At the beginning of the new year, China-US Focus interviewed Professor Wang Jisi of Peking University’s School of International Studies and founding president of the university’s Institute of International and Strategic Studies, about the potential scenarios of China-U.S. relations over the next four years.
Wang is torn between pessimism and optimism. His pessimism arises mainly because the mainstream public narrative in both countries continues to identify the other as a major economic and security threat. That is countered, optimistically but with no certainty, by the fact that policies are determined by leaders of both countries and at high levels. If the leaders can increase communication, identify mutual interests and reach more strategic common ground, then relations may not get worse, in Wang’s view. China-U.S. relations will have a better future only when the two sides forsake the zero-sum way of thinking about bilateral competition.
Professor Wang’s research concentrates mainly on U.S. diplomacy, China-U.S. relations and Asia-Pacific security. In 2005 and 2012, Foreign Policy magazine twice named him as one of the world’s top 100 thinkers.
U.S. Ambassador to China Nicholas Burns visited the campus of Peking University for a cordial parting discussion with distinguished scholar Wang Jisi, Jan 10, 2025. (Photo: Ambassador Nicholas Burns (@USAmbChina) / X)
The full text of the interview follows:
Evolution of thinking
China-US Focus: Your views on China-U.S. relations have evolved over the past two decades. In your early work, you expressed optimism about the potential for a cooperative partnership. More recently, however, you have raised concerns about the deterioration of the relationship and the risk of conflict, even using the term “hot peace.” What factors have shaped this evolution of thinking? As you look ahead to the next four years, are you more optimistic or less, and why?
Wang Jisi: There have indeed been significant changes in my views about China-U.S. relations over the past two decades. Twenty years ago, I was quite optimistic about the potential of cooperation, but I’ve been worried about the deterioration of China-U.S. relations and the risk of conflict in the bilateral relationship in recent years — so much so that I even used the phrase “hot peace.” Actually I used such an expression 30 years ago, but I used “hot” to describe the warmth of the bilateral relationship. Now I use it to describe the intensity of the fierce verbal exchanges and the likelihood of war.
Looking back on the evolution of China-U.S. relations over the past two decades, a major change between 2004 and 2005 was that both sides believed “bilateral relations were at their best in history.” Vice Premier Qian Qichen agreed with U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell on the proposition and said China-U.S. relations “could be still better.” In 2005, when Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick proposed the concept of “responsible stakeholder,” the Chinese side also responded positively. I made a special trip to the U.S. State Department to exchange views with Zoellick, telling him that we endorsed such a vision for the China-U.S. relationship.
The gradual deterioration of relations began after the 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. The crisis was not just about the economy, but also further deepened domestic social and political division in the U.S. The Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements arose successively. The rightists represented by the Tea Party believed the Obama administration’s reforms hurt their interests, and their popular constituency shared a similar historical origin with Donald Trump’s supporters today.
The leftists of the Occupy Wall Street movement complained that the financial market was monopolized by the “fat cats of Wall Street,” which resulted in a widening gap between the rich and the poor. As such issues as unfair distribution further worsened, there arose a tendency to blame America’s problems on outsiders, which gave rise to the narrative that China damages U.S. interests both in the U.S. and all over the world, and grabs U.S. jobs.
After the inauguration in 2017, the Trump administration launched a trade war against China, while the two countries’ contradictions on such topics as Taiwan and the South China Sea began to intensify. Domestic politics underwent important changes in both countries around 2010.
In China, several very high-ranking Communist Party, government and military officials were dismissed after 2012 on corruption charges. The CPC intensified its anti-corruption campaign and its ideological struggles, emphasizing that officials should “dare to fight, and be good at fighting” in international relations. While continuing to concentrate on economic progress, China placed a lot more weight on national security in political life and enacted a series of laws and rules to defend against Western political infiltration. Under these circumstances, the U.S. perception and attitude toward China underwent profound changes, and its policies beginning to shift to overall containment.
