, maintaining that the priority should be Russia and the United States. So, if Donald Trump were re-elected, what do you think of the possibility that the U.S., China and Russia could hold talks and reach new agreements on arms control in the next five or 10 years?
Francesca Giovannini:
The arms control community in the U.S. has largely lost momentum in shaping the narrative around arms control agreements. There’s a prevailing belief, particularly regarding Russia, that entering into such agreements is futile, largely due to concerns about compliance. Many in the U.S. view Russia as untrustworthy and prone to cheating, so the question becomes, Why bother? This sentiment has extended to China as well, where there’s a perception that strategic talks are not worth pursuing.
However, it’s important to note that this perspective is not uniform across the U.S. government. The State Department, for instance, has advocated engaging in strategic dialogue with China. But within the defense community, there is a strong belief that arms control isn’t what’s needed right now. Instead, the focus is on strengthening deterrence, with a push for increasing military capabilities, thereby signaling superiority. As a result, it’s unlikely we’ll see serious arms control discussions in the near future.
The Trump administration’s initial effort to include China in arms reduction talks was ultimately a non-starter. Since the 1990s, China has consistently maintained that it will not engage in trilateral arms control discussions as long as the U.S. and Russia each possess more than 5,000 nuclear weapons. China’s consistent demand has been for the two nuclear superpowers — the U.S. and Russia — to reduce their arsenals significantly before China would consider joining arms control talks. The premise is that China would only engage in such discussions once the gap in nuclear capabilities has been meaningfully reduced.
Regarding Russia, any potential discussions about nuclear weapons are likely to come with significant demands — most notably an insistence on Ukraine remaining neutral. These conditions would make any agreement challenging in the near term. Looking ahead to 2026, it’s very possible that the New START treaty with Russia will expire without renewal, given the lack of any serious negotiations. Once this happens, the U.S. will no longer be constrained by the treaty’s limits on deployed nuclear weapons, which could be seen as advantageous, particularly as the U.S. evaluates China’s future actions in this domain.
I think China and the U.S. could resume strategic talks. But I just don’t think you will see very extensive treaties or agreements for a while. I think we are entering into a period of 10, 15, 20 years where we will just do a lot of informal partnerships, but there will not be a real attempt to create any formal agreement.
Huang Zhijin:
So in next 10 to 20 years, what principles and risk reduction measures can China and the U.S. talk about — either in dialogues or informal partnerships?
Francesca Giovannini:
This is an excellent question. There is a sense that the more we interact with China, the more we understand that it wants to define principles before it starts talking about policies. The U.S. operates exactly in the opposite way. The U.S. seeks converge not on principles which it sees as abstract and difficult to implement but on specific policies. Yet I think China’s approach on seeking harmonization on principles is a very important one. The U.S. and China could work together to bridge the gap between principles and policies. They are not mutually exclusive.
In terms of policies, there are very specific things that can be discussed between the two countries — for example, early notification on missile tests. It’s something that the U.S., the Russians and China have so that you notify your partner that you are about to conduct a specific missile test. This is very important and is part of the confidence-building mechanisms. There is also a proposal for de-confliction in the South China Sea and to somehow manage incidents at sea. Another idea is the strategic stability dialogue, which is part of the confidence building strategy.
For many years, the Soviets and the Americans didn’t understand each other, but they continued to talk. They wanted to understand what was the meaning of nuclear deterrence for the United States and what is the nuclear doctrine that you’re working on. Sometimes arms control simply takes a dialogue. The dialogue does not have to revolve necessarily around numbers. It can also begin with a discussion on principles that each side upholds to inform their nuclear doctrine. I also believe that the importance that China gives to no first use has to be taken seriously in Washington.
All these micro steps lead to larger agreements. Let’s not forget that it took over 20 years for the Soviet Union and United States to lead a negotiation and announce the arms control agreement. So I remind my colleagues in Washington: You can’t expect that you just jump right into an agreement with China. I think it’s very important for these great powers, both China and the United States, to perceive dialogue as a strategic tool, not as appeasement. Dialogue doesn’t preclude or doesn’t demand trust. Dialogue is based on the understanding that you want to understand your adversary.
Huang Zhijin:
On the question of the AUKUS pact, which China slams, do you think Donald Trump would change it? So far he has not revealed his attitude on it.
