Donald Trump wins back the presidency, Nov 6, 2024. (Will Lanzoni / CNN)
Even though most U.S. presidential elections are decided because of public attitudes on domestic issues, the president’s principal role under the Constitution is to manage the nation’s foreign policy. In the current election cycle, relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) should be an especially important issue. Unfortunately, instead of a meaningful debate on the best ways to minimize tensions and foster cooperation between the two great powers, the election campaign has increasingly featured a contest to determine which candidate can be tougher in confronting the PRC, economically and strategically.
This approach would continue the unhealthy, confrontational pattern that has characterized Washington’s China policy in the last two administrations. During Donald Trump’s presidency, U.S. economic policy featured a growing fondness for tariffs and other trade restrictions. Although the repeal of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) demonstrated a harder line by Washington toward its principal hemispheric trading partners, the PRC was the principal global target of U.S. economic nationalism.
Regarding security issues, Beijing seemed to be in a race with Moscow to be the source of Washington’s greatest concern and animosity during the Trump years. Most notably, U.S. military ties with Taiwan became both more extensive and more public. By the end of Trump’s administration, some experts even mused that the two governments had largely restored some substance of the formal defense alliance that existed before the United States switched formal diplomatic relations to the PRC in 1979.
However, one of the great surprises both within the United States and throughout much of the global community after Joe Biden unseated Trump in the 2020 election was the extent of continuity in U.S. China policy. Biden retained most of the tariffs imposed during the Trump years, and Washington’s complaints about Beijing’s commercial behavior scarcely diminished. Likewise, bilateral relations regarding the Taiwan issue did not improve. Indeed, the Biden administration’s strategic coordination with Taipei continued to grow, especially when the PRC conducted repeated (and larger) military exercises in waters near Taiwan.
The Taiwan issue was not the only source of diplomatic and strategic tensions between Washington and Beijing during the Biden administration. PRC leaders adopted several policies that annoyed or outright infuriated their American counterparts. In March 2023, the PRC stunned Washington by successfully mediating an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. That accord in turn led to Iran’s ally, Syria, being able to gain readmission to the Arab League, further eliminating a source of regional tensions. For U.S. officials who have long regarded their country as the dominant player in the Middle East, seeing China score such a diplomatic coup was more than a little galling.
The Biden administration made its hostility even more apparent when Beijing sought to play a similar mediation role in the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, Washington’s level of vitriol directed against the PRC for its stance on that issue was nothing short of stunning. Biden dismissed China’s proposed peace plan, suggesting its implementation would only benefit Russia. “Putin is applauding it, so how could it be any good?” Biden said in an interview with ABC News. “I’ve seen nothing in the plan that would indicate that there
is something that would be beneficial to anyone other than Russia if the Chinese plan were followed,” Biden said. Beyond his criticism of the specific peace plan, Biden outright rejected the notion of China playing the role of mediator at all, calling it irrational.
Biden was the one engaging in irrational behavior, however. His conduct also was counterproductive, driving Beijing and Moscow closer together on a range of issues. Perhaps most worrisome, PRC and Russian air, naval, and ground forces have conducted a mounting number of joint exercises over the past two years.
That outcome is a reflection of U.S. foreign policy ineptitude. During the Cold War, Henry Kissinger once observed that it should always be a U.S. policy objective to make certain that Washington’s relations with both Beijing and Moscow are closer than their relations are to each other. Biden administration leaders have violated that important principle in a spectacular fashion. A key question exists whether either a Trump or Harris administration would alter U.S. policy in ways that would reverse the trend of having two great powers united in their determination to end Washington’s dominant position in global affairs.
The prospects of such a change with respect to policy toward Russia are mixed. The pervasive allegations that Trump is a “Putin puppet” have always been nothing more than a cynical political smear, but it may still have the power to intimidate him from initiating needed policy reforms regarding Russia. Trump, however, does seem to understand that Washington’s handling of the Ukraine issue was extraordinarily clumsy, and he may sense some political advantage in ending Biden’s futile, cruel proxy war that seems based on fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian. Harris, in contrast, has been an integral part of the team that embraced the proxy war, and she has never shown any inclination to back away from that position.
Prospects for changing U.S. policy toward China to significantly improve bilateral relations are even less promising, given the strong bipartisan support for a hardline approach. Trump is clearly wedded to a staunchly nationalist approach on trade and other economic issues. That stance is especially apparent with respect to policy toward the PRC. He also remains a strong supporter of Taiwan’s de facto independence. Arms sales to Taiwan and close military cooperation would be a near certainty under a new Trump administration.
Matters are a little less certain with respect to the China policy of a Harris administration. However, she has shown no willingness to embrace a more conciliatory approach on either economic or security issues. Indeed, her repeated condemnation of Trump for being “too cozy” with dictators does not suggest much willingness to adopt a less confrontational policy toward the autocratic PRC.
As the political landscape shifts in Washington, one thing appears certain: the trajectory of the U.S.’ China policy is unlikely to change, regardless of who sits in the White House for the next four years. The stakes are high, and the consequences of inaction would impact not just China and the U.S., but the entire world.