President Donald Trump and First Lady Melania Trump welcomed Chinese President Xi Jinping and first lady Peng Liyuan to Mar-a-Lago estate in Palm Beach, Florida in 2017.
Optimistic or pessimistic?
China-US Focus: Looking to the next four years, are you more optimistic or pessimistic about China-U.S. relations? Why?
Wang Jisi: At the beginning of this century, when bilateral ties were deemed to be at their best, few could have foreseen today’s situation. This makes me reflect on my own optimistic anticipations at the time. But at the same time I also consider such changes to some extent as inevitable. The decisive factors in the China-U.S. relationship lie in changes in both countries’ domestic politics, rather than in their comparative strengths, or the so-called Thucydides Trap.
In the next four years, there won’t be disruptive changes in the two countries’ comparative strengths, but political conditions within each country may show new changes and developments. For instance, Trump’s comeback with such tremendous political advantages defied many people’s expectations, and his approach to governance, as well as the orientation of his domestic and foreign policies, remain difficult to predict.
Therefore, it is very difficult for me to be clearly optimistic or pessimistic about the relationship in the next four years. My pessimism lies in the fact that mainstream public opinion and the narrative framework in both countries continue to hold that the other side is the main external economic and security threat, which I’m afraid may not change in the coming four years. I also have reasons to be less pessimistic, because policies are made by national leaders and at high levels of the two governments, and the outcomes depend on people’s efforts.
If the two countries’ leaders could enhance communication in the future, seek convergence points of mutual interests and form more strategic consensuses, conditions may not necessarily get worse. Also, the public opinion environment is often formulated by political elites, and better relations between the high levels of the two governments may also be conducive to a reversal of public opinion. For example, unlike Biden, Trump as president-elect has on multiple occasions expressed hope for closer communication with China and bilateral cooperation on international affairs. He invited the Chinese leader to participate in his inauguration.
Of course it remains to be seem whether his verbal display of goodwill will translate into actual moves on the U.S. side. If the U.S. side’s actions match its positive rhetoric after Trump’s inauguration, more consensuses may be reached between the two governments, and improvements in bilateral ties would not be unthinkable.
Global security
China-US Focus: Security conditions have been tense in many places of the world over the past few years, and strategic competition has intensified between major countries. What factors are responsible for this? With the incoming second term of Donald Trump, how do you predict U.S. relations with other major countries will go? What influences would such relations have on China-U.S. relations?
Wang Jisi: Changes in China-U.S. relations and the two countries’ domestic development are to a considerable extent subject to the global context. One worrying universal phenomenon in the global situation is that domestic wealth gaps continue to widen, and social contradictions are intensifying in all countries. In Europe, the outcomes of Germany’s elections in 2025 and the political chaos in France remain unknown. Russia has been weakened in its conflict with Ukraine, and its economic prospects can’t be good in the long term. Such issues as domestic distribution, deep social contradictions and rising populism and nationalism are important factors affecting U.S. politics and diplomacy.
Worldwide, rapid progress in AI technologies, climate change, immigration, refugees and public health crises have combined to create profound changes in global conditions. The increasingly fierce major power competition has taken place against such a backdrop. Many countries have blamed their domestic problems on external factors, leading to interwoven populism and nationalism.
The aforementioned international factors have had important impacts on China-U.S. relations. But the key to the relationship lies ultimately in their respective domestic development. We should not be overly pessimistic about prospects, nor do we have many reasons for optimism. As for U.S. relations with other countries, compared with the Biden presidency, Trump’s second term may see more differences in relations with Europe. European countries also have different attitudes toward the U.S. Despite the subtle changes in Japanese and ROK domestic politics, the U.S. alliance system in East Asia remains solid. India’s foreign policy tends to be more independent, unwilling to choose sides between China and the U.S. This reminds me of China’s foreign policy in the mid- and late-1980s, when it tried to maintain friendly relations with all countries. It tried its best to avoid making enemies, which was very wise. Considering this, U.S.-India relations won’t see fundamental changes.
