To what extent Donald Trump’s second term in the White House will affect the international situation and whether there will be a new “Trump shock” has been a focus of world attention recently. Considering the latest changes in international conditions and the recent turbulence in U.S. domestic politics, this round of shock will likely have some new characteristics.
A basic judgment is that the impact of Trump will be greater on U.S. domestic politics than on international affairs. This is not to say a second Trump presidency will have a limited international impact but rather that he would focus more on domestic policies. Compared with the international scene, his new domestic policies will be more shocking. This is an essential starting point for assessing the international impact of the new Trump term. This is mainly because, Trump and the Republican forces he represents believe the Democratic Party’s policies have led the U.S. down the wrong path. Therefore the fundamental priority of “America First” is “domestic affairs first.”
This is reflected in various Republican statements on the campaign trail, as well as in policy recommendations from conservative think tanks.
More important, the Republican Party maneuvered to win not only the presidential election but also gaining nominal control over both chambers of Congress. This, along with the current majority in the Supreme Court, will give the Republicans more resources and autonomy to implement its domestic strategy, and thoroughly reshuffle the Democratic polices they fiercely oppose.
A new round of domestic political turmoil is probable, and this will, in turn, constrain what Trump is able to do in foreign policy. It is owing to their anticipation of Trump’s concentration on domestic policy changes —and the prospect that it could ignite fierce infighting between the two parties — that many in the U.S., including such Republicans as Condoleezza Rice, worry about the U.S. returning to isolationism.
Judging from Trump’s remarks, the shock may first present itself over the two conflicts. The volatility of international affairs is visible in many aspects, but the two conflicts are undoubtedly where the most outstanding contradictions affecting present-day international conditions lie. Trump’s diplomacy in his second term will also prioritize such contradictions and gradually carry out new global strategic deployment.
Although they all feature deep-rooted structural contradictions, both conflicts will alter their trajectories once Trump (as he has claimed repeatedly) quickly ends the Russia-Ukraine conflict and boosts support for Israel. This may bring a host of uncertainties to America’s Russia policy and Middle East strategy, and more likely lead to adjustments in the U.S.-Russia-Europe, and U.S.-Russia-China relations. All such potential scenarios come with significant effects that may reshape the global geopolitical landscape.
Given Trump’s preoccupation with tariffs, the international order of trade will also suffer a conspicuous blow. Trump launched trade wars in his first term in office and renegotiated multiple free trade agreements. Now he is bragging about the peculiar role of tariffs in preserving U.S. interests.
The book “No Trade is Free” by Robert Lighthizer, who was U.S. trade representative during the first Trump presidency, embodied a fundamental reversal of the Republican Party’s longstanding attitude on free trade, focusing more on its harm to American workers, industries and communities, rather than just on trade balances. There is universal concern in the international community that Trump will wield the lead pipe of tariffs not only against such major competitors as China but also against allies and partners, including Europe, Japan and the ROK.
Considering that the international order of trade is already more fragmented than it was eight years ago, the trend of major adjustments in industrial and supply chains will be more conspicuous, and the shock to the international order of trade will be more violent during the second Trump presidency.
A potential uncertainty may be that, while he us obsessed with tariffs, Trump will exploit them as a tool for achieving other diplomatic goals — such as coercing other countries into conceding ground on matters beyond trade.
Trump’s policy orientation on global issues will also bring new shocks. On climate, Trump has insisted climate change is a pseudo proposition. Even his energy secretary pick is advocating further exploitation of traditional petroleum and gas resources — such moves as withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, which would again complicate the global response to climate change. As for cryptocurrencies, Trump has obviously turned around and become a supporter, claiming to establish national reserves of cryptocurrencies such as BitCoin, resulting in the continuous upsurge of their value in the stock market. The cryptocurrency influence on the existing international currency regime and financial order are emerging step by step.
On AI development and regulation, Trump has been influenced greatly by such upstart tech entrepreneurs as Elon Musk. Such moves will also bring new uncertainties to nascent cooperation in international governance.
The aforementioned topics not only concern the safety of humanity but also involve influences arising from varied policy orientations in different countries, which will result in more complex fragmentation and reorganization of state-to-state relations.
Unlike 2016, there is now more conspicuous volatility and uncertainty in the international situation, and elements that shape international conditions have become more complicated. The various ideas of Trump and his foreign policy team will also be subject to the structural constraints of the current international system. The international community’s policy reserve and psychological preparedness have also far exceeded those in 2016. This, too, will be conducive to offsetting the Trump shock.
