U.S. and Chinese military officials meet for the Defense Policy Coordination Talks at the Pentagon, Washington, D.C., Jan. 9, 2024.
Let me first talk about the current state of China-U.S. crisis management. In August 2022, against the backdrop of a steady deterioration of relations, Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, visited Taiwan despite China’s strong objections. The visit prompted a crisis and led to the suspension of all communication. Bilateral relations then became even more tense with the balloon incident the following February.
Through joint efforts in the extremely dangerous situation, high-level contacts gingerly resumed in May 2023, as did dialogues in various fields. Among them, the resumption of consultations on Asia-Pacific affairs and the first consultation on maritime affairs were particularly relevant to the strengthening of crisis management. In November, the two country’s heads of state met in San Francisco and reached common understanding on many topics, including the direction needed to further stabilize China-U.S. relations.
Since the beginning of this year, senior officials have had more frequent contacts and further dialogues. The first intergovernmental dialogue on artificial intelligence was held. For crisis management, the most important progress has been the restoration of military-to-military communications and exchanges.
In just half a year, top military leaders, including defense chiefs and department officials had video conversations. The defense work meeting and the maritime military security consultation were restarted. And China’s defense minister and U.S. defense secretary met at the Shangri-La Dialogue. In addition, it is reported that the mil-to-mil crisis communication working group will also be restored before the end of the year.
Thanks to strengthened crisis management, risks related to aircraft and vessel encounters in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea have been decreasing since the beginning of this year. In response to Lai Ching-te’s provocative separatist speech at his inauguration ceremony in Taiwan on May 20, the Chinese mainland held a large-scale joint military exercise, but no new crisis broke out between China and the United States. Compared with the previous two years, the risk of crisis or conflict has decreased.
However, there are still many differences and deficiencies in crisis management between China and the United States.
First of all, China still has great doubts about the U.S. proposal to build guardrails for U.S.-China competition and strengthen crisis management. It fears that this will serve as an “insurance policy” and give a green light to further American suppressive moves.
Second, China believes that, unlike the U.S.-Soviet military security frictions spreading all over the world during the Cold War, China-U.S. military security frictions have all occurred in areas near China. In this case, despite the importance of crisis management, the only way to avoid a crisis or conflict is for the U.S. to reduce, or cease, its military activities around China that are perceived as endangering the latter’s national security.
Third, some dialogues that are very important to crisis management have not yet resumed — for instance, the joint chiefs dialogue and cybersecurity dialogue. Or they may be difficult to establish, as with dialogue at the theater level or involving strategic stability. In addition, there has been no substantive dialogue or communication between the two sides on the Korean Peninsula issue in recent years. The China-U.S. arms control and non-proliferation consultation, which was restarted last year, was suspended again this year because of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Fourth, crisis management awareness and ability remain unbalanced between China and the United States. This also has a negative impact on their crisis management cooperation.
Next, let me talk about the challenges confronting China and the U.S. in crisis management.
After the end of the Cold War, China and the U.S. have faced two major crisis risks: the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan. The former stems from long-term hostility of the U.S. and ROK toward the DPRK and the resulting nuclear issue, while the latter stems from the pro-independence, separatist activities and external interference in Taiwan.
Since the start of the new century, two other major crisis risks have emerged in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The main cause is the American intervention in China’s disputes over sovereignty and maritime rights and interests with Japan and the Philippines, and the military gaming between China and the U.S. in the South China Sea.
In addition, as the U.S. strengthens its military containment and suppression of China, along with rapid high-tech development in recent years, the possibility of emergencies or crises between the two countries in the air and sea, outer space, cyberspace and artificial intelligence has been increasing each passing day. Such a crisis may occur alone, or as a part of the above four major crises.
It is not difficult to assert that of all the crisis risks, the ones on the Korean Peninsula and involving Taiwan have higher probability and greatest risk. They are therefore the main challenges confronting China and the U.S. in crisis management.
Faced with so many crisis risks, the existing diplomatic and military dialogues, military security confidence measures and communication mechanisms are obviously insufficient and must be further strengthened and improved. Before that, the first thing is to better implement the existing mechanisms.
In addition, China-U.S. crisis management will also face the challenges and tests of the U.S. election. In the next few months, the presidential candidates will compete to show strength against China. The Biden administration may come up with more measures to suppress China, and Congress will probably pass a new anti-China bill related to Taiwan. These may again rapidly increase crisis risks. In addition, the result of the election in November could pose new challenges to crisis management. The attempted assassination of Donald Trump may have helped his chances of winning. If he is re-elected, it is hard to predict the impact, as there is great uncertainty about his foreign policy approach.
Looking forward, the challenges will be long-term and severe. Crisis management between China and the U.S. must be continuously strengthened. To this end, it will be crucial for the two countries and their armed forces to reach the following basic common understandings:
First, crisis management has an indispensable role to play in achieving peaceful coexistence, avoiding a cold war and steering clear of a military conflict or hot war.
Second, affirmative actions are needed both to prevent and to manage crises.
Third, necessary crisis dialogue and communication mechanisms should be established and maintained.
Fourth, instead of simply copying the U.S.-Soviet model, China and the United States should proceed from their respective realities.
Fifth, the two sides should cultivate the confidence and ability to improve crisis management.