I believe, as the world’s two foremost powers, China and the U.S. still have considerable advantages on the world stage. But the pattern of the two powers’ coexistence is different from the bipolar pattern of the Cold War era. The Soviet Union at that time dominated the majority of socialist countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization as a military alliance. China’s relationships with such countries as Russia, the DPRK and Iran identify them as partners rather than allies. Therefore, China is not like the Soviet Union.
Regional conflicts
China-US Focus: The U.S. has become involved in both the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, while China’s approach to regional conflicts has been to maneuver negotiations and promote peace — trying to ameliorate the conflicts as soon as possible to serve the world’s peaceful development. Do China and the U.S. have common interests in coping with regional conflicts, and could they coordinate and cooperate?
Wang Jisi: I believe the U.S.-Russia relationship is an important variable in China-U.S. relations. Although Trump has touted friendly personal relations with Vladimir Putin and hopes to resolve the Russia-Ukraine conflict as soon as possible, U.S. policy toward Russia still hinges on American political elites and public opinion rather than on Trump’s personal opinions about Russia.
Unless there are conspicuous changes in U.S.-Russia relations, there won’t be significant changes in the China-U.S.-Russia trilateral relationship. We must keep in mind that, as the world’s two largest economies, China and the U.S. are both seeing a widening gap with other countries. The rise of India is an exception, which deserves attention. However, India won’t pose a substantial challenge to either China or the U.S. As for U.S. involvement in the Russia-Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, as well as their impacts on China, some people hold that those conflicts have weakened the U.S., making it unable to concentrate on the Asia-Pacific and impose greater pressure on China, and therefore China can let the conflicts evolve and doesn’t need to mediate. I think this idea is worth debating.
First, the Chinese government’s efforts in maneuvering negotiations and promoting peace in these regional conflicts are not just superficial diplomatic gestures but are based on a profound understanding of the global economy. The Russia-Ukraine, Middle East and other regional conflicts are all countercurrents against economic globalization that have dealt heavy blows to the world economy. As the foremost beneficiary of economic globalization, China’s economic interests have suffered dearly from these conflicts. For instance, many places involved in the Belt and Road Initiative have experienced tensions as a result of such conflicts, including Ukraine and surrounding regions. The conflicts have directly harmed Chinese economic expansion and investment environment. So China’s appeals for peace are sincere, and intended to promote regional stability and restore economic development.
Second, there is no way for us to prove that without the Russia-Ukraine conflict and turmoil in the Middle East, China-U.S. relations would be worse than they are today.
Third, regional conflicts have resulted in massive losses of life and casualties. Out of international moral considerations, China couldn’t stand by and do nothing. In fact, we have seen China-U.S. and China-EU relations suffer from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. It won’t necessarily be bad for China if the U.S. moves to settle the conflicts after Trump’s inauguration. What matters is that the two countries avoid sinking into zero-sum thinking — that is, assuming whatever is in the U.S. interest is necessarily against Chinese interests, and vice versa. Actually, Chinese and U.S. interests may find convergence points in such aspects as easing regional conflicts and restoring economic growth in turbulent regions.
China-U.S. cooperation should not be limited to such non-traditional security realms as anti-narcotics, climate change and public health. Coordination and collaboration are also possible in other fields of international security.
New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman wrote in a recent article that the present-day world faces three epoch-making challenges — out-of-control AI, climate change and turmoil in collapsed countries and regions. All three call for China-U.S. cooperation. I think his opinion has strategic value. Whether China and the U.S. can forsake zero-sum thinking in the future and develop strategic consensus on such subjects as regional conflicts and global governance is key to the development of bilateral ties. The above challenges not only involve the interests of China and the U.S. but have to do with global peace and stability. The Global Security Initiative, Global Development Initiative and Global Civilization Initiative, which China has proposed, were based precisely on such logic, conveying its hope for promoting global common prosperity and security via cooperation.
