The 2013 election of Hassan Rouhani, who advocated moderate policy toward the U.S. and the West, opened a door of détente between Iran and the U.S., two clear archenemies of the last few decades. The final the deadline for negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear agreement is March 31, 2015. Though it is still not known whether the parties will finally come to terms, the détente will seem to be irreversible since neither Barack Obama nor Hassan Rouhani can pay the price of returning to old hostilities.
It is widely held that China will lose in the case of U.S.-Iran rapprochement, and that China had benefitted from hostile relations. This line of reasoning is easily sold in Iran, the U.S., and even China. Some U.S. and Iranian scholars argue that China will lose some business opportunities as a result of the U.S.-Iran détente; similarly some Chinese scholars do worry that China-Iran business relations will be truly weakened.
While this opinion sells, it is actually poorly based in fact. China had never been a beneficiary of U.S.-Iran hostility. China did win some business opportunities in Iran in the past decade, but it was not because of the absence of U.S. companies as a result of the hostility. China’s commercial success in Iran, as in any other country, lies in the competitiveness of China’s economy, the complementary nature of the two economies, and the hardworking characteristics of Chinese businessmen. With or without U.S. presence, China can have business opportunities.
U.S.-Iran hostility, instead of being a favorable factor, had severely undermined China’s economic relations with Iran. For instance, China’s oil imports from Iran had dropped from 600 to 400 thousand barrels a day because of U.S. unilateral sanctions in this area, and Chinese companies lost their businesses in Iran since they were unable to be paid for their exports due to U.S. unilateral financial sanctions on Iran.
On the contrary, China will also be a major winner of a U.S.-Iran détente. After the sanctions on Iran are partly or totally removed, China-Iran total trade volume will be greatly increased. China can also benefit in a rather comprehensive way.
China would firstly like to see the outcome of the risk of nuclear proliferation being reduced. China and the U.S. do share the same security concerns over Iran’s nuclear program, but differs to a degree. The U.S. sees Iran as an archenemy ruled by radical mullahs, and therefore, takes Iran’s nuclear activities as an enormous and urgent threat. Pro-Israel lobbying strengthens such concerns.
China’s concern is not so much as that of the U.S., but this does not mean China is not concerned. China has no reason to live with another nuclear weaponized country in its neighborhood. China already had too many such neighbors. It is wrong to think that Iran will definitely develop its nuclear program for military purposes, and it is equally wrong to think that Iran definitely has no intentions to militarize its program.
The current U.S.-Iran détente will reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in two ways. The détente will by itself alleviate Iran’s security concern, which is actually a potential imperative driving a nation to develop nuclear weapons. The U.S. had long been threatening to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities and even topple the regime. Though they themselves never realized the danger, it might truly serve as an imperative driving Iran’s nuclear ambition. Also as a result of the détente, a potential nuclear agreement will lead to a stronger international monitoring of Iran’s nuclear program. That will ensure Iran will not be able to divert its nuclear program for non-peaceful uses.
China will secondly benefit from a more peaceful (or at least not further worsened) regional security environment as a result of U.S.-Iran détente. In addition to its peace-loving culture, China also regards peace as relevant with its national development strategy. The Middle East is a major source of China’s petroleum imports, a major market for China’s commodities, and a potential investment market as well. China shares the same security concerns as other external powers—if not more.
U.S.-Iran détente will greatly reduce the risk of the two entering another regional military conflict, the U.S. only focusing on a military solution to the Iran nuclear issue, while Iran only discussing military resistance. Conservatives in Washington have already boasted about regime change by military means. With a détente, the excuse for running into war will be greatly weakened.
A U.S.-Iran détente also provides an opportunity for the cooperation between the two in regional issues ranging from the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq to the fight against the Islamic States. All these will serve to improve regional security situations.
Thirdly, a U.S.-Iran détente is also in line with China’s interests of pushing forward its one belt, one road initiative. Iran is a critical partner for China in the one belt, one road initiative due to the merits of its geographical position, territorial capacity, and population. The removal of the sanctions will better Iran’s economic situation, and improve Iran’s economic relations with its Central Asian neighbors and with China. An economically developing Iran integrated with the region will be in China’s interests.
Fourthly, China will be at ease handling its bilateral relations with either of the two old foes. China has normal relations with both the U.S. and Iran. This should be a favorable position. Unfortunately, in the last decade, China has actually faced a difficult situation in maintaining relations with the two because of the mounting tensions. The U.S. thought that China had not invested enough effort in pushing for Iran’s compliance, while Iran was also angry with China, asking how it could support the U.S. on its illegitimate requests. With U.S.-Iran détente, China will have less pressure from both sides.
All in all, U.S.-Iran détente is in line of China’s interests in the region. And China has actually been working hard for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue. The step-by-step approach proposed has already become one of the guiding principles in nuclear negotiations.
