During the past week’s acrimonious public debate over the stalled nuclear negotiations in Geneva regarding Iran, China has escaped public censure. Beijing’s low profile was not due to indifference, but to China’s complex relationship with Iran and the United States.
Richard Weitz
Fundamentally, Chinese leaders seek to change Iran’s behavior, but not its regime. They oppose Iran’s acquiring nuclear weapons, but also the use of force or severe sanctions to prevent that development. PRC policy makers want Iranian oil, but they are cautious about irritating more important commercial partners, especially the United States. The Chinese government would protest a U.S. military strike against Iran, but would otherwise eschew retaliatory actions.
Chinese leaders do not want Iran to have nuclear weapons, but Chinese leaders do not consider Iran a near-term security threat. PRC policy makers discount the possibility that Iran will soon acquire an arsenal of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles to carry them. They also doubt that, even if Iran obtained nuclear-armed missiles, Tehran would ever use such weapons against China. Iranians have refrained from supporting terrorist acts against Chinese targets, supporting Uighur nationalists seeking autonomy from Beijing, developing ties with Taiwan, or taking other actions that would threaten vital Chinese security incidents.
Chinese analysts believe that Iranians might seek nuclear weapons primarily for defensive means—to deter a U.S. or Israeli attack—rather than as a means to confront other countries or support international terrorism more aggressively. For these reasons, PRC officials have encouraged their Western counterparts to accept Iran’s right to continue enriching uranium as long as this capacity was limited and transparent to external monitoring. Chinese officials believe that Iran has presented the world with a fait accompli—its nuclear program has advanced too far to be completely rolled back. They are now trying to negotiate limits on the quantity and quality of Iranian nuclear actives—keeping them below the threshold of a potential nuclear weapons program.
Beijing’s main fear is that Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons could raise the prospects of war in the Middle East, the source of approximately half of China’s imported oil. Such a conflict would threaten China’s energy security and decrease demand for its goods. Another Chinese concern is that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons could lead additional countries to seek them. Depending on how the nuclear proliferation dominoes fell, Japan and South Korea might acquire nuclear weapons, which would negate an important military advantage China has over both countries.
When it comes to coercing Iran into restraining its nuclear activities, the Chinese government aims to do just enough to keep the West pacified without overly upsetting Iranians or impeding China’s buying Iranian energy and developing profitable economic ties with Iran. When faced with proposed UN sanctions against Iran, PRC policy makers calculate whether supporting limited UN Security Council measures against Iran would inflict less harm on Chinese business and other interests than the possible unilateral actions of Western governments, which typically include the adoption of supplementary national sanctions, should the Council block the proposed multilateral sanctions.
In a parallel manner with how U.S. policy makers view Beijing’s critical role in the case of North Korea’s nuclear program, Chinese officials consider the United States the key player on the Iran issue. They see Washington as exercising considerable influence on the Iranian policies of other countries. Furthermore, they doubt that Israel would attack Iran without U.S. approval and support. A reinforcing factor is that China’s ties with the United States are much more important than those with Iran.
PRC policy makers will weigh heavily Washington’s likely response when deciding their own course on any Iran-related issue. Even when defending Tehran, Beijing strives to avoid confronting Washington directly.
If U.S. policy makers place a high priority on an Iran-related issue, Beijing will try to pursue policies that appear to meet U.S. concerns, though often without much public fanfare to avoid appearing to cave in to U.S. threats. If U.S. policy makers were to confront Beijing with a stark choice of being “with us or against us” on the Iranian nuclear program, Beijing would more likely side with Washington against Tehran. But thus far China has not faced such a stark choice.
Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute.
