China-US Focus editor KJ Kerr sat down with Dr. Michael D. Swaine, a prominent American scholar of Chinese security studies, to explore his thoughts on the state of U.S.-China relations. Swaine, currently with the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, points to a need for greater frankness and openness between the rival powers and suggests that they can do things — both individually and together — to reduce tensions and forestall conflict.
KJ Kerr:
Thank you so much for being here with us, Dr. Swaine. Security, particularly in relation to China, has been your primary focus throughout your career and now at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Over the last few years, we’ve witnessed heightened concern over national security in both China and the United States. What strategies do you think both sides could enact or consider to prevent these concerns from hindering opportunities for cooperation or evolving into a conflict?
Michael Swaine:
A variety of things need to be done. First, both sides need to stop the one-sided blame game, which is currently in effect, and recognize that the two countries are caught in a destructive dynamic to which they both contribute. They need to begin genuine strategic dialogues at both the official and the unofficial Track II levels that are designed to create a more positive, constructive vision of peaceful coexistence and bounded areas of competition.
This requires honest, frank discussions about both the acceptable and the unacceptable features of current and future bilateral and international policies. This is what needs to happen to avert zero-sum escalation and to encourage cooperation and constructive forms of competition. There must be that kind of discussion, which I don’t see happening at present. Both sides need to develop a vision of constructive, peaceful coexistence based on balance and some level of mutual compromise, not the drive for dominance or singular leadership — or, in the Chinese case, the victory of socialism. All of these tropes, these statements that are made by U.S. officials at times, and by analysts and others, are just not helpful in trying to reach the kind of understandings, balance and shared leadership in many respects that are required for the United States and China if we’re going to have a stable and productive relationship going forward.
KJ Kerr:
How do you think they can integrate that balance without undermining each other’s economic stability and future growth?
Michael Swaine:
I think this requires clear, international, coordinated definitions of the scope and limits of technology, competition and cooperation, as well as industrial policies and subsidies and a more selective and functional — as opposed to political — use of sanctions. In the case of sanctions, Washington needs to make more explicit the conditions under which the U.S. would expand or relax restrictions and sanctions against China to make clear that U.S. policies are a calibrated and proportionate effort designed to shape Chinese policies and behavior, rather than being unconditional efforts aimed at containment, which is what the impression seems to be now.
We need to have all of these things to try to balance national security concerns without undermining growth. We have to have a clear definition of the limits of the competition, how far we’re willing to go in sanctioning each side. You need to know how you undo those sanctions over time, what the limits of technology competition are, etc.
KJ Kerr:
There have been increased security concerns in the Asia Pacific more broadly as well, with regional powers expanding military spending, growing concerns over an arms race in the Asia Pacific. How can the U.S. and China address stability in the region without contributing to further destabilization?
Michael Swaine:
There’s no replacement for serious diplomacy. There needs to be serious, sustained diplomacy to provide credible assurances that each side will not opt to threaten the vital interests of the other in ways that force a crisis or conflict. We need, in particular, to stabilize the Taiwan situation through a revitalization, as I put it, of the original understanding that Beijing and Washington reached over the island — which on the U.S. side was a clearly viable and believable “one China” policy; and on the Chinese side was a clear commitment to achieve peaceful unification as a top priority.
The United States needs to be much clearer in the nature of the policy. It has eroded over time. China uses this as a talking point all the time. It may sound like I’m just carrying water for Beijing, but in fact it is the case — it has certainly eroded. The U.S. has shown less commitment to the kinds of principles that originally defined the “one China” policy in some areas and relies now on a very simplistic repetition of mantras: “We continue to support the ‘one China’ policy. We do not support Taiwan independence.” But there needs to be much more said and done to really lend credibility to the fact that the United States does not recognize Taiwan as a formal ally. It does not see Taiwan as a critical strategic node that must be kept out of the hands of the Chinese under any conditions, as some people have said. It is committed only to unofficial relations with Taiwan. It’s not going to be deploying warships to Taiwan, much less soldiers. There’s a whole series of things that need to be said to really try to strengthen stability across the strait.
China itself also needs to remain committed to seeking peaceful unification and needs to say that it has not given up on efforts to work with Taipei to reduce tensions and that it has no deadline for unifying Taiwan with China. Now, this has been said by Chinese leaders at lower levels of the system, but to my knowledge, it has never been said publicly and clearly by Xi Jinping — that China has no deadline. So I think that needs to be said, and I think China needs to indicate that it will reduce the development of invasion capabilities and military exercises around Taiwan as tensions over the island abate.
Finally, I would say that China needs to start thinking about new formulas for dealing with Taiwan, beyond “one country, two systems,” or considering new versions of that could have some chance of being found acceptable by the people on Taiwan. Right now, the people of Taiwan completely reject the idea of “one country, two systems,” and China needs to work beyond that.
KJ Kerr:
Do you think that third-party actors such as regional allies and multilateral institutions can contribute to promoting stability and easing the tensions surrounding Taiwan, and what role should they play?
Michael Swaine:
Yes, I think third-party countries and third powers should openly support the kind of initiatives that I’ve been talking about and also resist clearly signing on to commitments to fight alongside Beijing or Washington in a Taiwan conflict. Both sides also need to resist this idea of trying to pull in third countries to support their efforts to conduct a war. These third powers should state that they best preserve stability in the region by maintaining their own self-defense capabilities, maintaining their own capacity to deter aggression against themselves, not by joining a grand coalition to deal with the Taiwan situation.
So, I think that as power dynamics keep shifting in the Asia Pacific, the U.S. and China should work more with their allies and partners. They need to overcome the zero-sum approach that we now see in multilateral organizations and initiatives and work together — third powers, the U.S. and China — to create the rules and norms for a more genuinely inclusive regional and global system.