Taiwan question
China-US Focus: The Taiwan question is considered a “core interest” of China, while the U.S. keeps testing the Chinese mainland’s bottom line on its Taiwan policy, which is an important source of tensions. Could the tensions over Taiwan get out of control during Trump’s second presidency, and even lead to a war between China and the U.S.?
Wang Jisi: Before and after his election, Trump has dodged questions about whether the U.S. would intervene directly in a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. Such an attitude may be construed as a positive signal, showing he is not willing to see the situation get out of control and have the U.S. dragged directly into a cross-Strait military conflict. At present, and for a considerable time ahead, there is a risk of “independence” forces on the island continuing to grow. The Chinese mainland has harshly criticized this tendency and elevated military, political and economic pressures against the seekers of independence.
Generally, neither China nor the U.S. wants to see a cross-strait conflict leading to a direct war, and both governments have repeatedly reiterated the principle of peaceful coexistence. The Chinese side is serious about its proposal for “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems,” which are also its substantive policy goals. Judging from developments over the past few months, both the Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration are concerned about the rising momentum of the Taiwan independence camp, and have sent messages via different channels to the island’s leader stating that they don’t want to see the Taiwan independence faction come off the railsand cross the red line.
The U.S. government has repeatedly stated that it does not support Taiwan independence and follows a “one-China” policy. I believe the Trump administration will reiterate this position. Such statements won’t just be pure diplomatic rhetoric but will be made out of concern over the possibility of separatists triggering a conflict between China and the U.S.
Obviously the U.S. doesn’t want to see the Taiwan question worsen to such an extent that the Chinese mainland has to resort to force. I think the situation across the Taiwan Strait may be subject to some degree of control, so it won’t get to the point of triggering a war between China and the U.S. It is of critical importance for both sides to clarify their respective bottom lines and strive to improve crisis prevention and management mechanisms in related areas.
Trade relations
China-US Focus: During Trump’s first term, in January 2020, China and the U.S. reached their Phase I trade agreement through strenuous negotiations. Before and after his election this year, Trump has threatened to impose high tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. Looking ahead, will China-U.S. trade frictions worsen or ease in the next few years, and shift onto the track of what China calls win-win cooperation? Could Chinese and U.S. business communities play positive roles in bilateral trading relations?
Wang Jisi: When it comes to economy and trade, President-Elect Trump has claimed he would impose tariffs of over 60 percent on Chinese exports and raise tariffs on other countries that enjoy favorable balance in trade with the U.S. Part of such rhetoric was bluffing, because implementing such high tariffs would also undermine U.S. domestic economic interests. Whether economic and trade frictions in China-U.S. relations escalate in the future hinges on Trump’s concrete trade policies after he assumes office. Economic and trade frictions in such fields as cutting-edge technologies, electric vehicles and rare metals may escalate, but there still exists room for cooperation in areas involving such products as daily necessities.
The two countries’ businesses still play the role of “pressure relief valves” in the process. I have personal relations with businesspeople in both countries. Many Chinese entrepreneurs, from both private and state companies, wish to expand China-U.S. economic and trade exchanges and dread decoupling. American entrepreneurs share the hope that their economic interests in China will be guaranteed. Although they often avoid openly clarifying their positions under the pressure of political correctness back home, they have tried to exert influence on federal and local officials in the U.S., as well as on Congress.
During our discussion of his recent trip to China, Harvard University Professor Graham Allison displayed impressive interest in some Chinese people’s proposal that China and the U.S. have a stake in each other’s future — or, literally, “you are in me, I’m in you” — and even had the idea of expounding it theoretically. I told him this actually embodies the cultural wisdom and rational way of thinking of the Chinese people. In economy and trade, this means some Chinese products have incorporated U.S. technology and capital, and many U.S. manufacturers can’t go without Chinese components, raw materials and labor, illustrating the two sides’ in-depth interdependence in industry and supply chains.
