Joseph Nye is University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, and a regular contributor to China-US Focus. He unpacks his insights on the bilateral relationship in this new interview with James Chau, President of the China-United States Exchange Foundation.
While the two countries may have decoupled in some narrow aspects, Professor Nye warns that any broad moves will be devastating for their economies and the global economy. But progress is possible despite ongoing mistrust. He uses the term “cooperative rivalry” to suggest how to partner and compete at the same time.
Click here to watch the interview.
James Chau:
Professor Joseph Nye, thank you very much for speaking with us. You write in your new piece about enduring rivalry, but you don't think it necessarily captures the current tensions in the modern U.S.-China relationship. Could you expand on that?
Joseph Nye:
Well, the concept of enduring rivalry — which conjures up something like the relationship of Germany and Britain before World War I — implies something that can't be avoided. People often think that means destined for war. But in fact, if you look at the rivalry between the U.S. and China, notice that in the 50 years or so since 1949, when the Communists took over, there have been very different phases in the 50s. We were shooting each other on the Korean peninsula in the 70s. After Nixon's visit, we were cooperating to limit the Soviet Union. In the 80s, 90s and early 2010s, we were in the process of economic engagement. And now, since about 2015 or 16 or so, we've been in what's been called a great power rivalry. A term such as “enduring rivalry” has so many different aspects. It's not a very helpful description.
James Chau:
Let's talk about the Cold War. You've lived through different chapters. I saw the end of it. Many people, including former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, have made comparisons between the U.S. and China. What they see is a modern Cold War. Do you necessarily agree with that when you look at the modern and the historical?
Joseph Nye:
Well, if by Cold War one means intense rivalry without shooting, then I suppose you could say that the U.S.-China relationship is a Cold War of sorts. Cold War means something like the U.S. Soviet rivalry with the 40 years or so that we lived through, which were many of them very dangerous years. Then I don't think we are in a Cold War. In that sense, the conditions are quite different. We, with the Soviet Union, had military interdependence, but virtually no economic or ecological interdependence. Whereas in the relationship with China, we have a great deal of both types of interdependence and all types of interdependence. So that's why the analogy of the Cold War can be misleading as well.
James Chau:
Let's move on to economic decoupling. There are some people who say that the U.S. and China have already decoupled; others think this could never happen. So these are two extreme positions that have no overlap. What's your take on this? Is it possible to avoid if it hasn't happened already?
Joseph Nye:
Well, there is selective decoupling. If you look at the steps have been taken to prevent Huawei from developing or building out 5G infrastructure in the U.S., or if you look at the steps that have been taken to restrict the most sensitive security-related semiconductor exports, that is decoupling based on security. But as National Security Adviser, Jake Sullivan put it, we want to have a high wall around a small yard. If you tried to have a large decoupling, it would be enormously devastating in terms of its economic effects on China’s economy, the U.S. economy and the world economy. So in that sense, a selective decoupling, yes, we’ve already seen it. A real decoupling or total decoupling we haven't seen, and I don't think we should. What's more, there is an area of interdependence that I call ecological interdependence — issues like climate change or pandemics and so forth — where it makes no sense at all to talk about decoupling, because those issues obey the laws of physics, not of politics.
James Chau:
You've been writing a lot recently about what you call cooperative rivalry. What does that mean in practice, and how does it differ from the containment strategies that we saw in the postwar era during the Cold War?
Joseph Nye:
Well, I use that term cooperative rivalry to try to get people to realize that when we're formulating a policy toward China, we must compete. We also need to combine with cooperation. Nobody can solve problems like climate change acting by themselves. You have to have power with other countries as well as power in contrast to other countries. So a cooperative rival requires us to do things that seem to be mutually inconsistent — compete and cooperate at the same time. It can be done, but if you express it in those terms, it makes the policymakers think more clearly about strategy rather than simplistically that it's all one or the other.
James Chau:
I want to stay with the theme that you just touched on there, about how no one country can go so long in solving these enormous global shared challenges that we're currently faced with, because you're also talking about leveraging partnerships and alliances like Japan and India. Who are they important for? And how are they going to help the U.S.-China relationship as a complete entity?
