The China-Latin America Forum will celebrate its 10th anniversary on Jan. 8. Over the past decade, the it has pushed overall China-Latin America cooperation and corresponding bilateral cooperation onto a fast track. China has become the No.1 trading partner of such major Latin American economies as Brazil, Chile and Peru, and annual China-Latin America trade is expected to surpass $500 billion a year. Facing the rapidly growing China factor in its backyard, as well as declining control, U.S. political and academic circles have mixed feelings, displaying a general tendency of decreasing comfort, and rising calls to hedge.
Opinion in the United States about the rapid warming of China-Latin America relations over the past few years can be grouped into four categories:
• China becoming a “new neighbor” has made it the biggest threat to U.S. strategic security in the Western Hemisphere. Those holding this view claim that Chinese-invested projects in Latin America are dual-used civilian and military. Such projects involve deep space, satellites and 5G technology. At the same time, this view holds that ports have military purposes behind them and endanger U.S. safety barriers in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore the U.S. must return to the Monroe Doctrine to cope with China the uninvited guest.
• The growing China factor in America’s backyard poses the potential risk of reversing democratic processes in Latin America. This view holds that as Chinese investment in Latin America continues to show the effects of soft and smart power, compared with China’s capital exports, there’s greater reason for concern. Chilean President Gabriel Boric’s interest in China’s national governance experience indicates that the Latin American process of democratic development may carry some Chinese marks.
• China’s presence in Latin America is a positive factor. Those with this opinion believe, given the natural advantage of Latin America’s geographical proximity and longstanding historical and cultural connections, that China will be unable to dislodge America’s peculiar role and geopolitical status in the region, let alone Chinese investments have promoted economic development, increased employment and are conducive to reducing the U.S. burden of shoring up its neighbors.
• The impact of the China factor is undetermined. Those holding this opinion contend that it is still too early to tell whether the China factor in the U. S. backyard is good or bad, so America’s future orientation and changes require close observation.
Each of the four categories has its own audience in the United States, but the first and second categories have gained the upper hand in recent years. During the four years of the Joe Biden presidency, the U.S. has dramatically adjusted its Latin America policies to hedge against the fast-growing China factor in its backyard. Biden has prided himself on familiarity with Latin American affairs and declared that “America is back.” To answer Latin American countries’ appeals for equal footing with the U.S., Biden has claimed Latin America is no longer the backyard of the U.S. but rather its “front court.”
At the 2022 Summit of the Americas events, Biden announced the establishment of the APEP, which is aimed at increasing input in Latin American infrastructure and sustainable development — and are thought to be targeting the Belt and Road Initiative projects China has been promoting in the region. This “return to Latin America” sustained its momentum in 2024, as the U.S. has not only implemented the APEP in the region through such financial institutions as the Inter-American Development Bank but Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced that the government is considering the acceptance of Argentina as an APEP member.
Moreover, the U.S. has expanded near-shoring to become friend-shoring in the reshuffle of global supply chains, claiming the move will benefit more Latin American nations by facilitating economic recovery and job growth. Not long ago, the U.S. joined hands with the IDB to launch the CHIPS ITSI program to collaborate on semiconductor initiative in the Western Hemisphere, intending to build a chips alliance with such Latin American nations as Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica.
Such moves show that the Biden administration has explicitly accepted domestic political and academic circles’ criticism that U.S. arrogance and neglect have pushed Latin America into China’s embrace.
The U.S. is on the threshold of Trump 2.0, but this doesn’t mean Trump will scrap Biden’s backyard policy. Despite their fierce infighting, the Democratic and Republican parties maintain a certain consensus on preserving U.S. strategic interests in its backyard. Both insist on maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, and striving to prevent extra-regional powers from getting involved deeply in its sphere of influence.
Predictably, the incoming Trump administration will partially inherit Biden’s backyard policy and possibly continue the Growth in the Americas initiative launched during his first term in office. That initiative is intended to boost U.S. investment in Latin American energy and infrastructure to balance the growing influences of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
In addition, even before his inauguration, Trump has clamored to impose tariffs on Mexican exports, in an attempt to crack down on Chinese exports that are re-exported via Mexico for purposes of tax evasion. Therefore, under Trump 2.0, the United States will not want to see China become its new neighbor. Its strategic red line, striving to prevent China from challenging its Western Hemisphere interests, will not change, and such economic means as tariffs, sanctions and trade protectionism will become Trump’s main tools for constraining the warming China-Latin America relations.
Facing the China-U.S. power game, most Latin American nations have mixed feelings: They worry about suffering collateral damage, and they wish to profit from the major power rivalry. Therefore, most of them have adopted a strategy of balance between the two powers.
Latin America’s political biosphere has changed in recent years: The left wing has controlled the local political landscape, and U.S.-Latin America relations have shown new dynamics. Latin American nations frequently say no to the U.S., and their awareness of strategic autonomy has grown, with the U.S. increasingly unable to control its backyard. It is no longer the decisive factor in U.S.-Latin America relations.
Latin American nations have demonstrated an obvious tendency to “look east” recently in the triangular China-U.S.-Latin America relationship. Latin American countries believe that taking advantage of Chinese investment and trade, as well as riding China’s economic express, are precious opportunities for Latin American development. Approaching China is becoming a strategic choice for ever more Latin American nations.
How to correctly handle the U.S. factor in China-Latin America relations should not just be a strategic consideration for both the Chinese and Latin American sides. It is also worthy of reflection on the U.S. side. Declining U.S. influence in Latin American is rooted in its mistaken strategic positioning of neighboring countries, because Latin America is not America’s backyard. The way to get along with neighbors is to treat them nicely as equal partners, rather than bullying them. This is the difference between kingly ways and a tyrant’s ways.
The U.S. should reflect on its historical and current conduct in Latin America. China should not become a scapegoat. Latin America should not be an arena for China-U.S. wrangling but rather a bridge for bilateral cooperation. During Trump 2.0, the two governments should reactivate the mechanism of bilateral consultation on Latin American affairs, eliminate misjudgments, increase consensus, consider Latin American concerns and optimize their respective interest in China-U.S.-Latin America trilateral cooperation.
