China’s experiments with industrial and financial policies may end up providing emerging economies with valuable insight into how to avoid the middle-income trap. But, for a US concerned with its eroding manufacturing base, the lesson is already apparent.

In March, two leading members of the Trump administration announced that China’s ZTE Corporation would pay the largest criminal fine in U.S. sanctions history. As long as North Korea’s military program tops the U.S. foreign policy agenda with China, economic sanctions aimed at punishing Chinese corporations may take a back seat to reaching a goal of increased Chinese pressure on the North Korean regime.

The Mar-a-Lago meeting between presidents Trump and Xi has started to generate concrete results, the recently announced trade agreement between the countries shows. However, the transactional approach risks leading to an impasse; it needs to be buttressed by more fundamental deals, such as the US-China Bilateral Investment Treaty.

Ugandan petty merchants believe not that Chinese are sharper traders than they are but that they are subsidized by the Chinese government, meaning unfair competition. Just as the Trump administration in the United States asserts that China dumps raw steel on world market, selling its own glut of steel below cost, so the vendors of Uganda and Zambia are confident that Chinese traders in their countries can only provide imported goods at lower cost because they are somehow subsidized with export rebates from the Chinese government.

A less alarmed view of China’s Belt and Road Initiative finds first of all that the whole project is much overhyped. Figures about investments include projects that had been previously launched. Although China is likely to increase its influence in the region, its growing influence should not be equated with aggression. In determining how to react to the Silk Road initiative, the West should draw on a major strategic consideration: Do the U.S. and its allies plan to block any and all increases in Chinese influence—or merely contain those moves that entails China’s use of force to dominate other countries?

Giving priority to important institutional innovations and rule-making will not only provide opportunities for promoting China’s industrial capacity cooperation and manufacturing upgrading, but also promote a new round of prosperity-oriented growth for global trade and new globalization.

The initial deals represent more intangible benefits than tangible ones, but high-tech, energy, steel and infrastructure financing all offer bankable opportunities for both countries beyond the 100-day action plan.

Pakistan’s deep-sea port Gwadar, which the Chinese built and are now operating under a 40-year agreement, is a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The U.S. and India are looking at the Chinese initiative with skepticism, believing that the twin initiatives are meant more to secure China’s geo-strategic aims.

Against a background of global economic gloominess, China’s Belt and Road Initiative injects a fresh spirit of multilateral cooperation and truly win-win opportunities. There is reason to expect a more vibrant regional and global economic recovery to be stimulated by this partnership initiated and led by Beijing.

Africa pins high hopes on the Belt and Road Initiative to promote African industrialization and infrastructure construction, and to turn the 21st century into an era of African development. The priorities of Washington and Beijing could be in concert here, giving the US and China historic roles to play.