Joseph Nye:
Well, I think that on some of these issues — climate, for example, or pandemics — you need the cooperation of Japan, India and Europe. Basically you need everybody. But I was thinking on the Japan-India Alliance, the so-called Quad if you then add Australia. It's more in the security area, which essentially shapes the external environment. For China, it's impossible to change China internally. How China changes internally is going to depend on the Chinese. It is just much too large for the U.S. or any other external actor to try to change. But you can shape the external environment. … Well, if you have this relationship of alliances and friendships, it means that as China becomes crosswise with one partner, it weakens its relations with the others as well. So essentially, shaping the external environment is not the same as containment. We're not trying to stop Chinese growth. But it does mean that if China acts aggressively, or in a bullying fashion, you will find that it's more costly.
James Chau:
Would that not then just push China into a space of its own by isolating it somehow from some countries? Would the behaviors you describe, therefore not just become more determined?
Joseph Nye:
I don't think so. Because if you look at most countries, they want good economic relations with China. And they also want to be protected against bullying or aggression by China. And that means that there's a balancing act going on. And that balancing act is for countries that are relating to China. And China, in turn has to realize that. So if China were to retreat or become aggressive and so forth, you would wind up paying a price.
James Chau:
We've been discussing how alliances partnerships and friendships can, as you say, shape the external environment, but ultimately, what is it going to require? What do you think will actually happen in terms of the U.S. in China achieving coexistence that is not just peaceful but one that actually is good enough to work from now on?
Joseph Nye:
Well, I think it's going to require more top-level contact. I mean, Xi Jinping has centralized power in him to an extent that we haven't seen since Mao. And that means that when you try to work with the Chinese to get things done, in terms of positioning the two countries, it's going to require a great deal of symmetry. But on the other hand, having middle-level contacts and ministerial-level contacts is also important because that's where you get the implementation of policy. Commerce Secretary Raimondo or Secretary of State Blinken visiting China recently, are also important. And then at a third level, general people, students, tourists. Scientific exchanges are also important to help develop a better understanding of the realities of the two countries. So it's going to take connections that are all three levels.
James Chau:
You are, of course, an institution in yourself as a globally respected academic leader. Do you think that the exchanges between universities — between scientists, for example — and other forms of people contacts will become more important in this hostile environment? And will they be allowed to flourish as much as they can?
Joseph Nye:
Well, I think there is some realization that we have to keep up these contacts. For example, in the area of climate, we have maintained good working relations. We had actually very good working relations in the area of pandemics, when you go back to the SARS crisis of the early 2000s. Unfortunately, both sides mishandled the COVID crisis. But I think we are going to need to cooperate there again in the future. So I think keeping these scientific contacts alive is extremely important.
James Chau:
Professor, I want to finish up with this one question here. These interviews, these dialogues have the stated purpose of bringing people together and of advancing trust and understanding through conversations like these. There is, I believe, zero or near zero trust between the United States and China today, which must make a lot of people very sad and others frustrated. What is it going to require? What's the one idea, the one first step that everybody can take, together or separately, to reestablish that trust in a really meaningful way?
Joseph Nye:
Well, I find that interpersonal contacts, and working on projects where you have a common goal is very useful in terms of showing that you can have parts of the relationship that are trusting, and then those may spill over into other parts.
James Chau:
I have to ask you — on the 45th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties, where were you in 1979 when the new relationship was announced?
Joseph Nye:
I was working in the State Department under Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in the Carter administration. At that point, we took this as a very favorable step forward.
James Chau:
When was your first trip to China?
Joseph Nye:
My first trip to China was in 1982. I was invited to give a series of lectures at Fudan University, and then I was a guest of the Chinese government in terms of showing me all the normal sites, like the Great Wall and so forth.
James Chau:
What did you learn at that time? And was it necessarily useful in the long run looking back?
Joseph Nye:
I realized that we shouldn't think of China as a monolith. There are different views. And different Chinese see different things, in different perspectives, just as different Americans do. Realizing this is, I think, the first step toward developing a reasonable relationship.
James Chau:
You said that in 1979, establishing a modern relationship with China was seen as useful. You were working under Cyrus Vance. Would you say now, 45 years later that that was a mistake or that was a misunderstanding in itself?
Joseph Nye:
No, no, absolutely not. I think that was an essential first step. But now, given what we've seen in our cycles of ups and downs in the U.S.-China relationship, we ought to be thinking about how we get an upturn in the future.
James Chau:
Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University, I want to thank you so much, not only for this interview but for dedicating your life to giving people an accurate understanding.
Joseph Nye:
Thank you very much. I enjoyed the chat.
