Strategic adjustments of American diplomacy have been a main theme in US foreign policies since Barack Obama’s very first day in office as US president. After winning general election, the new administration found two historical missions on its shoulders: One was to reinvigorate US economy; the other was to rebuild the country’s role as world leader. During Obama’s first term of office, an important aspect of diplomatic readjustments was disposing of the negative legacies left behind by the Bush administration. But the most remarkable change in diplomatic strategies characteristic of the Obama administration has been the “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific. It seems to me that the word “rebalancing” indeed has conveyed the central idea of US strategic adjustments in the Asia-Pacific: Since the end of the Cold War, significant changes have occurred in the pattern of US-dominated strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific. In order to maintain its hegemonic status, the United States has to make active adjustments to dictate the building of a new strategic equilibrium that can adapt to the profound changes in international relations of the 21st century. Which is at the same time the core concept behind the US foreign strategic adjustments in the new era.
Cui Liru
Debates over whether the United States has embarked on a downward slide toward “decline” are still raging on the world over. Yet it has been an undisputed reality that more centers of power have rapidly arisen. Due to the severe blows from the financial crisis that broke out in 2008 and the ensuing global economic crisis, the United States’ international status has obviously been on the decline.
Twenty-first-century international relations have a more fundamental characteristic: Economic globalization has resulted in unprecedented inter-dependence between countries, which is particularly prominent between major countries. This is actually a significant difference between the multi-polarization of the present-day world and previous multi-polar international systems in world history. Which means, with its capabilities of dominating international affairs on the decline, the United States has to face more competitors; while at the same time seeking more effective cooperation with other countries, especially emerging countries, so as to establish an international system that will both adapt to the new world, and sustain the United States’ leadership role.
Therefore, the strategic adjustments of US diplomacy are a kind of strategic transformation in nature and need to simultaneously cope with challenges from two aspects. On one hand, in order to address the gap between capabilities and ambitions resulted from excessive expansion during the Bush era, the United States has to readjust the sequence of global strategic goals on its priority list and change its “unilateralist” behavioral mode. On the other hand, with an eye on the mega-trend of changes in world affairs, the United States has to enhance alliances and partnerships, transform international economic, political and security mechanisms, and to preserve the international order that has long been dominated by the West. While the basis for the realization of the above goals, and the most imperative task, is to revitalize the US economy, and strengthen American superiority.
The most conspicuous move in the Obama administration’s adjustments of foreign strategies has been the explicit shift of strategic center of gravity to the Asia-Pacific. The two major reasons for such an adjustment are obvious. One is economic and the other is strategic . Rejuvenating the US economy is the Obama administration’s most important historical mission, as well as its most pressing task. As the new center of gravity for the global economy, Asia has the most important role in American foreign economic and trade relations both at present and in the future. Home to the world’s biggest and most vigorous emerging economic entities, such as China and India, Asia is not only the most important engine driving present global economic growth, but also our globe’s largest export market and most attractive investment destination. It will also become the largest source of overseas investments in the future. The US economy has been woven tightly together with Asia, making its future development even more inseparable from Asia.
In the meantime, the United States has also located its major strategic challenges in Asia. First, the United States sees the rapidly rising China as its foremost rival in strategic competition. Second, Washington believes the Asia-Pacific is home to the biggest number of instable and uncertain factors in terms of security. Identifying a main rival in strategic competition has always been a core factor in American diplomatic and military strategies. However, for quite a long period of time, palpable strategic competition had not emerged between China and the United States.
Such situations did not see tangible changes until after 2008, when the “rise of China” appeared to turn from a murky concept into a jaw-dropping reality. After a persistent ascent on the ladder of global GDP rankings, China has overtaken Japan as the world’s second largest economy in GDP terms, become more pro-active than ever diplomatically; and achieved the status of the United States’ top foreign creditor. Meanwhile, the rapid progress of China’s national defense construction has raised concerns in some countries, and tensions have arisen in relations with Japan and the Philippines because of territorial disputes.
Also during that period of time, the United States saw the unprecedented financial crisis break out, and was subsequently bogged down in the most serious economic recession since the end of World War II. Debts and financial deficits, enlarging wealth gap and double-digit unemployment, as well as political and social polarization became each other’s cause and effect, resulting in a damaging vicious circle. Pessimism permeated. Public confidence in the government plummeted to record lows. Extreme conservatism found opportunities to make waves and saw its political energy amplified. Trade protectionism and economic nationalism raised their ugly heads, and China has thus become the most convenient target of attacks by politicians and the media alike. With consecutive years of severe crackdown on terrorism and strict precautions showing obvious effects, Americans’ worries about terrorist threats have mitigated greatly. Under such circumstances, following traditional strategic concepts, it is a matter of course for Washington to identify China, who has rapidly grown into the world’s second largest economic entity but remains politically heterogeneous, as the United States’ main strategic competitor.
It is on the basis of such complicated economic and strategic concerns that the United States put forward its “rebalancing” strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Its central idea is to preserve US dominance in Asia through the use of the so-called “smart power” under new conditions where the international strategic pattern is turning from uni-polar to multi-polar. However, in the face of the even more complex conditions under the new pattern, the connotations of the so-called “rebalancing” are also convoluted. From the economic perspective, the “rebalancing” has an eye on forging closer ties with the entire Asia-Pacific region, where China remains the most important existence few meaningful connections can navigate. There are both competition and cooperation between China and the United States. Their relationship could be competitive when it comes to regional dominance, but the two parties have to collaborate to sustain mutually beneficial economic and trade relations.
