China’s implementation of non-proliferation controls has been subject to intense and ongoing criticism from the West since the 1970s. However, China’s non-proliferation commitments have gradually expanded over the decades, with implementation following behind, albeit with a substantial lag. There are signs that a tipping point may have been reached but China still has much to do to build confidence in its ability to manage strategic technology.
China and Proliferation
China has long been branded a proliferator. China itself acquired nuclear weapons in the 1960s and there were accusations of Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as early as the mid 1970s. As recently as February 2015, Rohan Joshi writing in The Diplomat criticized China’s implementation of controls, stating: “China has demonstrated remarkable consistency over four decades in acting in ways that undermine with impunity the global non-proliferation regime.” Other commentators have also questioned China’s commitment to “non-proliferation norms” in relation to nuclear sales to Pakistan, stating: “As Russia exports reactor technology to Iran and China bypasses Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines to provide Pakistan with nuclear technology for strategic purposes, there is a heightened fear that non-proliferation norms lack the importance they once did as new suppliers emerge.”
The cases involving Chinese procurers Karl Lee and Sihai Cheng, who supplied sensitive goods to Iran, appear particularly egregious: transfers of proliferation-sensitive goods to the nuclear and missile programs of Iran have been prohibited by UN sanctions resolutions since 2006.
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