As an archipelagic state with a huge maritime domain, the Philippines attaches great importance to its waters, more so in recent years. Maritime issues are cross-cutting, affecting the country’s security and economy. As a developing country, it aims to sustainably harness resources from the sea, notably food, energy, and, down the line, critical minerals, to grow its blue economy. It recognizes mounting traditional and non-traditional challenges at or from the sea and is taking steps to mitigate or address them. Diplomacy remains the country’s preferred approach to calming choppy waters.
The National Security Policy 2023-2028, the third of its kind, envisions “a free, resilient, peaceful, and prosperous archipelagic and maritime nation, at peace with itself and its neighbors, enabled and protected by reliable defense and public safety systems.”
Traditional and non-traditional security challenges
The NSP document cites several national security interests that bear on the country’s maritime domain. These are national sovereignty and territorial integrity, economic strength, ecological balance and climate change resiliency, and regional and international peace and stability. The country’s national security agenda in its waters includes defense and military security, maritime and airspace security, border security, food, energy, and transport security. The country aims to exercise sovereign rights and freedom of movement in its maritime zones and strengthen maritime law enforcement operations against piracy, smuggling, poaching, illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF), and drug and human trafficking.
The recent oil spill off Manila Bay affected the marine environment, livelihoods, and safety of coastal communities and threatened to reach the shores of Metro Manila and neighboring provinces shows the gravity of maritime risks that the country faces. Typhoons and inclement weather can amplify the impact of such accidents. Industrial molasses also spilled into the waters of Negros Island, threatening a marine reserve area. This requires investment in enhancing maritime humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) capacity. Joint activities like the Regional Marine Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX) between the coast guards of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan last June are helpful in this regard. Last August 9, Philippine and Vietnamese coast guards also held their first joint exercise that focused on firefighting, search and rescue, and medical response.
In dealing with growing maritime security challenges, Manila is modernizing its military and coast guard and expanding defense ties with allies and partners. From April through May of this year alone, it held bilateral and multilateral naval drills with the United States, France, India, , Japan, Canada, and Australia. It is using diplomatic, military, economic, and social tools to deal with challenges in its vast maritime expanse. The country signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) with Japan and is working out a possible visiting forces agreement with France. Last July, Manila, for the first time, hosted the Philippines-U.S. 2+2 talks that gathered their defense and diplomacy chiefs. It welcomed the visit of German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius, the first of its kind, in early August. An Italian carrier strike group was reportedly keen on visiting the country after taking part in Australia’s Pitch Black multilateral air force exercises, where the Philippines is also a participant, sending aircraft (four FA-50s) for the first time to join the biennial undertaking. The country is reportedly eyeing to acquire French Scorpene submarines, American F-16s, and Swedish Saab Gripen multirole fighter jets. The country is raring to get more capable actors invested in its security. It also appreciates statements supporting its position in the flashpoint, including a June G7 Leaders’ Communique that cited the landmark 2016 arbitration award and rebuked the use of force and intimidation in recent sea clashes.
The Philippines is actively taking part in conversations to harmonize maritime law enforcement operations at sea. Last June 4-7, 2024, coast guards from ASEAN countries gathered in Samal, Davao del Norte, in the Philippines’ second-largest island of Mindanao, to work on a concept paper and terms of reference (TOR) and initiate the crafting of the South East Asian Protocols on Engagements At Sea for ASEAN Coast Guards and Maritime Law Enforcement Agencies (SEA-PEACE). The hope is that such a document can provide a useful guide for ASEAN maritime law enforcement agencies.
Two maritime flashpoints were cited in the NSP: the West Philippine Sea (WPS) and the Taiwan Strait. The first “remains a primary national interest,” while the second concerns “economic stability, a potential influx of refugees, and the welfare of overseas populations.” In the WPS, more than “the divergences of claims,” Manila argues that “claimants’ methods of asserting their positions, continue to pose strategic challenges, endangering not only the country’s territorial integrity, but also the Filipino people’s exercise of legitimate rights and their safety and well-being.” On the cross-straits issue, the NSP states that: “Any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would inevitably affect the Philippines given the geographic proximity of Taiwan to the Philippine archipelago and the presence of over 150,000 Filipinos in Taiwan.”
Deterrence and dialogue
The first state visit by President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. last year was to China. This year, it was to Vietnam. On both occasions, maritime issues figured. In 2023, the Philippines and China decided to create a direct communication mechanism between the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and the Maritime and Ocean Affairs Office of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines. Both sides commit to keeping the vice-ministerial level Bilateral Consultation Mechanism (BCM) on the South China Sea and Foreign Ministry Consultations. Early this year, the Philippines and Vietnam signed two memorandums of understanding (MOUs) on maritime incident prevention and coast guard cooperation. The two countries also agreed to resume the joint commission on maritime and ocean cooperation at the vice-ministerial level. In early August, both sides held their first coastguard exercise off Manila Bay. The Philippines remains committed to concluding a regional Code of Conduct on the South China Sea at the earliest time possible.
Last July 2, the 9th Philippines-China BCM was convened in Manila, and both sides vowed to de-escalate tensions and keep the dialogue to handle the disputes. There was an agreement to improve maritime communication mechanisms. Aside from Coast Guard hotlines, direct channels between the two sides’ Foreign Ministries and Presidential Offices will be opened. A provisional arrangement in Ayungin Shoal was reached, and a resupply mission to the contested feature days after the talks went smoothly without incident. Needless to say, while Manila is investing in deterrence and defense, diplomacy and dialogue remain the key approaches to resolving disputes and avoiding conflict, including an inter-state maritime crisis. In his third State of the Nation Address, President Marcos Jr. said: “In the face of challenges to our territorial sovereignty, we will assert our rights and interests in the same fair and pacific way that we have always done.” He added that “Proper diplomatic channels and mechanisms under the rules-based international order remain the only acceptable means of settling disputes.”
This updated commentary is based on the author’s participation in the sixth workshop organized by Centre for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore) and the Diplomatic Academy of Viet Nam held in Jakarta, with the theme “Southeast Asia’s Preparedness for Crises in the Maritime Domain.”