The US-proposed TPP has dual implications: Economically, it aims at upgrading cooperation with the Asia-Pacific; at the same time, it has evidently incorporated macro strategic considerations about enhancing long-term competitiveness against China. From the perspective of political and military strategies, the United States focuses primarily on checking and balancing China’s rise and subsequent expanding influences, while simultaneously taking care of other targets and challenges in the area. The Obama administration has made a high-profile statement that the United States will consolidate military presence in the Asia-Pacific region, including enhancing alliance systems, building a more extensive partnership network, increasing inputs in military expenses, personnel and equipment, the construction of military bases and supply points, and holding more joint military drills. The United States’ newly formulated “anti-access denial” strategy and “Air-Sea Battle” strategy display a quite clear intention of targeting China. Thanks to its thick military colors, the “rebalancing” strategy has provoked criticisms both at home and abroad.
In China, some people share the strong belief that the US “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific is in essence a strategy to contain China, which is tantamount to a New Cold War. Such a point is not completely groundless. In fact, some people in the United States have been open advocates for the containment of a rising China. However, more people have reached the cool-headed understanding that containing China does not align with American interests – not to mention that no country can prevent China from rising through containment. Since the two countries again opened the doors of exchanges and communication, progress in bilateral relations has brought tremendous benefits to both sides, as well as to Asia and the world at large. This is a fact no one can ignore. Nowadays, the deep and broad interdependence that has been formulated in economy and trade has turned out to be an important basis for the development of both countries.
China’s rise undoubtedly constitutes an increasing challenge for US hegemony. At the current stage, the competitive aspect of Sino-US relations has grown in prominence and become a focus of public attention. However, this has in no way changed the need for the continuous progress of bilateral cooperation between China and the United States.
The United States has always been a believer of policies backed up by power. Revitalizing its economy is essential for the United States to sustain its strong national might. Continuously enhancing its military advantages and turning them into a sharp sword that can effectively deter rivals will always be the United States’ most-favored instrument. China is simultaneously a partner the United States needs and a competitor it wants to hold in check. The US’ China strategy is actually seeking a balance between the two needs. The so-called “rebalancing” thus refers to strategic adjustments intended to cope with the changes in the strategic pattern. And the rise of China has been perceived as the most important variable resulting in such changes. At the same time, the “rebalancing”, as a process of strategic transition, cannot be fulfilled at one stroke. The various future uncertainties are important problems the US Asia-Pacific strategy must take into consideration. The process of the strategic adjustments of the “rebalancing” will at least last through Obama’s entire term of office. It will be subject to revisions or modifications as a result of changing conditions in various fields and aspects. A certain process of interaction may also emerge at the same time between China and the United States.
The orientation of future interaction between China and the United States is a question of major strategic significance that promises uncertainties. Obama said the United States will never be second place; China is determined to realize “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Therefore, competition is inevitable between the two countries. In fact, both China and the United States have taken the other as a main strategic competitor. However, since the two are yet to be on a par with each other in terms of comprehensive strength, the United States remains in a dominant position for its tremendous advantages. Given the popular belief that, step-by-step, China will narrow the gap between it and the United States, the latter certainly cannot sit back and relax. Therefore, the United States’ current “rebalancing” is actually a precautionary move aimed at future competition. Yet, from the perspective of the prospect of Sino-US relations, the core question is in what manner the well-matched competition between the future China and United States will unfold, instead of the competition itself. Based on realistic political theories and the historical experiences that rising powers and established powers of the 20th century repeatedly headed from competition toward confrontation, some Americans asserted that confrontation will ultimately be inevitable between China and the United States, and that the United States must make strategic preparations for that scenario. Many more believe relations between major countries of the 21st century have been dramatically different, and China and the United States should and could avoid repeating the historical destiny of confrontation. The prospect of the bilateral ties will rest mainly on China’s and the United States’ strategic orientations, policy goals, and ways of dealing with differences. The consensus, wisdom and political will of the two countries’ leaders and decision-makers to prevent confrontation will prove to be decisive.
In June of 2013, President Obama, who was beginning his second term in office, and President Xi Jinping, the newly appointed leader of China, held a meeting at the Annenberg Retreat in Rancho Mirage, California. The two had in-depth and candid discussions about extensive topics on bilateral ties, and reached important consensuses. One thing that attracted the most outsider attention was President Obama’s positive response to President Xi’s proposal of “a new type of major-country relations”. This is an important step the US side has taken regarding the idea about the future development of bilateral relations. The outstanding Sino-US competitions that call for management and control, however, concentrate in the Asia-Pacific. Therefore, the process of China’s and the United States’ exploration in building the proposed “new-type major country relations” will certainly show a tricky correlation with the proceeding of the US “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific.
At the meeting, President Xi defined the “new type of major-country relationship” as “no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation”.
Cui Liru is the former President of China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). The above is an excerpt of an article to be published in the first issue of the 2014 Fudan American Review.
