The results of two latest elections in the Middle East were no surprise at all. They completely complied with all observers’ forecasts.
On June 3, military leader Abdel Fattah el-Sisi won 97 percent of the vote and was elected Egypt’s president one year after he ousted former president Mohamed Morsi. The following day, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad won 89 percent of the vote and won himself another seven-year term after surviving almost four years of civil war. This was his third term since he came to power in 2000.
The two polls, if viewed from the angle of election politics and democracy, are lifeless and boring, for the winners had no real rivals. El-Sisi won with the support of the military, which had suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood high-handedly. Al-Assad’s success also rode on his army’s overwhelming victories over the opposition forces in battlefields. Moreover, the elections had no suspense, even from the beginning.
If viewed from the perspective of the changing setup of power in the Middle East, however, the two elections are thick with meaning. Over a long period of time, there has been intrinsic feud and contradiction between Saudi Arabia and Iran – both of which are strong powers in the region – in terms of ethnic and religious sects, social systems and geopolitics. Such contradiction and conflict may remain “dormant” and imperceptible when the regional situation is stable. But when the situation becomes chaotic or certain external crisis breaks out, the hidden contradiction will be “awakened” and conflicts ignited.
The “Arab Spring” that started in 2011 has caused unprecedented political turmoil and reshuffling of power in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran both hope to extend the influence of their religious sects while keeping the domestic situation under control. Both powers want to be the region’s number one. That is why the Saudi Arabia–headed Sunni sect and the Iran-headed Shiite sect are usually seen looming up behind the political turmoil and conflicts in the region, such as in Egypt and Syria.
In Egypt, a decommissioned general sitting on the throne of president means zero opportunity for Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood to come back, as well as a rising influence of Sunni-dominated countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the country. During the year-long amount of time they were in power, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood adopted many “irregular” measures, such as seeking detente with Iran, supporting Hamas in the Gaza Strip and flirting with a theocratic political system similar to that practiced in Turkey. That explains why Iran and Turkey accused El-Sisi for his “military coup” when the general forced Morsi to step down at gunpoint; it also explains why Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait made a gift of $12 billion in aid package to the Egyptian strongman in praise of his “second revolution”. Therefore, the consolidation of El-Sisi’s power also means that Saudi Arabia has replaced Iran and Turkey to become the dominant influence in Egypt, which itself is an important influencing country in Middle East and Africa.
In Syria, the continual presidency of Al-Assad, a Shiite, and his strengthened control of the domestic situation means that Iran, which also belongs to the Shiite sect, has secured another layer of safety for itself. And, supported by Lebanon’s Hezbollah and Iraq’s Shiite government, Teheran has succeeded in forming an alliance of Shiite countries in the region with Iran playing the leading role. Different from Saudi Arabia’s practice of showering Egypt and other Middle East allies with petrodollars, Iran gives its Shiite allies not only financial support but also, and more directly, military aid. In addition to Syria, Teheran also supports Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s regime in Baghdad. When the Iraqi government forces suffered heavily under fierce attacks from the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL), an al-Qaida offshoot, and lost major cities and regions, Iran sent two Revolution Guard troops to fight the Sunni extremist insurgents in Iraq.
While Riyadh and Teheran tussle for sectarian and regional dominance, and try to establish fraternal alliances, their relations with the United States, the European Union and other major powers rise and fall alongside with the ebb and flow of crises in Egypt and Syria. Unfriendly to the Muslim Brotherhood and suspicious of the legality of El-Sisi’s “non-democratic” way of taking power, the West powers appeared apathetic about the results of the Egyptian election though they have expressed a reserved welcome. As for the Syrian election, the West dismissed it as a meaningless political show, because in their eyes the Al-Assad regime had long lost its legality. This stance of the West is basically to Saudi Arabia’s liking but a far cry from Riyadh’s hope of seeing the Al-Assad regime being struck with iron fists. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s relationship with the West is cooling down because the Obama administration is “drawing back” on the issue of Syria’s chemical weapons. The Obama administration is also “drawing back” on the option of launching military strikes at Syria because the US and EU are becoming increasingly interested in holding more talks with Iran on the nuclear issue. On the contrary, the relationship between Iran and the West is improving.
Given this, the US and EU are clearly suffering a waning influence in Middle East during the dramatic change of power patterns in the region.
He Wenping is a Research Fellow at the Charhar Institute and a Research Fellow at the West Asia and Africa Studies Institute of the China Academy of Social Sciences.