Strategic distrust
China-US Focus: You and American scholar Kenneth Lieberthal co-authored a report in 2012 in which you put forward the idea of China-U.S. “strategic distrust,” and expressed hope for the two countries to increase strategic mutual trust and avoid conflict. Strategic mutual suspicion seemed to have been increased, rather than reduced, over the past decade. What expectations and suggestions do you have for the two governments and societies to increase mutual understanding and reduce misgivings?
Wang Jisi: The strategic distrust we pointed out at the time has deepened dramatically. The U.S. side’s biggest suspicion is that China’s strategic purpose is to sabotage, even overthrow, the world order the U.S. attempts to preserve, and to take over the U.S. role as the global hegemon. The Chinese side has repeatedly denied this strategic purpose, while the U.S. side is increasingly convinced of its own judgment, and emphasizes that, as Chinese strength grows, so will its attempt to compete with the U.S. for global hegemony. The biggest Chinese suspicion of the U.S. is that the latter wants to change China’s political system. The U.S. side has once and again claimed it “doesn’t seek to change China’s systems,” but the Chinese side doesn’t believe it. Such strategic mutual suspicion won’t be reduced in the foreseeable future. I wish the gradual increase in people-to-people exchanges could to some extent reduce those suspicions. But I have no confidence in this coming true.
Reshape narratives
China-US Focus: Do you think internal domestic narratives in China and the U.S., particularly those that frame the other country as a rival or threat, will increasingly hinder progress in bilateral relations? What can be done to reshape these narratives to allow for more constructive dialogue?
Wang Jisi: Chinese authorities have expounded the principle for handling China-U.S. relations as “mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation.” Mutual respect means each side respecting the other side’s domestic system, development path and status in world affairs, co-existing in peace, and then cooperating for win-win outcomes. The U.S. has defined China-U.S. relations as “long-term strategic competition,” and proposes to “outcompete” China. The Chinese authorities don’t accept defining China-U.S. relationship with the word “competition,” because when competition is identified as the core of bilateral relations, the likelihood of cooperation will decrease, and there has to be a “winner” at the end. “Win-win cooperation,” as China proposes, to my understanding, means that competition may exist in the long term, but there doesn’t have to be a clear winner, and it would be best to have no loser.
Some people hold that China-U.S. relations are now in a stage of strategic stalemate. I take it with a grain of salt. “Strategic stalemate” first reminds me of Mao Zedong’s article “On Protracted War,” which was published during China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. In the article, Mao proposed that the War of Resistance may be divided into three stages — the enemy’s strategic offensive, the two sides’ strategic stalemate and our side’s strategic counteroffensive and ultimate victory.
If we define today’s China-U.S. relations as strategic stalemate, it means we will launch a massive counteroffensive against the U.S. at some point in the future and completely defeat it.
What we see in the real world, however, is that neither side will lose thoroughly, and there won’t be a massive counteroffensive. In other words, we hope such competition ends up in a scenario of win-win cooperation. Once we accept the U.S. slogan about competition, we may sink into Cold War thinking, and subsequent mutually debilitating struggles.
Chinese cultural wisdom doesn’t just deny the existence of competition but rather strives to achieve win-win in competition, and avoid lose-lose as a result of a head-on collision. Competition between China and the U.S. should focus on which country can achieve greater unity and stability at home, who's people can live better lives, who's natural environment is more livable and which is supported by more countries in the world.
The kinds of difficulties and problems that have arisen in the U.S. in no way serve Chinese interests. For example, polarizing domestic politics, rising isolationism and anti-foreign sentiment in the U.S. will affect Chinese economic interests in the U.S., the living and working environments of Chinese Americans and Chinese nationals in the U.S. and bilateral exchanges between the two countries’ businesspeople and intellectuals. The Chinese people don’t want to see the U.S. get more chaotic, or see U.S. domestic contradictions intensify. On the other hand, Americans don’t want to see China’s economy falter, and thus reduce overseas exchanges. Chinese economic prosperity and improved lives for the Chinese people will bring the U.S. more opportunities. Only when both sides abandon the zero-sum thinking of competition will China-U.S. relations see a brighter future.
