The idea of global governance was first proposed in 1990 by Willie Brandt, former chancellor of West Germany, whose aim was establishing a new governance model for the international order based on globalism and regulatory philosophy. More than three decades later, a pragmatist tendency is becoming increasingly prominent, interpreting the concept in different linguistic contexts. With international geopolitical conflicts occurring more frequently and Donald Trump returning to the White House — holding high the “America first” banner — significant changes can be expected in the European interpretation of global governance and how it fits with America’s notion of “globe governing.”
European political and academic circles continue to disagree on how to define global governance — from the academic level to its application at the policy level. Yet there has been broad consensus over who governs, what is to be governed and how to govern — the three core elements of global governance.
First, on the subject of governance, European political and academic circles believe that, compared with traditional governance models, the government is no longer the sole behavioral agent, and a fresh governance model without an authoritative government, i.e. “governance without government,” is needed. Therefore, they believe international organizations, transnational corporations, NGO’s and civil society will play leading roles in global governance.
Second, as to the objects of governance, in the first 20 years after the concept of global governance was put forward, European political and academic circles almost unanimously held that the main objects of global governance should be non-traditional security topics such as climate change, global public health security, energy security, food security and terrorism. Climate change, in particular, had been an indispensable topic at various European forums, almost becoming a synonym of global governance. In such an atmosphere, where climate seems omnipresent, traditional security as the previous main object of global governance has increasingly been marginalized.
Third, when it comes to the approach to governance, European political and academic circles believe that Western countries alone are unable to meet global challenges; therefore, they need to join hands with emerging economies to manage global affairs from the perspective of multipolar thinking. Despite this, the European idea of multipolar governance remains a model of West-dominated joint governance by multiple actors.
Such incidences as the Ukraine crisis, Palestine-Israel conflict, military application of AI and Trump’s threats of U.S. territorial expansion have had shocking impacts on Europe’s outlook on global governance, and have to some extent overthrown European political and academic circles’ understanding of the three core elements of global governance. Such traditional security challenges as risks of a hot war — especially nuclear war — as well as national sovereignty have returned to the center of global governance.
Because conflicts of interest still exist between nation states, and unity is far from becoming reality, addressing such issues as major power rivalry, territorial disputes, proxy wars and a new cold war is as urgent as coping with climate change. Instead of giving way to non-traditional security concerns, traditional security has again become one of the main objects of global governance. Despite the changes in the objects of global governance, NGOs, civil society and international organizations have yet to be capable of playing a leading role in handling such traditional security challenges. Governments remain the foremost actors in global governance. By the same token, as the Global South — represented by BRICS countries — rises collectively, the West-dominated model of joint governance is no longer accepted by emerging powers, who want to be equal masters with the West in international affairs.
After Europe proposed the concept of global governance, the United States didn’t adopt it without reservation. Instead, it absorbed, utilized and transformed it using pragmatist principles, aiming to accomplish its own goal of ruling the world with a liberal order. The U.S. agrees with Europe on adopting such universal values as human rights and democracy as values for global governance, and it advocates making rules based on U.S. and Western ideology to adjust international relations and regulate the international order.
Similarly, taking advantage of the globalist views in the European vision of global governance, the U.S. proposed to formulate the so-called Washington consensus by means of the neo-liberalist model of “liberalization, privatization, marketization.” As for the approach to governance, the U.S. does not endorse Europe’s multipolar governance and even refuses to accept the West-dominated model of governance by multiple poles. Taking advantage of its status as the world’s sole superpower, the U.S. proposes to cast global governance in terms of strength, insisting on the U.S. governing the globe as the single pole and believing Pax Americana is an unrivaled global order.
So the U.S. outlook on global governance holds that the United States is the singular example of “exceptionalism” in international affairs and must lead the new world order to normalize international situation. It is thus obvious that, after being utilized and transformed by the U.S., Europe’s global governance has already become a U.S. edition of globe governing.
With Trump returning to the White House, the transformed U.S. globe governing will again undergo profound changes:
• First, globalism as the foundation of global governance has almost disappeared from Trump’s rhetoric, giving way to upsurging isolationism, conservatism and populism.
• Second, globalization has been a ready target for attacks by anti-establishment forces. Predictably, driven by Trump’s new policies (such as immigrant deportations and high tariffs), the tide of anti-globalization will rise further, and the fragmentation of global industry and supply chains will accelerate.
• Third, since such frameworks of global governance as the Paris agreement and the WHO are incompatible with Trump’s “America first” policies, and the U.S. may withdraw again at any time. Its moral halo as the world leader will dim.
• Fourth, amid Trump’s unfathomable utterances about buying Greenland and taking back the Panama Canal, the international community is worried that neoimperialism may undermine the framework of global governance. For this reason, French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot commented with grave concern that Trump’s words marked the “collapse of global rules.”
But while Trump’s new policies show a tendency to look inward, it doesn’t mean the U.S. has given up on globe governing. In fact, preserving U.S. global hegemony is a bipartisan consensus. Otherwise, Trump would not have threatened to impose punitive tariffs should BRICS countries undermine the dollar’s status. Hence the essence of the U.S. practice of globe governing as the sole pole has not changed but only the form and means. Trump is after the transactional effect on U.S. allies, partners and followers contributing more, and the U.S. reaping profits from all over the world.
To sum up, both the European “global governance” and U.S. “globe governing” are Western narratives about the global expansion of monopoly capitalism. They are inconsistent with the changes in comparative international strength, and cannot meet Global South nations’ demands for changing the imbalance in the distribution of international institutionalized powers. While the Western outlooks on global governance reveal defects and weaknesses, the new outlook proposed by BRICS countries — achieving global rebalancing through consultation, joint governance and shared benefits — has attracted broad international attention.
