History unfolds in a continuum of events. The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy is a prime example. Donald Trump (which is to say members of the Trump administration) initially introduced this strategy during their first term, defining its core objectives and overarching policy structure. The strategy focused on fostering interagency coordination, rallying public support and galvanizing international allies. Under President Joe Biden, the strategy has evolved further to become more systematic, institutional and expansive. In other words, it seems to be working for the U.S. in the region.
The Indo-Pacific strategy has become more systematic over the past four years, with a well-defined road map and better policy synergy. In June 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense released a report that outlined the military and security policies needed to advance the strategy. Later, in February 2022, the White House’s own strategy report offered more strategic and comprehensive policy guidance, refining the approach and putting new emphasis on economic and non-traditional security issues. This powered the strategy on multiple fronts.
Institutionalization is particularly evident in minilateral arrangements such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the U.S.-Japan-Philippines security relationship. In the same vein, the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral mechanism is a particularly noteworthy development.
Expansion is characterized by two pivotal elements: First, the strengthening of cross-regional ties, particularly between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. NATO’s pivot toward the Indo-Pacific has aroused the interest of policymakers and scholars alike, and the AUKUS grouping underscores the dynamism of these cross-regional mechanisms. Second, the U.S.-centered system covers a sweeping spectrum of issues, from security and technology to supply chain management. Security policy is the cornerstone of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, with both the Trump and Biden administrations endeavoring to refine security deployment in the region. Efforts include bolstering the military presence in key Indo-Pacific nations, such as Japan and Australia, enhancing extended deterrence for South Korea and Japan, affirming defense commitments to Japan (encompassing the Diaoyu Islands) and to the Philippines, extending to the South China Sea).
They also continue to push forward things like the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. The Biden administration has further strengthened defense along the first island chain by elevating security cooperation with the Philippines and increasing military assistance to Taiwan. Additionally, it has expanded maritime law enforcement collaboration with allies, ensuring more cohesion between military and maritime forces in the region.
It its second-term the Trump administration is likely to inherit Biden’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, though possibly with shifts in policy coordination and alliances. In particular, changes to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are in the cards.
Unlike the Biden administration, which has emphasized economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific, including the IPEF, Trump has shown less interest and has even suggested a withdrawal. However, a complete exit is unlikely. The IPEF, unlike the comprehensive TPP, consists of four independent yet interrelated pillars: connected economy, resilient economy, clean economy and fair economy. The supply chain agreement is already in effect, and negotiations on the clean economy and fair economy are nearly concluded; but consensus on the connected economy pillar — otherwise known as trade agreements — remains elusive.
Given the importance the U.S. placed on supply chain security, anti-corruption and fair competition, Trump’s second term will likely continue to push forward the resilient economy and fair economy initiatives. However, the clean economy pillar, which involves climate change and green growth, might be set aside. Consequently, even if Trump turns away from a specific pillar, the policies of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework can still be pursued de facto, albeit rebranded as a repudiation of Biden’s approach.
Despite his criticisms of alliances, Trump is not against them per se, but he has sought to restructure them, aiming for a new architecture with a clear hierarchy, balanced responsibilities and obligations. The U.S. seeks to bolster its influence within these alliances while also pressing allies to take on heavier burdens for their own defense. This approach could strain some U.S. relationships.
In contrast, the Biden administration has strengthened solidarity among U.S. allies, enhancing mutual understanding and support. This stabilizes these relationships and offers hope that the impact of Trump’s approach on the alliances is temporary and that future administrations may again prioritize alliance-building as Biden has done. Given the political shifts in Europe and East Asia, U.S. allies may grudgingly compromise and adapt. Renewed strain is likely, but it will not unwind the alliances altogether.
Trump's policy approach is known for being unorthodox and unpredictable. Yet, the last eight years have shown a steadfast stance on the Indo-Pacific Strategy, which in turn has bolstered policy momentum and locked in the trajectory. As it is aimed at managing “generational competition” with China, the strategy indeed poses challenges to the Eastern giant. But China has gained a deeper understanding of the strategy’s objectives and methods, and it has gained significant experience from past interactions. It is logical to anticipate that China will approach Trump’s second-term Indo-Pacific Strategy with greater confidence and composure.