I think there should be more international conferences at both the Track I and Track II levels to discuss the possible feature of such a system, of an international, inclusive system in the 21st century that assumes continued but not antagonistic Sino-U.S. competition. Third countries should be behind this kind of effort and not simply drawing lines between China and the U.S. or signing on to Beijing’s or Washington’s intentions regarding the other.
KJ Kerr:
We’re of course also on the brink of the U.S. elections. What strategies do you think Beijing could adopt to manage its relationship with Washington over the next four years, regardless of who is in office?
Michael Swaine:
China needs to show very clearly that it is committed to stabilizing the relationship, that it is willing to consider having a strategic dialogue with the United States to define exactly where there are areas for cooperation and to define where there are serious areas for competition — and what, when areas of intense competition (if not conflict) exist, could moderate those levels and depths of competition, rather than just exchanging the usual mantra talking points that occur at many of these meetings. There needs to be a much greater level of frankness and openness. Talking about what each side can do — actually do — to reduce the sense of rivalry between them.
I think China needs to show that it is quite willing to undertake changes in some of its policies, particularly in the area of cyber hacking, I would say, as well as in some areas of technology and trade, that would make for a less suspicious West. It also should exemplify that it would provide an open door to a prolonged dialogue at both the Track I and Track II levels in these areas.
I should say that the Track II level, is really important in all of this, because you can have discussions at that level. I’ve been involved in Track II dialogues with the Chinese on crisis management for many, many years. And you can have discussions at that level that do not pin the participants to an official policy line, that do not restrict what they can and cannot say.
Of course, China will still stay within certain parameters, but within those parameters, there is still a good realm of area for give and take that I think is necessary if you’re going to get at some of these really tough questions. I think it’s necessary to have a Track II dialogue that reinforces and coordinates with a Track I dialogue to probe these bigger questions and that seeks areas of compromise, where there are possibilities for mutual accommodation and what reaffirming initiatives would look like that the other side would find substantive and meaningful — and that are also feasible. Testing those kinds of things in a Track II dialogue, and then seeing if they can be transposed to a Track I dialogue is really important.
The last point I’ll say is that it’s really important for the United States and China to develop a much more credible crisis management and crisis prevention dialogue to reduce the likelihood of a conflict, in case all these initiatives that we’re talking about don’t succeed and we get a growing degree of adversity between the two countries. Right now, we have some crisis management mechanisms in place between Beijing and Washington, but they are woefully inadequate. They are not nearly sufficient to be able to effectively deal with a serious political or military crisis between the United States and China. Such a crisis could escalate quickly, and it would very quickly go beyond the military, which is where a lot of these crisis management mechanisms are lodged. It would very quickly make its way to civilian leadership at the central level, the top levels of both governments. These leaders and their subordinates need to be much better informed about the pitfalls of the attitudes, assumptions, biases, decision-making systems and intelligence systems that operate on both sides that obstruct effective crisis management. We’re not nearly there yet. We must have a much more effective dialogue on this topic.
KJ Kerr:
I think a lot of what you just expressed goes for both sides of the Pacific. But do you have further specific recommendations for the next U.S. administration in shaping a China policy that mitigates tensions, fosters economic growth, promotes trade and encourages some kind of constructive cooperation?
Michael Swaine:
The next U.S. administration really needs to take a serious, hard look at the state of the relationship and its dynamics. They need to consider the trends that are going on — and on the Hill in particular [Congress] — but also in other areas that are continually reinforcing this steady drumbeat of a dire zero-sum competition that is existential in nature in some ways, and could result in war, especially as we have constant references to war preparation as opposed to war avoidance. They need to genuinely try to emphasize diplomacy over preparations for conflict.
The next administration needs to take a second look at this problem and really begin to think hard about how we can move to a diplomacy-led policy. This is going to involve some very significant risk-taking on both sides. It involves initiatives that each side is willing to take and putting themselves out there to see if there is a positive response by the other side and trying to really work out credible actions that the other side would look upon as meaningful.
We also must ask ourselves where we want the relationship to end up. Ultimately, we don’t want to end up in a cold war. We certainly don’t want to end up in a shooting war. We don’t want to end up in a vicious zero-sum competition that shuts out our ability to cooperate in almost every area, including climate. And climate is a critical area where we are closing off incentives and options to deal with each other because of the larger strategic competition that’s going. It is really throttling efforts to try and move forward on these types of significant areas — dealing with pandemics, climate change and things like that. We have to establish a much more credible approach to dealing with each other that can really enhance the incentives for cooperation over just simple competition and the fight for dominance.
KJ Kerr:
I’ll end with this: We’re in a time of intense polarization and increased tensions. Do you think there’s still hope for achieving that kind of cooperation — critical cooperation — on climate, pandemics and other global challenges for a future in which both countries can establish a sustainable, positive relationship, ultimately, for the wellbeing of humanity?
Michael Swaine:
Yes, of course, I do have hope that this kind of meaningful cooperation could occur beyond what we see now, but it’s going to take determination. It’s going to require risk-taking and a much clearer definition of the strategy involved by each side and their concrete goals. There must be clear signs of progress and what constitutes progress in this interaction.
And I should add that there needs to be zero tolerance for the kind of dogmatic, ideological, zero-sum war mongering, I daresay, that goes on both in Washington and Beijing by individuals who are dedicated to the primacy of each side or by ultra nationalists who simply beat that drum and expect others to rally to it — to engage in some never-ending “do or die” competition with the other side. These things need to be countered. They need to be really rebuffed, openly and with real energy by the administration on each side in order to try to tamp down these kinds of negative attitudes and really allow for some hope or stability in the future.
I think it can be done. It’s going to take some courage, some real political courage on the part of our leaders on both sides, but I think the alternative would be much, much worse.
