The Gaza conflict, now in its 11th month, has led to direct military clashes involving several actors, including the Houthi militia in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, Iran, Israel and the United States. It has significantly strained Israel’s relations with surrounding Arab nations, creating substantial challenges for the Middle East at large. War frequently functions as a stress test, during which the red lines and bottom lines of all stakeholders emerge.
It is crucial to understand that regardless of Israel’s military prowess or resolve, its aspirations for absolute victory, complete victory and total victory are unrealistic. The prospect of completely eradicating Hamas, Hezbollah or Iran is apparently not feasible. For years, Israel has considered Hamas a security threat, one that was believed to be manageable through targeted military operations by the Israeli military. However, following the Hamas attack on Oct. 7, 2023, the threat was perceived to have escalated to a point of being uncontrollable and unmanageable, prompting Benjamin Netanyahu’s conclusion that the only solution was the total annihilation of Hamas.
The ongoing conflict has indeed inflicted significant damage on Hamas, but it would be naive to think it could be entirely defeated. Israel must come to terms with the reality that the path to a cease-fire and dismantling of Hamas will be long and arduous. Hamas will be around for a long while, be it in the West Bank, Lebanon or Somalia. As for the dismantling of Hezbollah or the elimination of Iran, it is evident that Israel lacks both the capability and desire to pursue that outcome.
The possibility of a two-state solution appears to be diminishing, highlighting the urgent need for Palestinians, Israelis and the global community to harness their collective imagination and innovative thinking. They must seek out practical and viable interim measures that could pave the way for a two-state solution in the future. Currently, neither Palestine nor Israel seems ready for such a solution. Moreover, the ongoing conflict in Gaza has exacerbated tensions between Palestinians and Israelis, as well as deepened internal divisions within their respective communities.
The conflict has taken a toll on both sides, with the October incursion leading to Israeli retaliation that has resulted in heavy civilian casualties, as noted by Khalil Shikaki, director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, who observed that “neither Israelis nor Palestinians see each other as human beings.”
The complexity of the situation has been exacerbated by the decline of Hamas's military capabilities and the severe weakening of the Fatah-led government. These factors have presented the Palestinian authorities with new challenges. The near-collapse of security coordination between Fatah and Israel, coupled with the rapid expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the daily military operations conducted by Israeli forces in the area and Israel’s resolve to assert long-term control over Gaza, have all contributed to the diminishing sovereignty of the Palestinian National Authority.
Since 1993, the PNA has struggled to maintain a semblance of governance, but now its authority has become tenuous. Prospects for a Palestinian state are becoming increasingly precarious, with the PNA having lost much of the sovereignty it had strived to achieve.
The support for a two-state solution among both Palestinians and Israelis has been steadily diminishing. While popular will in favor of this approach has been evident from the late 1990s until around 2010, enthusiasm has since been fading. A survey conducted in June found that only 32 percent of Palestinians still believed in a two-state solution, while a substantial 70 percent supported the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7.
Additionally, a poll conducted in May last year sjpwed a marked decline in the number of Israeli Jews who believe in a two-state solution, dropping to 19 percent from 32 percent before Oct. 7. On July 21 this year, the Knesset overwhelmingly passed a resolution against Palestinian statehood by a vote of 68-9, which underscores the growing skepticism toward the two-state solution. That solution appears elusive in the near term, and it merits reflection on how Palestinian-Israeli relations should be managed.
In addition to Hamas, the other elements of the resistance axis — Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iran and Syria — do not possess the will or the military muscle to confront Israel directly. The conflict between Hamas and Israel is an existential fight, with Hamas committed to resisting to the bitter end. Hamas had expected a full-scale counteroffensive from Hezbollah in response to its attack on Oct. 7. However, looking back, the support provided to Hamas by Hezbollah, the Houthis, Iraqi militias and Iran was mostly indirect or through proxies, who didn’t directly enter the fray themselves.
At pivotal moments of war and peace, caution and restraint are the rule of thumb. On July 20, Israel conducted its first airstrike against the Yemeni port of Hodeidah, prompting the Houthis to pledge retaliation, but that has yet to materialize. On July 30, Israel carried out a targeted killing of Hezbollah’s top military commander, Fouad Shukur, in Beirut. Hezbollah’s response on Aug. 25 caused no significant damage to Israel. Additionally, on July 31, Israel assassinated to top political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniya, in Tehran, eliciting a pledge of retaliation from Iran, which likewise has not yet been realized.
Each member of the axis of resistance has its own set of priorities, with most operations focused within their own national boundaries. Hezbollah effectively governs within Lebanon, the Houthis control the majority of Yemen’s population and territory and the Iranian government manages a nation of 80 million people. Moreover, Israel does not pose an existential threat to these groups, which explains why none of them will up the ante too much in confronting it.
Gone are the days when Arab nations formed military and economic alliances to confront Israel. Initially, before 1979, these countries were ready to resort to war in defense of Palestinian interests. Later, they opted for political, economic and diplomatic channels to safeguard Palestine. Nowadays, however, the Arab nations primarily just lend moral support to uphold Palestinian rights. During the Gaza conflict, no Arab country severed diplomatic ties with Israel, imposed economic sanctions or engaged in military action against Israel. In fact, trade between Arab countries and Israel rose by 16 percent last year. Notably, on April 13 this year, in response to Iran’s incursion against Israel, several Arab nations joined in Israel’s air defense efforts.
The United States plays the role of “necessary devil” in the Middle East and is still valued as a key ally by Arab nations and Israel in the realms of military affairs and security. When conflicts erupt, the unwavering support of the U.S. for Israel often elicits backlash from the Arab world and beyond. However, their moral imperatives sometimes clash with their strategic interests.
In their competition with regional actors, the U.S. and Israel have demonstrated formidable military and intelligence capabilities, thereby reinforcing America’s position as the preeminent military ally in the region. Despite occasional disagreements, the intelligence and military collaboration between Israel and the U.S. has reached unprecedented levels and is expected to continue even after the current conflicts subside. Bahrain has recently inked new defense agreements with the U.S., and both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are showing a strong interest in enhancing their defense partnerships with the U.S.
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has noted that a comprehensive deal with the U.S. and Israel could potentially make him a target for extremist factions, referencing the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Nevertheless, he has indicated that he is prepared to accept this risk.
Only when the dust of war has settled do the nations involved recalibrate their domestic and foreign policies to align with newly established bottom lines and red lines. This dynamic may account for why warfare frequently exerts a structural influence on the political landscape.
