Escalating tensions in the maritime dispute between China and Japan force an unwanted dilemma on Washington, and exasperated objections to squabbling over a few “rocks” don’t help the United States grasp its quandary. U.S. policymakers must respond deftly to Chinese assertiveness, but the Chinese nationalist sentiment entwined with the dispute leaves the United States with few savory choices. Observers can hope for calmer heads to prevail in Beijing, but that option may soon leave the table.
Given China’s growing energy demands and fears of encirclement, Beijing’s claims to the Diaoyu, or Senkaku, islands are rational. Chinese estimates place hydrocarbon deposits in the East China Sea as high as 160 bbl of oil and 210 tcf of natural gas. Under international law, ownership of the islands would provide economic rights and administrative authority, granting a strong foothold in the strategically important area. However, the islands resonate far more deeply in China than as just economic and strategic prizes. To the Chinese people, they represent a permanent symbol of Japan’s role in the historical exploitation of China.
In April, Shintaro Ishihara, Tokyo’s ultra right-wing Governor, outlined a plan for the city to independently purchase the islands, criticizing the national government’s administration of the islands and alleging its failure to “protect” them. Ishihara’s plan was received negatively by Beijing, which feared Japanese right-wing influences in the dispute.
Ishihara’s meddling presented a diplomatically troubling headache to Japan’s Prime Minister, Yoshihoko Noda. The motivation for the central government’s September purchase of the islands was to circumvent a crisis between Tokyo and Beijing, while thwarting further politicization of the islands at home. Noda’s $26 million bid for calm, however, met with disaster.
The perceived nationalization of Chinese territory sparked mass demonstrations against Japan throughout China. The demonstrations were peaceful in places, but elsewhere, Japanese businesses and products were attacked and destroyed, and several Japanese factories closed. While Beijing committed massive numbers of security forces to keep the demonstrations in check, the government sidestepped curbing anti-Japanese sentiments. The China Daily ran a provocative piece titled “Japan shall be blamed for damage of China protests,” and Beijing dispatched China Marine Surveillance vessels to display China’s jurisdiction over the isles. Against this backdrop of nationalist furor, China’s once-a-decade leadership transition looms, reminding Washington and Tokyo of their revisionist China fears.
Despite those fears, Beijing’s seemingly intractable position on its maritime claims are most accurately viewed as an assertive bargaining position, designed to maximize Beijing’s negotiation results when it is ready to deal. Where profitable, Beijing has shown willingness to shelve its historical rhetoric in favor of joint resource development, while maintaining the legal and strategic positions necessary for pursuing its national interests.
However, the most disheartening prospect for East Asian security is that Beijing may never make it to the negotiating table. Internally, China faces intense pressure from its populace to take a hard line on historical issues, as shown by the mass demonstrations. Furthermore, China’s ruling party is anything but wholly unified; the hawks inside the Communist Party of China are able to pander to the population’s nationalist sentiments to gain prominence within the Party and undermine their more moderate adversaries. Given this political situation, leaders in Beijing will never be able to negotiate their maritime disputes without fear of political outmaneuvering or popular opposition. Even if Beijing could secure a geostrategic or economic win in a negotiation, any settlement short of absolute victory would fuel a hardliner narrative of capitulation, weakness, and betrayal.
Crafting a response to China’s mounting maritime assertiveness is a necessary, but dangerous, tightrope act for U.S. policymakers. When facing rising belligerent behavior, there are two main approaches: deter the behavior or appease it. But neither approach has a clear prospect (or track record) of success.
If the United States were to implement a hard line with China over the dispute, an even stronger nationalist response may be incurred. Perceptions of American meddling and memories of Japanese militarism could galvanize nationalist sentiment, harden the population’s views of the outside world, and grow the ranks of hawks in government. A confrontational approach would play into the hands of the hardliners in Beijing, validating their bombastic views of the United States and Japan, which stand in opposition to moderates’ more accommodating views. Nationalist-centric political dialogue in China would only exacerbate competition, and a catastrophic tit-for-tat paradigm leading towards war could emerge.
However, if a weak (or absent) response to China’s behavior were adopted to appease the nation’s perceptions of victimization, hawks may still gain. If Washington or Tokyo were to completely capitulate on the dispute, Beijing would learn a dangerous lesson: belligerence gets results. This would validate the hardliners’ approach and facilitate their rise to prominence in the Party and other state organizations. Likewise, this lesson would legitimize to China’s population a shift away from China’s current defensive and non-hegemonic policies. While escalation is deferred through a weak approach, the underlying problems would continue to fester. Chinese nationalist sentiment and territorial claims would expand, Beijing would be unable or unwilling to negotiate fairly with its neighbors, and disputes in the seas could still escalate into conflict.
The United States must carefully weigh its response to China’s maritime assertiveness, taking into account the domestic realities that could distort Beijing’s decision-making. The American strategy must not inadvertently aggrandize or facilitate Chinese nationalism by being too hard or too soft. If Washington does not emphatically, yet tactfully, engage China on its behavior, East Asia will be invariably pushed towards conflict.
John Henzel, Commentary Editor for WSOU 89.5’s Global Current radio program, a weekly news and international affairs broadcast to the New York City and New Jersey area