Francesca Giovannini:
If Trump were reelected, would he cancel it? It depends on how the agreement is presented to him by his advisers. If the agreement is cast as a commercial deal where the U.S. gets money out of it — if it's a commercial deal that allows American technology to be exported — then he will most likely support it. The rhetoric about AUKUS has been changed slightly in order to overcome some concerns and disagreements expressed by the nuclear nonproliferation community, in Australia and the UK in particular. It was cast as a defense agreement, now it is talked about also as a commercial deal and shifted to private sector cooperation by these three countries in terms of high-level technology and so on.
Huang Zhijin:
China says the AUKUS deal stimulates an arms race, undermines the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and disrupts regional peace and stability. What do you think of its nuclear proliferation risks?
Francesca Giovannini:
I have to be honest here. I understand China’s position. But I’m hearing also some misrepresentations about what AUKUS is, which concerns me a little bit. People say that to safeguard AUKUS, we will have to put in place a different kind of safeguards agreement because Australia is not a nuclear weapons state. The U.S. is appreciating this concern but also believes that the proliferation claim of China is unfounded.
The belief is that the U.S. and the UK will remain in full control of the fuel and refueling process, and the Australians will never be involved in the most sensitive phases — which would constitute a proliferation problem. The technology will not be controlled by Australia. That’s why it becomes very difficult to negotiate the implementation of the AUKUS agreement, because you need to build a submarine. But information sharing between two nuclear weapons states and information sharing with a non-nuclear weapons state must be very different. That’s why Aukus is progressing slowly, because there are a lot of legal issues that have to be resolved, including export control policies and how you align and harmonize the UK, the U.S. and Australia on the export control policy.
Therefore, it’s an agreement that looks way into the future but has a lot of difficulties right now. I understand China is making its point, not being pleased with the agreement, but I think it’s not about nuclear proliferation risks.
Huang Zhijin:
So from a security perspective, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell has linked AUKUS to Taiwan. He suggested in April that AUKUS submarines could be used in a war with China over Taiwan. This will raise the possibility of a direct military confrontation where nuclear weapons could be used. Are you worried about the security risks in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea?
Francesca Giovannini:
Without any doubt, yes. In Boston, MIT has run several war games exercises involving the Taiwan Strait, the United States and China. And virtually every single war game they run ends up in a nuclear exchange. In one scenario, 900 nuclear weapons were used by the two countries. The potential for an escalation to nuclear war is there.
What concerns me is not so much where it is going to happen but how is going to happen. There are a few things that we have lost. The first is signaling. There’s a lot of confusion about the messages we are sending to each other. Every time China makes a move, the U.S. thinks this is addressed to me and vice-versa, which leads these two countries onto an escalation path. In addition, the introduction of low-yield nuclear weapons in the Asia-Pacific theater, might create an incentive to believe that a nuclear exchange with China can be kept limited and controllable.
Huang Zhijin:
A final question on artificial intelligence. Whether building up the conventional capabilities or expanding nuclear forces, the application of AI technology seems indispensable. What is the role of AI in the nuclear industry? How should big powers like China and the U.S. manage the risk AI poses to the integrity of nuclear command and control?
Francesca Giovannini:
What AI does for the U.S. is just enlarge the ability in real life to detect any possible change on the ground in many countries around the world. As for surveillance around the globe, the ability of AI to develop models that map out what is happening in real-time in every single country — for example, the silos in China or the movements at the nuclear test site of the DPRK.
There is a big discussion in the U.S. about the integration of AI and nuclear command and control. This is a very delicate issue because the U.S. has already declared that humans will always remain in the loop. So the human in the loop is what President Xi and President Biden agreed on. It’s a sincere statement. But it is a little bit vague and superficial. What it doesn’t tell us is at what level of every single decision-making point in the nuclear infrastructure AI will be integrated. You are going to see a fundamental arms race also when it comes to artificial intelligence in nuclear command and control because it’s too important to have real data points, a sense of the intention of your adversary, to be communicated in real-time.
Artificial intelligence will inevitably be integrated into nuclear command and control. What is important is that both countries need to work on this. Despite what artificial intelligence might tell you in terms of a scenario, if you have a good knowledge of the country, of the nuclear doctrine, of the intentions, and if you have humans in the loop to review the data points, then you can still make sensible decisions.
I think the integration is already happening. Think about how missiles will work. Entire delivery systems, most of the computer simulations, or the trajectory or the time that these missiles need to cover, will all be more modeled by artificial intelligence.
Removing AI is going to be impossible, but to increase human knowledge, you’ll be required to examine those data points. In that sense, President Xi and President Biden started a very important work, and the next administration would like to work on this. I think cooperation between China and the United States on AI is going to be way more feasible than the cooperation between the U.S. and Russia.
