Six factors suggest that the IPEF will not succeed: meager benefits for developing economies, new and unpopular commitments, disproportionate benefits for the U.S., vague negotiating plans, uncertainty of the framework’s survival under a new American administration and skepticism by U.S. allies.

U.S. President Joe Biden formally launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework in June, but the initiative falls short of providing an actual trade agreement. In order for the IPEF to work long term, the Biden administration must include interlocking development initiatives that are multilateral and backed by public-private partnership agreements.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is an essential component of Beijing and Islamabad’s economic relationship, but the CPEC has faced extensive pressures internally and externally, including strong criticism from the U.S. and India.

Thirteen countries in the Indo-Pacific region have joined the initiative, which indicates interest. But there are problems with the framework as presented that raise questions about its ability to succeed and endure.

Geopolitical risk, sanctions, and covid in China are redefining how we think about the future of global supply chains. Nations must start considering how to better secure their supply chains through regional trade partnerships, reshoring essential manufacturing capabilities, and sourcing goods from multiple nations and regions.

India and Pakistan share a deeply intertwined and embattled history. And now that India sees China entering the picture to back Pakistani development, the thought of two neighboring rivals growing closer has put India on notice.

The United States has recklessly dismissed China’s efforts, even though many factors beyond China’s control have influenced its ability to fulfill its side of the deal. The agreement should be implemented jointly and thoughtfully, not by finger-pointing.

A robust semiconductor supply chain without China is out of question, while complimentary China-U.S. cooperation would make the global supply chain both complete and resilient for years to come.

In The Economic Weapon: The Rise of Sanctions as a Tool of Modern War, historian Nicholas Mulder reminds us that even when Britain and Russia were savagely battling each other during the 1853-56 Crimean War, they continued to service their debts to each other. Likewise, when hedge funds launched predatory attacks on Asian currencies during the 1990s Asian financial crisis, they ultimately still played by the rules (even though their unethical behavior brought some East Asian countries’ economic progress to a halt).

Vietnam and India still have a long way to go to compete with China. Control of the pandemic, selective resumption of production and continued strengthening of its supply chains globally will keep China on top for some time.